

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE SUMMIT
DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the Graduate School
At the University of Missouri

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

By
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JULY 2012

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THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE
SUMMIT DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT

Presented by Agnes Simon

A candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

And hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I have always loved reading the acknowledgment section of scholarly books. More often than not I have found them very entertaining in how the authors express their gratitude for assistance and advice they received and obstacles they faced during the process of writing and research. But I have always dreaded the time when I have to write one – just recently I was wondering if I could just skip this part and add another substantive chapter to the dissertation. It is not because there are no people worthy to be included in this section. As a matter of fact, there are plenty of them!

First and foremost I would like to thank my dissertation advisor, Cooper Drury. He seemed to put up with my crazy Hungarian ways (and I secretly hope he was at least amused by it). I greatly appreciate the encouragement, understanding, support, and endless feedback he has given me not only during my the dissertation writing process but throughout my stay at Missouri.

I would also like to thank those who, for shorter or longer period of time, have served on my doctoral committee and provided me with invaluable insight in order to make this project better: Marvin Overby, Robert Collins, Kate Floros, and Stephen Quackenbush. In addition, I would like to thank James Endersby for being available whenever I needed advice or a friendly chat to clear my mind. The Department of Political Science of the Univeristy of Missouri has been an excellent academic environment, for which I am indebted.

A huge, gigantic, and enermous thank you goes out to my sister, Eszter Simon, the first Dr. Simon in our family! She was always ready to bounce ideas back and forth

when I got stuck or indecisive. I am afraid she also heard more about summits than it was healthy but this did not keep her from reading the full draft of this dissertatoin and help me weed out many grammatical nonsenses.

Last but not least I would like to thank my parents and friends. I am sure my family and old friends have been convinced that I did not only move a continent away to pursue my degree but also got married...to my studies. I am glad to have made new friends over here with most of whom I did this journey together.

The list of people who helped me stay insane one way or another in the past seven years is, of course, much longer than this. It is only my vulcan nature, feeble memory, and the looming submission deadline that keep me from mentioning all of them by name. I hope one day I can make up for this by reminiscing with them about good times over a drink.

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THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE SUMMIT
DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT

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ABSTRACT

American presidents have attended more than 2,000 summit meetings since the end of the Second World War. Yet, what we know about these meetings is limited to historical case studies. In this dissertation, I move beyond these descriptive accounts and give a systematic analysis of the consequences of presidential summit meetings with foreign heads of state and government. I focus on three areas of importance. First, I look at the domestic impact of summits arguing summit meetings can give a small, positive, but evanescent boost to presidential approval ratings. Second, I turn to the international political impact of summits and find that summit meetings have a small positive impact on the bilateral interstate relations of the U.S. This supports the possibility that these events help socialize heads of state and government into the international order. Third, I investigate the economic impact of bilateral summit meetings with developing states. Results uncover a positive relationship between summits and bilateral trade relations with and U.S. foreign aid to, but not foreign direct investment to these countries. This dissertation does not only uncover a general, *albeit* modest positive impact of summit diplomacy, but it also shows how the general impact of summits were stronger during the Cold War than it is today. Finally, my findings also demonstrate the worthiness of and need for studying summit diplomacy further.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Background

The American president attends summit meetings often and with increasing frequency since the end of the Second World War. While some individual summits – most notably meetings between the heads of state/government of the Cold War superpowers – have received significant attention, there exists no systematic analysis of U.S. presidential summit meetings. What we know of summit meetings are based on anecdotal evidence or a few case studies. Summits are not only foreign policy tools similar to primetime foreign policy speeches, economic sanctions, foreign aid, or the (threat of) use of force, but the president also uses this more often than the other available tools: he attends significantly more summit meetings than the number of times he initiates economic sanctions or uses or threatens to use force. Hence, understanding the role of summit meetings in U.S. foreign policy management, and, thus, in international politics is imperative in order to expand our knowledge of American foreign policy and diplomacy.

This dissertation fills some of the above gap in the literature by providing a large-N quantitative analysis of presidential summit meetings since the end of WWII. Specifically, I analyze the potential impact of U.S. presidential summit meetings. It is important for scholars and policy-makers alike to understand whether or not these summit meetings have any effect, and if so, what the nature of this impact is. If there is no impact at all, then presidents might waste a large amount of their precious time on simple courtesy calls. If summits do have an influence, understanding what this impact is and

under what conditions it is present can facilitate the decision-making process including the more effective use of this means of foreign policy-making. Therefore, in studying the consequences of summit meetings I devote attention to three different areas: the domestic approval ratings of the president, the political relations of the United States with other states, and finally, to foreign economic relations with developing nations. The rest of this chapter provides an introduction to the literature and, thus, a more detailed rationale for this study.

Summit Meetings

Although the term was not created until the middle of the twentieth century, summit diplomacy is an ancient diplomatic method that was somewhat pushed to the background with the professionalization of diplomacy. With rapid technological developments that made communication easier and travelling faster, summit diplomacy reemerged as a frequently used foreign policy tool after the Second World War (Reynolds 2007; Plischke 1986a). Summitry takes up a large amount of time in the schedules of heads of state and government around the world. The president of the United States is no exception: indeed, highest level interactions with the president of the United States are probably the most coveted of all summits on the international scene.

Summit diplomacy, according to Elmer Plischke (1986a), includes a wide range of communications between heads of state and government ranging from letters, phone calls, and special diplomatic envoys, to face to face meetings conducted either publicly or privately, bilaterally or multilaterally. The majority of the literature, however, not only limits the definition to summit diplomatic meetings, but also introduces other restrictions.

Watt (1963), similarly to Hamilton and Langhorne (1995), argues that the concept of summitry should be understood in the fashion Winston Churchill used the term, when he ‘invented’ it in 1950, and thus, should only be applied to multilateral meetings between the leaders of great powers (Galtung 1964 makes a similar argument regarding great powers and Schaezel and Malmgren 1988 concerning multilateralism). Giauque (2001), on the other hand, limits summitry to bilateral meetings and Galtung (1964) to *ad hoc* encounters between heads of state and government.

However, the rank of the participants of summit diplomacy is contested as well. Plischke originally included only heads of state and government arguing that meetings of foreign ministers are “more properly regarded as the ‘sub-summit’” level, but later added foreign ministers as summit participants (Plischke 1967, 43; cf. Plischke 1986a). Similarly, he argued initially that meetings attended by the legal heirs to the leadership of a state – president-elects, prime minister-elects, crown princes – may not be considered as summits, but changed his position subsequently (Plischke 1958; cf. Plischke 1979). Weilemann (2000) and Melissen (2003) include leaders of international organizations as participants of summit diplomacy. On the other end of the continuum, Watt (1963) argues that only encounters between heads of government – but not of state – of opposed countries can be seen as summit meetings.

In general, I accept Plischke’s (1986a) latest definition of summit diplomacy with some restriction. Summit diplomacy should include the personal engagement of the heads of state and government, and thus, special diplomatic envoys and foreign ministers are excluded. Summit diplomacy may take various forms: meetings, letters, telegrams, phone conversations, and lately even emails. Hence, summit meetings are only one form of

summit diplomacy, and this is the kind of summitry that my dissertation exclusively focuses on.

The narrow definition that some scholars have employed was one reason that summit meetings became dominant within the literature of summit diplomacy. The visibility of summit meetings as opposed to other, often entirely secret, summit level interactions makes them a natural candidate for this disproportionate attention. Moreover, the press and the public seem to attribute some mysticism to these events probably because of the contrast between the great expectations that the sight of two chief executives' handshake and smile into the camera create and the rather limited information about what really happens at their meeting as it is conducted beyond closed doors. Summit meetings between the heads of the Soviet Union and the United States were high profile events during the Cold War that attracted great attention from both the contemporary press and scholars. Indeed, studies (see e.g. Andersen and Farrell 1996; Nixon 1985) on summit diplomacy as a foreign policy event prioritize superpower summitry. Yet, the rarity of superpower summits limited academic accounts to descriptive, historical analyses trying to assess the importance and impact of individual events separately.

Although Small (1979) called for the application of quantitative techniques to the study of diplomacy three decades ago, such studies remain sporadic when it comes to summit diplomacy. This has not changed with the expansion of interest in other types of summits or other aspects of summitry: with the exception of studies that investigate the connection between the nature of summit meetings and the characteristics of the international system (Galtung 1964; Thompson and Modelski 1977) and the effectiveness

of G8 summit meetings (Kokotsis and Daniels 1999; Kirton 2004), the literature on summit diplomacy remains overwhelmingly descriptive and/or offers only a normative assessment (e.g. Plischke 1986a; Dunn 1996; Nixon 1985; Rusk 1960; Watt 1963; Ball 1976; Eubank 1966; Bayne 2000). However, it is only once we move beyond describing summits and look at their domestic and international consequences that we will be able to understand the role they play. This is why this dissertation relies on large-N quantitative analyses of U.S. presidential summits.

Another tradition in the literature is that, apart from describing individual summits, scholars quite often pay attention only to certain types of summit meetings: Cold War superpower summits (e.g. Andersen and Farrell 1996); summits of such informal and formal institutions as the group of the world's economically most developed countries (currently G-8) (e.g. Reynolds 2007) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Park 1996); summits convening around certain themes like disarmament (Adelman 1989) or such specific type of events like funeral summits are also analyzed together (Berridge 1996). What the literature lacks is a comprehensive look at all kinds of summit meetings. Therefore, I focus on all summit meetings that American presidents attended since Second World War and only limit my analysis to bilateral summits in chapter five due to theoretical reasons.

It must be also noted that summit diplomacy has been almost exclusively addressed in the American context. Indeed, even the most comprehensive and analytical study of the subject focuses on the activity of the American president (Plischke 1986a). The reason behind this is the availability of information: not only numerous personal accounts, but also the publically accessible holdings of several American archives favor

such an approach. My dissertation follows this tradition. Throughout the post-WWII period covered in this dissertation the United States has been a dominant player in the international arena. While this warns against overgeneralization of all kinds of summit meetings, exploring the consequences of the summit diplomatic activity of the American president facilitates our understanding of this foreign policy tool in a context where it has mattered most.

The Summit Diplomatic Activity of the U.S. President

Chapter 2 describes the dataset that I have built using information from the *Office of the Historian* Website of the Department of States regarding presidential trips to foreign countries and visits of foreign heads of state and government to the United States between 1945 and 2007. Beyond describing my sources and coding rules that I followed when putting this dataset together, I also identify patterns present in U.S. presidential summit attendance. This analysis is superior to both Plischke's (1986b) and Leguey-Feilleux's (2009) similar efforts of identifying regularities in summits given that Plischke's dataset ends in 1984 and he conducts separate analyses for presidential summit meetings at home and abroad while Leguey-Feilleux relies on the same information as I do, but only gives a rudimentary look at presidential summits prioritizing individual presidents to a comprehensive overview.

However, my dissertation goes beyond simply identifying patterns: my dataset with the help of large-N quantitative analyses allows me to overcome the most striking short-coming of the literature, that is, the lack of a more general understanding about the role of summit meetings in the American context. This is essential not just because of the

importance that heads of state/government, including American presidents, attribute to these events and the amount of time that they take up in presidential schedules in general: while much has been written about conflicts and diplomacy in crises, we know a lot less about the systematic role of regular diplomatic phenomena in peacetime. However, in order to understand interstate relations the effect of these events is just as important to uncover especially since crises are high profile, but relatively rare events. The vast majority of interstate relations are conducted in peacetime. As summit diplomacy has largely remained outside the scope of foreign policy analysis, many questions remain to be answered about its role as an instrument of statecraft. This is true to summit diplomacy in general and to the role of summit meetings in particular. This dissertation focuses on the impact that these meetings have on both American domestic and foreign policies. I argue that these are important events with small but significant impact.

Summit Meetings and Domestic Politics

Chapter 3 looks at the impact of summit meetings on the president's domestic approval. Chief executives may seek a summit meeting in order to improve their domestic political position as nothing as impressive for their domestic audience as seeing their heads of state being associated with the American president. Plischke asserts (1986a, 158) that this motivation is universal to leaders in general and thus the president of the United States is no exception: summit meetings create opportunities for a leader to search for "personal acceptance, power, and prestige, and for the enhancement of his [...] influence at home." Similarly, Watt (1963, 495) argues that "the attractions of 'summits' to democratic leaders beset by the need to obtain electoral support are obvious."

There are also several anecdotal references as to how summit diplomacy helped presidents boost their popularity at home:

The Washington summit completed Reagan's rehabilitation from the ignominy of the Iran-Contra scandal. At the year's end his job approval rating had soared from its low of 36 percent to a solid 58 percent (Tygiel 2006, 229).

The first of these [upwellings of support] followed the Camp David Summit meeting, which brought together President Carter, President Sadat of Egypt, and Premier Begin of Israel. [...] The Camp David accords were [...] positive for Carter. The summit became the center of attention (Brody 1991, 13 and 147-148).

Indeed, the use of superpower summitry as part of the 'rally around the flag' variable in Mueller's (1970), Kernell's (1978), and Brody's (1991) study also suggests that there might be some interesting facts to uncover in relations to summit diplomatic episodes and presidential popularity. More significantly, some include certain presidential trips abroad as one of their independent variables when explaining presidential popularity and find either a modest negative relationship (Marra, Ostrom, and Simon 1990; Brace and Hinckley 1993a) or no significant impact at all (Simon and Ostrom 1989; Brace and Hinckley 1993b). Even though foreign trips do not equal summit meetings – a trip often involves visits to multiple states and thus multiple summits – they represent the seeds of integrating these meetings into the list of factors that are understood to improve presidential approval ratings. It is just that summitry was not really treated as an event on its own right. The only exception is Plischke's (1985) attempt at understanding the relationship between high profile – mostly superpower – summits and the president's activity as the diplomat in chief. His findings however are

inconclusive and he acknowledges that there are too many other factors that may influence presidential popularity and thus “further analysis is necessary” (Plischke 1985, 560). I respond to this challenge by conducting multivariate statistical analysis that allows me to control for other potential factors that may influence presidential popularity. By filling this gap in the literature chapter 3 contributes to the understanding of the impact of foreign policy events on domestic politics as well as to the literature that examines the ‘rally round the flag’ effect that hitherto studied the influence of such events as the use or threat of use of force abroad, ongoing war engagements, international or foreign policy crises, international agreements, speeches on foreign policy issues, travels to foreign countries, and superpower summits (Mueller 1970; Brody 1984; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Simon and Ostrom 1989; Marra, Ostrom, and Simon 1990; Russett 1990a; Brody 1991; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Wang 1996).

Summit Meetings and International Relations

The International Political Impact of Summit Meetings

Chapter 4 examines how through summit meetings chiefs of state may influence the relations between their states. This chapter is based on the idea that if summit meetings are events of international politics, then heads of state and government should use it as a tool of statecraft to influence international relations between their states (see Plischke 1986a, 122). This chapter builds on the extant scholarship on the most debated aspect of summit diplomacy, namely, their utility in managing international relations. Practitioners, both diplomats and politicians, have long debated the pros and cons of leaders turning to summit diplomacy and they rarely agree.

The first of the two diametrically opposed opinions about the impact that summit meetings may exert on the relationships of states is the position Watt (1963) calls the liberalist-idealist view. This approach sees summits as diplomatic tools that bring positive changes into the interaction of states and is associated with politicians who generally find meetings with their counterparts crucial to managing the relations between their states. It builds on the notion that they are responsible for the final decisions, hence, they are freer to make or obtain concessions than lower level foreign policy bureaucrats, and they may also link issues together in a way that is impossible at more specialized levels of negotiations (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995). In addition, they also share the “loneliness at the top,” which makes them more sensitive to the responsibility they bear and more willing to make deals with people in a similar position (Melissen 2003; Schaetzel and Malmgren 1988). The positive consequence of summits may arise from simply establishing a dialogue or getting to know the mindset of their foreign counterpart, or by serving as a deadline to finalize ongoing negotiations (Plischke 1958; 1967; 1986a).

As opposed to this rather positive view, the professional-realist school approaches the consequences of summits rather pessimistically and contends that the personal meetings of state leaders exacerbate the relations between their respective states (Watt 1963). The most persistent supporters of this view are professional diplomats who are not only left with the task of mending the damages that summits can cause, but also dismayed by the interference of “amateurs” in the art of diplomacy (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995; Ball 1976; Eubank 1966; Plischke 1986a). Summits are harmful to interstate relations as heads of state/government are inexperienced in diplomatic practices and in international negotiations, they are ill-prepared and too willing to conclude any kind of agreement, or

they might just come to detest each other (Eubank 1966; Rogers 1955; Dunn 1996; Plischke 1967; 1986a; Weilemann 2000; Giaouque 2001).

One reason why the above debate could not be settled is that all opinions are based on either anecdotal evidence or single case studies. Therefore, my comprehensive analysis of post-WWII American summitry does not only contribute to a more general understanding of the role of summit diplomacy in interstate relations but it also has policy relevance in as much as it settles the debate within and between the diplomatic and political elites as well as between the liberalist-idealist and professional-realist views regarding the utility of summit meetings. Nonetheless, I will also look at some conditions under which summit diplomacy is expected to improve general diplomatic climate between states.

The Economic Impact of Summit Meetings

State leaders, however, often arrive at summit meetings with more explicit goals than just to improve interstate relations in general. In fact, there is almost no summit meeting that concludes without discussing economic issues and quite often leaders try to exploit the fact that the United States is a leading economic power. They are all likely to seek “economic assistance in the form of improved trade relations, emergency food supplies, financial grants, technical assistance, loans or private capital,” but bringing up these issues are “virtually universal for the leaders of Third World countries” (Plischke 1986a, 158). Accordingly, in chapter 5, I investigate if summit meetings can impact bilateral economic relations between the United States and developing countries.

By raising the levels of bilateral trade, U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI), and foreign aid to their countries heads of developing states can improve economic conditions within their states as well as the likelihood of their own political survival if they can claim credit for it (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007). They are also best positioned in their political and diplomatic structures to obtain these advantages (Barston 2006, 19). Both trade and foreign direct investment have been shown to ‘follow the flag.’ Regarding trade it most often refers to a negative process: when conflict erupts between two states, bilateral trade declines (Pollins 1989a; 1989b; Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny 2004). However, according to Pollins (1989a) not only conflict, but in general, political relations of two states influence the volume of bilateral trade between them. With regards to FDI, a positive process is identified since the presence of U.S. troops is argued to raise the flow of foreign investment to the target country (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007; Little and Leblang 2004). Jones and Kane (2005) point to a similar positive effect regarding trade. I argue that foreign aid should be no exception: given that of the three economic processes this is the one that the president is most able to influence, it is logical to assume that his and his counterparts’ diplomatic efforts will be rewarded in this area as well.

More importantly, Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) argue that they use the presence of troop in their analysis in lack of a measure of diplomatic climate between the two states. Summit meeting offers the opportunity to measure the impact of diplomacy by using an actual diplomatic measure. Therefore, in this chapter I examine how summit meeting may or may not able to impact bilateral trade relations, American foreign direct investment, and foreign aid to developing countries. I argue that not only actual talks but the simple fact of the meeting can be influential.

Uncovering differences in how these three economic factors are influenced by summit meetings is instrumental for state leaders to understand that they need to treat them differently when negotiating at the summit. This should not be surprising as there are several differences between these economic indicators. In case of U.S. foreign aid, the president has the most direct influence: he only needs to convince Congress in order to obtain the resources for his foreign aid allocation preferences. In case of trade and FDI, the president may exert influence over measures that can facilitate private business actors' willingness to take action or the symbolic value of summits might manifest themselves in a positive way among businessmen. Either way the president's impact can only be indirect. Finally, foreign direct investment differs from trade in that it is illiquid: once it is committed, it cannot be easily withdrawn which is likely to make investors behave more cautiously than traders (Jensen 2003; Ahlquist 2006).

Beyond expanding our general knowledge on summit diplomacy, looking at the economic impact of summits also contributes to the understanding of those factors that determine the level of trade between countries, foreign direct investment, and foreign aid. Adding diplomacy as a possible determinant of these phenomena refocuses the attention of the literature: regarding trade it moves beyond the trade-conflict interaction; it adds another political factor to the study of FDI, which is still mostly dominated by economic approaches; and finally it introduces a peacetime aspect other than the all too often emphasized human rights behavior of the target state to the potential determinants of U.S. foreign aid decisions.

Summit Meetings and their Consequences

I conclude with a general overview about the consequences of summit meetings as well as I elaborate on how the findings of the earlier chapters connect with each other. I argue that the small but consistent impact of summit meetings during the Cold War and their decreasing influence after it call not only for further analysis of the subject but also for the reconsideration of the role and use of summit meetings. This also allows me to discuss implications of these meetings for decision-makers: my primary concern is, of course, with the American president's summit diplomatic activity, but meeting states may also gain an insight based on the findings of this project. Finally, I conclude with further avenues for research.

CHAPTER 2: AMERICAN PRESIDENTS AT THE SUMMIT

Introduction

The schedule of the American president contains a relatively large number of summit meetings and yet we know very little of this foreign policy activity of the chief diplomat of the United States. Therefore, the quantitative analyses that are the foundation of this dissertation have required the compiling of a new dataset. It is this dataset and through it the summit diplomatic practices of the American president that I describe in this chapter.

Defining Summit Meetings

I have shown in the introductory chapter that the definition of summit diplomacy is highly contested and very strongly interlocked with that of summit meetings. From the modified Plischkean definition of summitry that I have adopted in this work, it is also obvious that meetings between leaders are only one type of summitry next to, for example, written communications and phone conversations. On the other hand, it is impractical to introduce restrictions on the type of meetings that qualify as summits since I am interested in the effect of meetings between the U.S. president and another foreign leader *per se*. Hence, I adopt Dunn's (1996) concept and define summit meetings as any encounters between incumbent heads of state and/or government as long as the purpose of the meeting is to discuss international politics. For simplicity, the state whose head the American president meets I shall call 'the meeting state.'

In this definition of summit meetings the expression “any encounters” suggests that summit meetings may take various shapes and forms. And indeed, the official State Department designation of summits uses many categories, but there is little agreement on what the exact differences are between them. There only seems to be one point on which scholars agree, namely, that state visits are the most formal one and unofficial visits the least ceremonious ones (Leguey-Feilleux 2009, 295-210; Sorensen 1965, 577; Plischke 1986b). However, Sorensen (1965) argues that state visits are three-day events with all the pomp while working visits last for one day with only a White House lunch. He also points out that during the early 1960s two-day visits were classified under both names. Plischke (1986b, 2-3) claims that state visits are only granted to heads of state but not to heads of government although not all visits by heads of state are state visits. He also points out that official visits are initiated by the host government while unofficial ones can be initiated by both the host and visitor. However, once it is the U.S. president who travels the meaning of these categories change because not all of his trips are considered state visits as the above rule would imply although in content and format there is little difference in between these various types of visits (Plischke 1986a, 180-282). Ceremonial visits are initiated to conduct some commemorative or dedicatory activity but not devoid of serious negotiations.

Summit meetings may also be informal or formal which refer to the ways discussions and negotiations are conducted (Plischke 1999, 406). Formal meetings are the ones that most people associate with these meetings: events that strictly follow the protocol whereby the two state leaders in their elegant business suits confer with each other in an official venue such as the White House. Informal meetings are not restricted

by formality of protocol and are characteristic of leaders that have a close relationship. For example, President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan preferred these informal occasions during which they talked politics while wearing causal clothing and drinking beers in a private surrounding (Schlesinger 1965, 315-316).

Unfortunately, these classifications largely depend on customs in the relations of two countries and are significant only for diplomatic protocol. As such, they fail to serve as useful analytical categories. Even though my data source gives some information on these typologies, I decided against including these in my database due to lack clear definitons, overlapping categories, and inconsistent reporting of this information.¹

Summits may also occur at home or abroad: the American president may receive a foreign head of state/government in Washington D.C. or he may travel abroad himself. He may also attend summits in the form of international conferences. While most often presidents do, summit meetings do not need to take place in the state of any of the participating heads. In other words, the host country may not be the United States or the home country of the leader with whom the American president meets. The few occasions when heads meet in a third country may occur due to practical considerations – if two heads of state/government travelled to a foreign state for an international conference or attend a bilateral summit with the host nation, it does save time, money, and energy if the two of them also agree to meet. In some cases the third country location can be explained by political reasons: most summits between Cold War superpowers took place in various European states – for example, in Switzerland in 1985, Austria in 1961, Iceland in 1986, or Malta in 1989. This was instrumental in avoiding that the visiting head's act be

¹ Department of State categorization of visits includes such labels as state, official, unofficial, informal, official working, ceremonial, informal, private, and conference summit meetings.

interpreted as a walk of Canossa or the necessity of scheduling two summits at once in order to respect the principle of reciprocity to which equal powers maybe very sensitive (Keohane 1986).

Finally, summits may also be classified according to the number of participants or whether they were conducted within or outside of an international organization. I will elaborate on the details of these categories when discussing coding rules.

Coding U.S. Presidential Summits

The *Office of the Historian* section of the U.S. Department of State's website contains sufficiently detailed information on the president's summit diplomatic activity and it is this source that I relied on when building my database, as this gives the most comprehensive information on presidential summits. Plischke (1986b) has a collection of presidential trips and visits that slightly differs from the *Office of the Historian* data, however, Plischke's data ends in 1984 which would have put severe limitations on the analysis even if in certain cases Plischke's data collection proved more detailed and precise. As the Department of State's homepage does include the overwhelming majority of summit events, it remains the most comprehensive collection over time. Hence, it allows me to focus on a 62-year period between 1945 and 2007 starting with Harry Truman's presidency and ending after the seventh year into the presidency of President G. W. Bush.²

² Consulting alternative sources during the coding process revealed that while the *Office of the Historian* site is the only data source available on summit diplomatic events across the entire period of interest, this is not complete. It became especially clear regarding the Johnson's years since the LBJ Presidential Library contains its own compilation of the president's foreign trips and the visits of foreign leaders to the United States ("Presidential visits with Abroad" 2006). For example, the May 28, 1964 meeting between President

The information on the State Department's homepage is recorded in two parts: one contains the visits of foreign leaders to the United States and the other the U.S. president's foreign trips ("Visits to the U.S..." 2006; "Presidential Visits Abroad" 2006). According to the notes available at the homepage the latter includes all "visits to foreign countries made by U.S. Presidents during their tenure as President or President-elect" including the place and time of visits and where available the type of visit ("Presidential Visits Abroad" 2006). These visits highly overlap with, but do not directly translate into summit events. Therefore, certain modifications are necessary. First, visits by U.S. president-elects do not qualify as summit events, and therefore, these meetings are deleted from the database. Second, if the American president met with a president-elect or crown-prince during his visit, but not the incumbent president or king, it is also dropped from the database from similar reasons. Third, a visit sometimes grouped two or more summit events together. These events were coded as separate ones. For instance, on May 9, 1977 President Carter arrived at Geneva for an official visit that included a meeting with Swiss President Furgler and another with the Syrian president the same day. Consequently, this visit was coded as two separate meetings.

In coding the information on the visits of foreign heads of state or government to the United States similar rules were followed. Since this database contains information regarding occasions where the vice-president or the foreign secretary stood in for the president to receive a foreign leader due to the president being indisposed or absent from the country, these events are deleted ("Visits to the U.S..." 2006). For example, Dutch Prime Minister van Angst was received by Vice-President Bush on April 1, 1981 when

Johnson and Australian Prime Minister Menzies is not recorded on the State Department's list. Unfortunately, no similar collections are available for other presidents.

President Reagan was hospitalized due to the attempt made on his life 2 days earlier. Moreover, visits by the governor generals of the states of the British Commonwealth to the U.S. were also excluded from the database since these politicians are only the representatives of their head of state, the Queen of England.

Note, however, that where a multilateral meeting of heads of state and government took place within the framework of an organization, the additional bilateral talks between the U.S. president and other leaders of the member states of that organization were not separately coded. Adding these events to the data would have introduced inconsistencies to the database, because most of these meetings are not only difficult to separate from the multilateral meeting, itself as the state whose leaders the president had bilateral meetings with during an institutional summit is often not always noted. A good example is the May 28-31, 1975 NATO summit in Brussels. The State Department site only notes that President Ford – apart from attending the summit and addressing the North Atlantic Council – “met separately with NATO Heads of State and Government” (“Presidential Visits Abroad” 2006). No information was provided regarding which leaders the president met in bilateral circumstances.

Summits where the president met with the leaders – the president of the European Council and/or the president of the European Commission – of the European Union were kept in the database. These events became regular events in every six months and are often accompanied by high media attention. Moreover, one of the participants on behalf of the EU is a head of state/government due to the rotating presidency within the Council. Therefore, even if the talks were firmly limited to U.S.-EU matters, personal chemistry and the emerging working relationship, or the lack thereof, between the heads still could

harm or improve bilateral relations between the two states. However, if only the president of the European Commission participated in these events, then the summit was dropped.

Despite the fact that Palestine is not yet being recognized as a state I also kept meetings between the president and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat for two reasons. First, since November 22, 1974 the PLO has observer status in the United Nations General Assembly and on January 12, 1976 the UN Security Council granted the right to the PLO to participate in its debates without voting rights, which is usually the privilege of the member states of the United Nations. Furthermore, the 1993 Oslo Accords established interim self-governance for the Palestine people under the entity of the Palestine National Authority until the Israeli-Palestine negotiations lead to the establishment of a Palestine state (“Declaration of Principles...” 1993). In addition, it is internally organized like a state having its own legislature, prime minister, and president. Second, although not yet a state, it has largely been treated as such by the international community. The fact that the president of the United States received President Arafat on more than one occasions in the White House and President Clinton visited the Palestine Authority on December 14-15, 1998 grants *de facto* recognition to Palestine. Third, some of these meetings took place in the presence of other heads of state/government thus deleting Palestine would have changed the nature of the summit and deleting the whole event could have led to a selection bias. In other words, the principle of consistency requires that all the meetings in which Palestine participated remain in the database.

In those cases where the above problems or a confusion over the exact date of the summit emerged alternative sources were consulted. Specifically, the online version of

The Presidential Papers of Eisenhower (2006) includes the daily schedule of the president just as the relevant pages of the Truman (“The President’s Day” 2006), Kennedy (“White House Diary” 2006), and Carter Presidential Libraries (“The Jimmy Carter Presidential...” 2006), which proved invaluable in dealing with these issues. In addition, the Johnson Library has its own collection of presidential summits (“Presidential visits with Abroad” 2006). The old White House site of the Clinton administration archived by his presidential library (“White House Web Sites” 2006) and the White House site under President G. W. Bush (*The White House* 2007) also provided useful information.

The resulting summit variable is a dummy which is coded “1” when the president attended a summit and “0” otherwise.

I also coded several other dummy variables with regards to information on the characteristics of summit meetings. First, the most obvious difference between summits is displayed by the way information is listed on the *Office of the Historian* website, namely, the distinction between summits that take place in a foreign country (trip=1) and summits when the American president receives foreign dignitaries in the United States (visit=0).

Second, I looked at the number of participants. Bilateral meetings are those where the heads of state or government of two states met whereas multilateral summit meetings involve three or more heads. The former is coded “0” and the latter as “1”.

Third, while there is a high level of overlap between institutionalized (or organizational) and multilateral summits (correlation=0.66), they are not identical. Whereas there are always more than two heads involved in summits within the

framework of an international organization, a group of state leaders may meet *ad hoc*. For example, the president has met several times with both the British and Canadian prime ministers when these meetings were not conducted within the framework of an international organization. Therefore, the criterion for institutional summits (=1) is that they are held within the framework of an international organization. Regular meetings without an institutional background are considered *ad hoc* (=0).

Describing U.S. Presidential Summit Attendance, 1945-2007


All summits

Between 1945 and 2007 presidents attended 2,340 summits all together. On average, thus a president attends three summits a month which does not seem much. However, depending on the actual program, a modern summit could take from a few hours to four days. Nor are summits distributed evenly during the year. The above number, however, is more impressive after looking at how the number of summit meetings has changed over time. The number of summit meetings has continuously risen over the years and while President Truman attended 1 summit in two months, by the beginning of the new millennia President G.W. Bush participated in 13 summits during a two-month period (Table 2.1). It is interesting to note, however, that while the number of summits grew rather slowly during the first administrations, this growth became steeper in the mid-1970s, slowed down during the Reagan administration, and sped up subsequently again. Interestingly, the frequency of summits grew with slower pace during the most confrontational periods of the Cold War and they increased rapidly both during détente and in the post-Cold War era (Figure 2.1).

Table 2.1. Presidents at the summit, 1945-2007

President	Summits Attended	Months in Office	Monthly Mean of Summits
Truman	55	93	0.59
Eisenhower	135	96	1.41
Kennedy	89	34	2.62
Johnson	133	62	2.15
Nixon	143	67	2.13
Ford	82	29	2.83
Carter	147	48	3.06
Reagan	299	96	3.12
Bush Sr.	265	48	5.52
Clinton	450	96	4.69
Bush Jr.	542	83	6.53

Figure 2.1. Average monthly summit appearance by president, 1945-2007



The reasons behind the mushrooming of summit meetings are manifold. First, the growing number of independent states due to both decolonization and later the breakup of several multiethnic states such as the Soviet Union meant that there are more potential states whose head would like to meet the American president. But it is only partly the result of newly emerging states to seek recognition from the most powerful states. The

quest for recognition rarely ends with the recognition of a state as each incoming government feels the need to get acknowledged as well (Plischke 1986a, 158).

Second, during the bipolar system of the Cold War the Soviet Union and the United States shared the burden of managing the international system. Moreover, those countries that were clearly aligned with the Soviet Union rarely if at all could gain a summit meeting with the American president, partly because the Soviets would not have approved and partly because the U.S. president had very little interest in these meetings as the United States did not have much to profit from them. However, once the Cold War was over this changed as the United States remained the sole superpower in the international arena and the Soviet Union/Russia lost control over its former satellite countries. Consequently, meetings between the leaders of the U.S. and these former communist countries have become important for both sides: the United States hoped to encourage democratization in these countries while the former members of the Eastern block hoped for – monetary and moral – support for their political and economic transitions.

Third, as the foreign policy of the United States was redirected from an anti-Soviet position to first a world policeman role and then to an anti-terrorist stance, countries that earlier were considered insignificant to American foreign policy goals had to be cultivated. Among other things, it meant summit meetings with their heads.


Fourth, the triumph of capitalism over communism and the spread of the liberal economic order had a similar impact: states that earlier were considered less important have now become more central to United States as these countries offered markets for American investors and cheap labor for American multinational corporations (MNCs).

Fifth, the number of international organizations and the regular meeting of heads of state within the framework of these organizations have also increased. So did large multilateral gatherings focusing on a region or some issues.

Even though at this point in time there is no systematic data on the exact length of all summits, a trend still can be discerned by a careful look at the available information. While more and more heads of state and government have the opportunity to meet the American president, in many cases these meetings are rather short as the president tries to fit in as many visiting leaders or as many visited countries into a day as he can. Needless to say, it is the states that have smaller weight in international politics or the lesser priority in American foreign policy that are subject to these speedier summits (Leguey-Feilleux 2009 makes a similar argument about the importance of states and summits).

I have pointed out above that both summits with individual states and within international organizations had reasons to increase in numbers over the years. In general, the majority – about 90% – of these meetings are bilateral. Bilateral and multilateral summits are equally responsible for the total increase in the number of summits (Figure 2.2). Some differences in presidential preferences can be detected however. For example Kennedy, Nixon, or Reagan seemed to prefer bilateral meetings whereas President Clinton gave somewhat bigger priority to multilateral summits. Similarly, some change can be detected if we look at larger periods rather than at individual administrations: while only 7% of all summits were multilateral during the Cold War, this number rose to 12% after 1991.


Figure 2.2. Bilateral vs. multilateral summits by administration, 1945-2007



Given the high correlation between multilateral and institutional summits the dominance of *ad hoc* (95%) summits over organizational ones (5%) are natural. In fact, the story behind institutional summits is very similar to the one outlined above with regards to multilateral ones. The number of *ad hoc* summits almost fully corresponds to all summits until the mid-1970s. It is these that the two lines diverge somewhat showing that more and more institutional summits are attended by American presidents (Figure 2.3).

[Figure follows on next page]


Figure 2.3. Ad hoc vs. institutional summit meetings by administration, 1945-2007



It is more interesting to look at the kinds of organizations under the aegis of which these summits were convened (Figure 2.4). The most frequently attended summits are the semi-annual meetings of the G8 that started only in 1975 and the highest level meetings of the United Nations (n=34 each), followed by NATO summits (n=21), and meetings of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (n=13) which was established only in 1993. This list clearly shows the primary interest of American foreign policy in these regions and how more attention has been paid to the Asian and Pacific regions after the end of the Cold War. Although most organizations from the American region are missing from the top of this list, it is primarily because there are a greater variety of the regional organizational summits (e.g. OAS, CARICOM, Summit of the Americas) as well as regular multilateral but *ad hoc* meetings like summits of Central

American Republics, Latin American summits, Drug summits and so on. The argument about the increasing number of organizational summits also bears out: on average in a year the president went to 1.54 summits before the break up of the Soviet Union and to 2.75 afterwards.

Figure 2.4. Institutional summits by organization, 1945-2007



Finally, the president is much more likely to receive foreign leaders in the United States than to travel abroad, as about three fourth of all U.S. presidential summits are conducted on American soil. Partly, it is due to the international role of the United States: its preeminence in the international system means that other heads of state/government consider it a privilege to meet the American president and are more than willing to travel to Washington, D.C. if need be. Partly, this imbalance between summits at home and abroad is due to domestic considerations: the president does not want to spend too much time away from the country. It takes him away from domestic political life, as he is


unable to respond sufficiently to domestic events. It is not an accident that the president tries to avoid foreign trips at the midst of mid-term and presidential election campaigns, when the most important items of his legislative agenda is discussed by Congress, or at the times of domestic or international crises (Brace and Hinckley 1993a make a similar point). Most of these events, however, do not impair his ability to receive foreign heads in the White House.

The relatively few foreign summits the president goes to also means that it has a special significance if the president decides to visit a state. How many foreign trips a president makes may also depend on opportunity and individual taste. Unless there is a well-founded reason to visit a country, the president rarely travels to a foreign country: if the actual state of affairs between the two countries does not warrant a trip, it at least should be a high profile media event such as President Kennedy's visit to Ireland in 1963. On the other hand, some of the differences in presidential practice across administrations are due to personal preferences: it seems that President Truman preferred summit meetings at home as he conducted 89% of those meetings in the United States, while President Clinton especially liked travelling abroad given that 32% of his summits took place in a foreign country (Figure 2.5).

The general assumption that Republican presidents tend to be more isolationists while Democratic presidents usually have a more open approach to foreign policy does not seem to bear out in their attitude toward summits. Whereas Democratic presidents in general spend 26% percent of their summits abroad, Republican presidents travel to 24% of their summits. In addition, Republican presidents (n=1466) altogether attended almost twice as many summits as Democratic ones (n=874) which can only be explained

partially with the fact that they spent more time in office (429 vs. 333 months respectively).

Figure 2.5. Presidential summits at home and abroad, 1945-2007



Bilateral summits

Since later chapters – chapter 4 but especially chapter 5 – pay special attention to the impact that bilateral summits have on the United States’ relationship with other states, it is imperative to examine these summits more in detail. Earlier I have tapped into the idea of regional differences when I looked at the host organizations of institutional summit meetings. Creating five continental regions allows for a closer look at the geographical distribution of summits. Clearly, most of the summits take place with European countries (39%), followed by Asia (27%) and America (17%). Leaders from

Africa (13%) as well as from Australia and Oceania (4%) are the least likely to meet with the American president. These partly represent U.S. foreign policy priorities but one should also keep in mind that there are a lot more countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa than on the American continent and especially in Australia/Oceania. Even taking this into account summits with meeting states from Europe remains most popular with about 12 summits for every potential meeting state on the continent, followed by Asia (13) and the Americas (10). In this comparison, however, even leaders from Australia and Oceania (5.4) fare better than their counterparts from Africa (5.2).

Distance might also be an issue: it is more likely that a state has – positive or negative – issues to discuss with a neighboring country than with one that is thousands of miles away. The superpower status of the United States may somewhat modify this as it forces politicians of the U.S. to think globally rather than just regionally. All in all, when it comes to travelling abroad in 50% of the cases the meeting state is in Europe followed by Asia (23%) and America (19%). Presidents, however, rarely travel to Africa (5%) or Australia (1%) in order to meet their counterparts. Another indication that not only foreign policy preferences but that distance matters is that early post-Cold War presidents were the least likely to travel to Africa or Australia (Table 2.2). In fact only 6 post-war presidents ever went to Africa and 4 of them to Australia. The length of one's tenure could also influence where and how often he could travel. Finally, in this comparison President Truman's summit diplomatic activity resembles to pre- rather than post-WWII presidents since he rarely travelled abroad – out of his 4 bilateral summit meetings abroad, twice he went to a neighboring state, once to Brazil, and left the American continent only once when he travelled to the United Kingdom on one occasion.

Table 2.2. Number of presidential summits by continent and president, 1945-2007

President	Africa			America			Asia			Australia & Oceania			Europe		
	Home	Abroad	All	Home	Abroad	All	Home	Abroad	All	Home	Abroad	All	Home	Abroad	All
Truman	1	0	1	11	3	14	12	0	12	4	0	4	17	1	18
Eisenhower	8	2	10	14	9	23	32	8	40	5	0	5	34	10	44
Kennedy	20	0	20	11	4	15	14	0	14	6	0	6	19	12	31
Johnson	19	0	19	16	10	26	35	5	40	8	2	10	28	2	30
Nixon	19	0	19	9	3	12	37	12	49	6	0	6	25	24	49
Ford	10	1	11	5	1	6	17	5	23	4	0	4	24	11	35
Carter	27	4	31	11	4	15	24	8	32	8	0	8	32	14	46
Reagan	45	0	45	48	14	62	60	5	65	9	0	9	78	22	100
Bush Sr.	26	2	28	47	12	59	35	10	45	6	1	7	74	30	104
Clinton	28	9	37	34	14	48	84	24	108	4	2	6	122	53	175
Bush Jr.	59	5	64	60	12	72	117	27	144	10	1	11	156	47	203
<i>Total</i>	262	23	285	266	86	352	467	104	571	70	6	76	609	226	835

In each continent there are a few states that have received accentuated attention (Table 2.3). In Europe Britain and Germany lead the list of most conferred meeting states including both their heads of state and government. In fact, the ‘special relationship’ between the United Kingdom is so special that it is the state having the most highest level diplomatic contacts with the United States overall too.

Table 2.3. The most popular meeting states, 1945-2007

Meeting state	Number of summits
United Kingdom	64
(West) Germany	61
Canada	44
Israel	43
Italy	41
Japan	36
Australia	35
Mexico	33
France	29
Jordan	26
Soviet Union/Russia	20
Egypt	20
South Korea	20
Austria	19
Spain	17
New Zealand	17

In Asia, Israeli and Jordanian heads had the most opportunity to see the American president. In, Africa Egypt is the clear number one. This shows the importance of the Middle East to American foreign policy makers both with regards to allies as well as efforts at settling animosities in the region. Although presidential travel to the fifth continent is rare, Australian prime ministers had the chance to confer with the U.S. president 46 times over the span of a little more than 50 years. In the Americas the two

neighboring countries, Canada and Mexico are the two most popular meeting states by far.

The kinds of countries the American president meets are indeed very telling of American priorities. 62% of all presidential summits occurred with allied nations. Of the fifteen states whose head he met the most often only two never had any sort of alliance with the United States based on the ATOP database's alliance indicator: Egypt and Jordan (Leeds 2005). However the numerous visits by Egyptian and Jordanian leaders can be easily explained by American priorities in the Middle East peace process.

What is really interesting that while during the Cold War only 58% percent of the meeting states were allied with the United States this number is 67% in the post-Cold War period. There are several potential explanations for this: first, a rise in the number of allied countries after the end of the Cold War. Second, while existing allies were extremely important in the Cold War, so were gaining additional allies especially among uncommitted nations. In the post-Cold War and especially in the post-9/11 eras, convincing allies to actually join the War on Terror enjoyed priority compared to winning new allies.

Indeed, nations with whom the United States has conflict have no chance for a summit meeting while the conflict lasts. During the period of 1945-2001, American presidents attended only seven bilateral summits with the leader of a meeting state that had an ongoing militarized interstate dispute (MID) with the U.S. in the year in which the summit took place (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). The Soviet Union/Russia is responsible for 5 of those summits (in 1959, 1961, 1979, and twice in 1998), while China (1967) and Haiti (1994) are the other two exceptions.

The regime type of the meeting state is also important to look at as the scholarship on democratic peace argues that the United States usually feels more affinity toward these countries either because of cultural or institutional reasons regardless from whether or not they are allied (see Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993; Bueno de Mesquita et al 1999). I measure regime by relying on the polity2 score of the Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) and code meeting states democratic (=1) if their level of democracy is 7 or higher on the polity score and non-democratic (=0) otherwise. American policy makers are more conscious in promoting and, thus, rewarding democracy when it comes to top level meetings: 59% percent of all summits took place with democratic heads of state or government. The number of democratic summits grew from the Cold War (52%) to the post-Cold War era (68%) which may be attributed to the facts that the Truman doctrine was replaced with a more morally based approach and/or that the family of democratic nations has expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, there are some evidence for the argument that great powers are responsible for the management of the international system and they are ready to join forces for this purpose. While there were only 4 other great powers – the United Kingdom, France, China, and the Soviet Union – in the Cold War according to the *Correlates of War* project's (2008) major power indicator, they are responsible for 10% U.S. presidential summits. This record is even more impressive between 1992 and 2007, when nearly 16% percent of U.S. bilateral summits took place with the six other great powers of the period.³

³ At the end of 1991 Japan and Germany joined the ranks of great powers.

Finally, given that chapter 5 focuses exclusively on bilateral summits with developing states it is essential to have a brief look at patterns regarding these states. 65% percent of all U.S. bilateral summit meetings took place with leaders of developing states, that is, with states that were not members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) at the time of the meeting. As the overwhelming amount of states fall into this category it is not surprising. This ratio remained consistent during the entire post-WWII era. Nonetheless, the numerous summits with developing countries can give ample opportunities to both the U.S. and developing meetings states to pursue their foreign policy objectives at these summits.

Conclusion

In this chapter I introduced a new dataset created specifically for examining the consequences of U.S. presidential summit meetings. I also described presidential practices regarding the attendance of summit meetings. This revealed some interesting trends: the number of summits has grown steadily since the end of the Second World War; the overwhelming majority of summits are bilateral and *ad hoc* as opposed to multilateral and organizational. Only 25% of all summits take place in a foreign country.

I also highlighted interesting patterns regarding bilateral summits. Summit meetings most often take place with European countries and compared to the number of states on the continent African countries are the least popular meeting states. The majority of summit meetings take place with allied nations and the president almost never attends summits with the leader of a state with whom the United States has an ongoing conflict. Great power meeting states get disproportional attention from the United States

even though developing states are responsible for the majority of American presidential summits. The regularities uncovered here give a firm foundation to the more sophisticated analyses of the following chapters that looks at the impact of U.S. presidential summit meetings on presidential approval rating (chapter 3), bilateral interstate political relations (chapter 4) and economic relations (chapter 5). The concluding chapter will also shed light on further potential uses of the database presented herein and future avenues for research.

CHAPTER 3: SUMMIT DIPLOMATIC ENCOUNTERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY, 1951-2001

Introduction

Foreign policy is often considered as a potential vehicle for the president to boost his domestic popularity. This assertion has been tested regarding the president's use or threat of use of force abroad, ongoing war engagements, international or foreign policy crises, international agreements, speeches on foreign policy issues, travels to foreign countries, and superpower summits (Mueller 1970; Brody 1984; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Simon and Ostrom 1989; Marra, Ostrom and Simon 1990; Russett 1990a; Brody 1991; Morgan and Bickers 1992). The latter two are special cases of the larger category of summit meetings; that is, the president's meeting with other heads of state and government. The summit diplomatic activity of the president has been the target of scholarly criticism that argued that, instead of emphasizing serious diplomatic negotiations by focusing on the private component of these meetings, the president exceedingly looks to these events as opportunities to improve his domestic popularity by favoring the public relations component of the meetings (Watt 1963, 495). In light of this argument, it is surprising that so far no study has directly addressed the question whether summit meetings in general increase the president's domestic approval. It is this question that this chapter investigates.

I start with an overview of the literature focusing on the link between the foreign and domestic activities of the American president and identify a gap in the literature regarding the role of summit diplomacy as an opportunity for the president to exploit his

differential powers in foreign and domestic politics in order to boost his popularity. Based on the findings of the scholarship on presidential popularity, I argue that the domestic approval rating of the president will increase as a result of his meetings with other heads of state and government. However, these meetings are different from such other foreign policy events as war, use of force, or televised foreign policy address in that the boost that they expected to cause in presidential popularity is only very small and evanescent. My results show that my initial expectations regarding the nature, the length and size of the impact of summitry on presidential popularity are supported: while on average presidents can enjoy a 1.3% percent increase in their popularity after summits, this effect is present only for a month. Moreover, only Cold War presidents could enjoy this domestic benefit of summit meetings. I discuss the implications of these findings in the concluding section of this chapter.

Summit Meetings and Domestic Popularity

Aaron Wildavsky claimed in 1966 that “Presidents have much greater success in controlling the nation’s defense and foreign policies than in dominating its domestic policies” and, therefore, there are “one President, but [...] two presidencies” in the United States (Wildavsky 1966, 7). The president enjoys greater power in foreign policy than in domestic policy because he has a wider variety of means and because Congress is less able to control the president’s foreign policy agenda. In addition, the changed international context after the Second World War – the Cold War rivalry and the threat of nuclear demise – has also contributed to the president’s differential powers in domestic and foreign affairs (Wildavsky 1966, 8-9). While the international context has repeatedly

been found influential in whether the president enjoys exclusive powers in foreign and defense matters compared to domestic issues, the exact nature of the Cold War's influence is widely debated. By measuring the president's success and support in Congress, Cohen (1991) shows that, contrary to Wildavsky's proposition, pre-WWII presidents enjoyed greater leverage in foreign policy than their post-WWII successors. Zeidenstein (1991) argues that the 'two presidencies' phenomenon has always been present in the Senate during the Cold War, whereas Fleisher et al. (2000, 21) claim that those international circumstances that Wildavsky found crucial disappeared with the end of the Cold War and so did the 'two presidencies.'

While Wildavsky's assertion about the existence of 'two presidencies' led to a quarter century long debate, the overwhelming majority of studies examined it through studying Congressional-presidential relations (see LeLoup and Shull 1979; Sigelman 1979; Shull and LeLoup 1981; Sigelman 1981; Edwards 1986; Fleisher and Bond 1988; Fleisher et. al. 2000; Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis 2008).⁴ However, Wildavsky's original formulation – though not his measurement – went beyond Congressional-presidential relations. Nonetheless, the 'two presidencies' thesis has remained largely unchallenged in areas where the president is free to act without congressional approval (Lindsay and Steger 1993; Renka and Jones 1991). As the commander-in-chief and the diplomat-in-chief, the president does enjoy some distinctive powers without Congressional inference. Moreover, this scholarship has particularly neglected the president's role as the diplomat-in-chief. Congress may express disagreement with it or take negative action, but it cannot "play the president's diplomatic role" (Oldfield and

⁴ The only exception is Renka and Jones's (1991) article that looks at executive orders.

Wildavsky 1989, 59). Hence, an analysis that focuses on the president's activities as the chief diplomat is long overdue.

The literature that investigates the impact that the president as the commander-in-chief has on his domestic standing gives further clues on how the chief diplomat may exploit its differential powers in foreign and domestic politics. Indeed, these studies build on the assumption that the president is able to translate his power in the foreign policy area into a crucial factor in domestic politics: presidential popularity. Thus, the 'rally around the flag' notion holds that notable foreign policy events can trigger the public approval of the president in the short run (Mueller 1970; Kernell 1978; Russett 1990b, 35; Edwards 1990, 151; James and Oneal 1991; Lian and Oneal 1993; McAvoy 2006).

The 'rally around the flag' effect is generally accepted among scholars but as Jentleson (1992) as well as Lian and Oneal (1993, 294) conclude the "president cannot expect significant," more than 1-3%, "advantage by using force abroad." However, the relationship between domestic problems and the president's use of force abroad is widely disputed. Anecdotal evidence is not fully supported by quantitative analysis. Early studies as well as contemporary research have found no general support for the relationship between the two variables at all (Rummel 1963; Kegley, Richardson, and Richter 1978; Meernik and Waterman 1996) whereas Ostrom and Job (1986) showed a modest negative correlation. Morgan and Anderson (1999) assert that the problem of demonstrating a strong relationship between the use of force and domestic problems might be due to the fact that leaders can turn to other solutions such as domestic policy initiatives or diplomatic action with the intention of influencing their declining popularity.

DeRouen (2000, 319) argues that presidents “want attention away from domestic problems and they want to boost their image by creating a vivid image of forceful leadership.” Thus, the use of force can be understood as a proxy for forceful leadership and it can be replaced with other factors such as diplomatic activity (Drury 2001 makes a similar argument). As the diplomat in chief of the United States the president signs treaties and executive agreements, receives foreign diplomats and politicians in the White House, visits foreign countries, and attends international conferences. It has, however, hitherto never been tested whether these diplomatic interactions may serve as a source to boost the approval ratings of the president similarly to such other foreign policy actions as the use of force abroad or prime time televised foreign policy addresses (Russett 1990a, 36). In some cases it is understandable since the public knows and cares little about the president signing executive agreements or receiving foreign diplomats. However, summit meetings – even the less important ones – have repeatedly created great attention and excitement among the media and the public alike.

Even though the literature on summit diplomacy has been primarily concerned with describing and analyzing the impact of individual summits, these studies contain the seeds that make summit diplomacy a logical area of study at the cross section of the scholarships on the ‘rally around the flag’ and the ‘two presidencies’ notions. The idea that leaders hope to increase their domestic popularity by participating at summit meetings is a recurring one in the literature. It is difficult to imagine that American presidents consciously schedule summits with the purpose of improving their domestic standing as a summit depends on the leader of the meeting state, general bilateral

relations between the U.S. and the meeting state, and international politics as well.⁵ Nonetheless, they are not shy to exploit the domestic advantages that emerge from a summit that they need to attend for foreign policy reasons anyways. Plischke (1985, 548) resonates Neustadt's (1990) claim on the importance of good standing in front of both the public and the insiders when he argues that "a direct linkage exists between the degree of the president's participation at the summit and both popular and expert regard of him in this capacity." In other words, how the public, Washington politicians and political analysts including the media evaluate his performance as the chief diplomat will reflect back on the president's popularity and, thus, on his ability to influence the policy-making process at home. However high popularity ratings are not only sought for domestic reasons, they contribute to the international stature of the president:

The president is the figure about whom other national leaders regularly need information, and the polls on the division of opinion in the public, on the way the president is doing his job, regularly provide this information (Brody 1991, 19).

Furthermore, the use of superpower summitry as part, albeit a small part, of the 'rally around the flag' variable in several studies and the inclusion of presidential trips as an independent variable when explaining presidential popularity suggest that there might be some interesting facts to discover in relations to summit diplomatic episodes and presidential approval ratings (Mueller 1970; Kernell 1978; Brody 1991). The lack of

⁵ While there are always some heads of state and government that would be ready to meet the American president any time – probably for obtaining similar domestic advantages by shining in the light of the leader of the strongest state – and would do so even on a short notice, the impact of randomly scheduling summits for other than foreign policy reason could be troublesome. Rivals or equals of the impromptu meeting state would likely request similar treatment which would potentially lead to an avalanche of unnecessary summit meetings or diplomatic complications.

agreement on the exact nature of the impact that these variables or simply individual summits have on presidential popularity shows the need for a more thorough analysis of summits (Marra, Ostrom, and Simon 1990; Brace and Hinckley 1993a; Plischke 1985; Simon and Ostrom 1989; Brace and Hinckley 1993b).

With regard to the rallying phenomenon, summit diplomatic episodes can satisfy the criteria that Mueller found necessary for a foreign policy event to influence the president's approval rating: "they are dramatic, specific, and sharply focused" (Mueller 1970, 21). I argue this despite the fact that Mueller (1970, 22) claims that only superpower summitry lives up to this criterion. Summit meetings are unique, short-term phenomena at best lasting for a few days; thus, they are sharply focused and specific. They are, however, not dramatic in the same sense as the use of force. They entail no questions of life and death and rarely include surprises (Brody 1991, 59). Rather it is the intensity and relative rarity in the relationship of two countries that makes them dramatic: everything must happen in those few hours or days, they can make or break the relationship of the leaders, and in many cases they will not be repeated between the two leaders for a long time if ever. Finally, what is crucial is not only whether events are dramatic, but whether they are presented as such by the press. The media does spend considerable time covering summit diplomatic events and often in a sensational manner. Therefore, I hypothesize that, similarly to the use of force, (hypothesis 3.1) *the president's appearance at a summit meeting increases his general public approval rate at home.*

Summit meetings are short but very intense events, which suggest that they fit the findings of the 'rally around the flag' literature on the temporal length of the boost in

public approval. However, the intensity and risk involved in these events are lower than that of interstate conflicts including the use or the threat of use of force. Considering that the rally effect generated by wars has been found to last no longer than 5-6 months (Mueller 1970; James and Oneal 1991), it is reasonable to expect that (hypothesis 3.2) *the temporal length of the impact of summit meetings on presidential approval ratings is much shorter than that of the use of force.*

The increase that summitry can cause in the public approval of the president's job-handling can be affected by two phenomena. First, the president's pre-summit approval rating can be an important factor. A president whose popularity before the summit was relatively high has naturally less room for improvement than presidents whose public approval was significant lower. For this reason, I expect a negative relationship: (hypothesis 3.3) *the higher the president's pre-summit popularity, the smaller the increase in his post-summit approval rating will be and vice versa.*

Finally, regarding the president's differential powers in foreign and domestic policy some have argued that this impact was temporally dependent and disappeared after the Cold War (Oldfield and Wildavsky 1989; Fleisher et al. 2000). Similarly, I have argued in chapter 2 that while the number of summits have increased during the entire post-Second World War era, the end of the Cold War had an especially strong impact on summit practices: the number of states suddenly increased, leaders of states that earlier were not considered summit worthy now became potential candidates for meeting the American president, and summits have multiplied within the otherwise also growing number of international organizations. This has led to a sudden increase in summit meetings which may have potentially resulted in shorter meetings, smaller attention by

the media, and consequently less interest by both the media and the public. Therefore, (hypothesis 3.4) *the impact of summit meetings on presidential approval ratings should be stronger during the Cold War than after the breakup of the Soviet Union.*

Data and Methods

The data are arrayed as a time-series (months) cross-section (presidents) (TSCS) covering the 1951-2001 period. In order to overcome the discrepancy between the dates of public opinion surveys and summit diplomatic events, the data were collapsed into monthly averages and consist of 612 observations. Using presidential cycles as cross-sections represents reality more truly than using time-series data with presidential dummy variables: not only is there a difference between the individuals occupying the White House, but the circumstances that they face both domestically and internationally are different. The former suggests that assuming that their personal approval ratings are dependent on their predecessor is not only theoretically mistaken, but may also bias the results.

My main dependent variable is the change in the public approval rating of the president before and after each summit event. It is based on the question “Do you approve or disapprove the way [the president] is handling his job as president?” from the Gallup polls. However, these polls were taken with varying frequency during the period. While it is clear that with time they became more frequent, there is no noticeable pattern in the length of the polling periods (they vary from 4 days to 6 months). My analysis starts in 1951 when polls became relatively regular. Polls are aggregated by month. If there were more than one poll conducted in a month, I take the average of those. As a

result there are 9 approval ratings per year on average, although in certain cases there are only 4 data points in a year (i.e. 1952) and in other cases there is an approval rating for every month (e.g. throughout the 1990s).

In order to test hypothesis 3.3, I created a second dependent variable. This variable measures the pre-summit approval rating of the president by taking the difference between the current approval rating and a three-month moving average of presidential approval before the summit.

The main explanatory variable that I discussed in detail in chapter 2 is summit meetings coded “1” when the president attended a summit in a month and “0” otherwise. I expect this variable to be positive if hypothesis 3.1 is correct and summit meetings have an affect on the domestic approval ratings of the president. On the other hand, when testing the relationship between the pre-summit level approval rating of the president and summit diplomacy this variable is expected to be negative if higher pre-summit approval rating leads to a smaller increase in presidential popularity.

I have added a series of control variables. Two of these are variables that have hitherto been found influential on presidential popularity: war engagement by the United States and the misery index. The first variable controls for highest level military conflicts and is based on version 3.1 of the *Correlates of War* (2008) project’s MID data, which is available only until 2001 (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). It is coded “1” when a war occurred, and “0” otherwise. It is expected to have a positive impact on presidential popularity.

Second, I control for the possible effect that the state of the economy may have on presidential popularity. I use the misery index which is the sum of the unemployment rate

and inflation.⁶ Economic indicators – the unemployment rate and consumer price index – were obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (2008a, 2008b). Based on previous findings, I expect the misery index to exert a negative influence on presidential approval ratings. I have lagged both the war and the economic variables since it is likely that their effect will show up with delay.

Third, the electoral cycle may also influence presidential popularity. Usually presidents are more popular at the beginning of their term and are plagued by decreasing popularity leading to low levels of approval by the middle of their term. To control for this lifecycle effect, I added a counter variable for the election cycle. This variable starts at 1 when each presidential term starts and increases to 48 by the end of the term.

Hypothesis 3.4 requires creating an interaction term between the summit and Cold War variables. First, I generated a dummy variable which is “1” during the Cold War and “0” after the fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Second, the interaction is also a dummy where Cold War summits are coded as “1.” This variable should have a positive relationship with the dependent variable.

Finally, it is very likely that some trending effect is present in the data. As I have pointed out in chapter 2 (Table 2.1) the number of summits attended since the end of the Second World War has steadily grown. This propelled me to introduce a year variable to control for this effect.

As presidential approval ratings are autoregressive (Fisher-test: $\chi^2=13.726$, $p=0.911$), I deal with this temporal dependence by using an AR(1) model. The persistence of the public’s opinion of the president, although randomly sampled, does

⁶ Misery index=unemployment+[(consumer price index this month—consumer price index a year ago)/consumer price index a year ago]*100

come from different units. Thus, there is less of a compelling theoretical reason to include a lagged dependent variable (Achen 2000; Keele and Keele 2006). The AR(1) eliminates the problems caused by serial correlation.

When the data are arrayed as time-series cross-section (TSCS), results may be driven by cross sectional rather than over-time variation, which could potentially bias both the standard errors and the coefficients (Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001). However, the Hausman specification diagnostic confirmed that my data do not suffer from unmodeled unit effects. Thus, there are no systemic differences between cross sections (presidents), and hence, a random-effects rather than a fixed-effects model is used in my analysis.⁷

Results and Discussion

Results confirm three of my four hypotheses. The model testing hypothesis 3.1 explains about 22% of the variation in presidential popularity. As expected summit diplomacy has a significant impact on the president's domestic popularity ($p=0.028$). In any month the president went to at least one summit his popularity increased with about 1.3% percent (Model 2 in Table 3.1). This effect is small due to summits: about one fourth of the impact that a president may gain by initiating a war. Compared to earlier findings, the 5.5% percent bump in presidential popularity due to the use of force is larger than the generally accepted 1-4% percent (e.g. Russett 1990a; James and Rioux 1998). This difference is likely due to the fact that I used only wars initiated by the United States in this variable, while other scholars investigating presidential popularity

⁷ After running both random-effects and fixed-effects models (not shown), it is clear that the two produce identical results except for the variable controlling for the growing number of summits (year), which reaches statistical significance ($p=0.000$) only under the fixed-effects specification.

used alternative specification of the use of force variable defining it as major uses of forces, all MIDs, and the use of force short of war. Finally, the positive impact of summits is able to smooth more than half of the decrease that presidents may suffer due to a badly performing economy. Consequently, both the conflict and economic variables are to the expected direction and highly significant.

In order to ascertain that these results are not the artifact of the novel time-series cross-section setup of the data, I reran the analysis with the more widely used time-series design including presidential dummies. Results show that arraying the data as time-series cross-section has only a small and conservative impact on the results. First, regarding the sole effect of summit meetings the traditional time-series specification shows an impact that is about 0.7% larger. Second, regarding the multivariate analysis, the estimated effect of summitry is nearly identical under both designs. However, the two substantive control variables – war and the misery index – appear to have a somewhat smaller effect when the data are arrayed as time-series cross-section. On the other hand, the level of statistical significance of all explanatory variable(s) holds under both specifications (Table 3.1).⁸ All in all, as there are no significant differences in results depending on how the data is arrayed, but as the TSCS specification is theoretically more justified, I keep relying on this in the rest of this chapter.

[Table follows on next page]

⁸ All presidential dummy variables from Eisenhower to G. W. Bush (not shown) are positive and significant at least at the $p < .01$ level in the multivariate regression. President Truman was used as the reference category.

Table 3.1. The effect of summit meetings on presidential popularity, 1951-2001

Independent variables	Time-Series Cross-Section		Time-Series	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3†	Model 4†
Summit meeting	1.294* (.594)	1.318* (.599)	2.026** (.679)	1.356* (.651)
War (lagged)		5.562** (2.086)		6.094** (2.156)
Misery index (lagged)		-1.784*** (.346)		-2.008*** (.341)
Electoral cycle		.006 (.044)		.022 (.042)
Year		.125 (.121)		-.688 (.434)
Constant	55.089*** (2.415)	-175.323 (237.966)	45.239*** (3.548)	1389.129 (845.439)
Wald χ^2	4.75	38.40***		
F			109.19***	124.17***
R ²	.0004	.2216	.7247	0.8066
N	453	444	453	444

† Presidential dummies not shown.

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Two-tailed tests

Standard errors are in parentheses

Unit of analysis: month

Dependent variable: *presidential approval ratings*

Models 1 & 2: GLS random effects model with a first order autoregressive process

Models 3 & 4: Prais-Winsten

Table 3.2. The temporal impact of summit meetings on presidential popularity, 1951-2001

Independent variables	
Summit meeting (no lag)	1.516* (.703)
Summit meeting (1 month lag)	1.000 (.799)
Summit meeting (2 month lag)	-.792 (.832)
Summit meeting (3 month lag)	-.876 (.822)
Summit meeting (4 month lag)	-.584 (.768)
War (no lag)	8.938** (3.410)
War (1 month lag)	17.068*** (4.024)
War (2 month lag)	14.049** (4.17)
War (3 month lag)	8.343* (3.919)
War (4 month lag)	3.504 (3.596)
Misery index	-1.765*** (.358)
Electoral cycle	.023 (.043)
Year	.137 (.126)
Constant	-199.571 (248.034)
Wald χ^2	38.40***
R ²	.2716
N	412

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Two-tailed test

Standard errors are in parentheses

Unit of analysis: month

Dependent variable: *presidential approval ratings*

Model: GLS random effects model with first-order autoregressive process

Hypothesis 3.2 is also supported since the result of a distributed lag model shows that summit diplomacy exerts its effect in the same month in which the summit takes place and this effect evaporates by the following month ($p=0.211$). On the other hand, the initiation of a war has a more lasting impact on presidential popularity: it lasts for four months (Table 3.2). This latter result resonates with earlier findings that estimated the impact of war to be short-lived and last for no more than a few months (Mueller 1970; Kernell 1978; Russett 1990a: 35; Edwards 1990: 151; James and Oneal 1991; Lian and Oneal 1993).

Turning to the expectation that the president's pre-summit approval would influence his post-summit approval rating, the data offer no support for this hypothesis (Table 3.3). The summit meeting variable is not only the opposite of the expected negative relationship suggesting that the higher level of pre-summit popularity leads to a higher increase in the post-summit approval rating, but this effect is also minuscule (0.3%) and statistically completely insignificant ($p=0.967$). This might be explained by the fact that summit meetings have a generally positive, although rather small effect where the public is not influenced by their earlier view of the president. Presumably the publicity and limelight that surround the president as the diplomat-in-chief are more influential than the actual personality of the president. This result seems to validate the decision of refraining from establishing a diverting hypothesis in relations to summit diplomacy: this non-finding is likely to stem from the fact that summits are not likely to be initiated strategically to raise approval ratings. Consequently, there is no difference in approach and, thus, impact between presidents with low and high popularity. Furthermore, war behaves similarly except that the result is statistically significant

($p=0.008$): more popular presidents are more likely to enjoy a greater increase in their domestic approval rate when they initiate a war, which corresponds to Ostrom and Job's (1986) argument that presidents resort to the use of force when they stand high among their domestic constituents rather than when their popularity is low or on the decline.

Table 3.3. The pre-summit popularity level and the size of increase in presidential popularity due to summits, 1991-2001

Independent variables	
Summit meeting	0.039 (.932)
War	7.854** (2.957)
Misery index	-.294 (.189)
Election cycle	.071 (.042)
Year	.042 (.048)
Constant	-83.004 (95.614)
Wald χ^2	15.54*
R ²	.0965
N	234

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Two-tailed test

Standard errors are in parentheses

Unit of analysis: month

Dependent variable: *Difference of pre-summit and current approval rates*

Model: GLS random effects model with a first-order autoregressive process

Finally, I have found evidence that there is a clear difference in the impact of Cold War and post-Cold War summit meetings. Testing hypothesis 3.4 requires the introduction of an interaction term for summit meetings and the Cold War. In interpreting the statistical results I use Brambor, Clark, and Golder's (2006) method to compute the

marginal effect and standard error of the interaction and I also refrain from the interpretation of the constitutive terms of the interaction as if they had an unconditional impact on the dependent variable.

Table 3.4. The impact of summit meetings on presidential popularity during and after the Cold War, 1951-2001

Independent variables	
Summit meeting	-.780 (1.369)
Cold War	11.960 *** (3.142)
Cold War summits (interaction)	2.344 (1.519)
War	5.611 ** (2.073)
Misery index	-2.058 *** (.326)
Election cycle	-.009 (.043)
Year	.370 ** (.123)
Constant	-665.972 ** (243.467)
Wald χ^2	67.43 ***
R ²	0.3727
N	444

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Two-tailed tests

Standard errors are in parentheses

Unit of analysis: month


Dependent variable: *presidential approval ratings*

Model: GLS random effects model with a first-order autoregressive process

Coefficients and significance levels in Table 3.4 are misleading: in reality they show only the impact of post-Cold War summits meetings which is negative and statistically insignificant (p=0.123) (cf. Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006, 75). In order to

see the impact of summits both during and after the Cold War, I created a graph (Figure 3.1).⁹ It confirms that post-1991 summits have an insignificant negative impact on approval. It also shows, however, that Cold War summits exert a positive and statistically significant influence over presidential approval ratings given that both the upper and lower boundaries of the 95% confidence interval are on the same side of zero.

Figure 3.1. The impact of summit meetings on presidential popularity during and after the Cold War, 1951-2001



The implications of this finding are considerable. First, it shows that while presidents during the Cold War were able to translate the foreign policy advantage of their office arising out of their summit meetings into short-lived domestic popularity

⁹ Since the Cold War summit interaction is a dummy variable only the two end points of the x-axis can be meaningfully interpreted.

bumps and through this into domestic political advantage, presidents facing the transformed post-1991 international order cannot count on this benefit. It could be simply the result of the changing nature of summit practices but it might also be the consequence of the disappearing differences in the president's power over foreign and domestic politics. If so, then it lends additional support to the view that the two presidencies phenomenon was temporally limited and ended with the Cold War (Fleisher et al. 2000; Oldfield and Wildavsky 1989). Nonetheless, for a more definite conclusion other presidential activities that are in the domain of those foreign policy actions where congressional inference is limited should be analyzed.

Conclusion

Scholars have argued in the past, implicitly or explicitly, that the president's appearance at the summit can positively influence his standing with his domestic public (e.g. Plischke 1985; 1986; Watt 1963; Brody 1991; Tygiel 2006). And indeed, the general impact of summit meetings may increase the president's popularity. In general, American presidents may enjoy no more than a 1.3% increase in their popularity due to their meetings with other heads of state and government but this effect fades away after a month.

When a summit event is scheduled, the president is able to exploit the inherent media attention that could reflect positively on his standing with his domestic audience. Yet, while these effects are usually attributed to the publicity factor of summit meetings, it may be related to the content of such meetings as well. If the public was found to be 'pretty prudent' (Jentleson 1992; Drury et al. 2010) regarding military intervention, it is

likely that a few pictures in the papers or frames in the evening news about the president's attendance of a summit meeting will not overwrite the negative connotations that reports on a failed summit are likely to create. In addition, while certain foreign leaders may crave for the recognition that a meeting with the U.S. president may bring, they are likely to refuse the opportunity if they suspect they are being taken advantage of. In this light, overemphasizing the publicity aspects at the price of substance would not necessarily lead to a bigger boost in presidential approval ratings and may even negatively impact interstate relations.

Furthermore, the size and temporal length of the rallying impact of summit meetings suggest that when Watt (1963) points to a diversionary logic behind the president's decision to go to the summit, he overstates the case. First, this effect is so small that this in itself questions the rationality of reverting to a tactic of trying to artificially increase one's approval rating by going to the summit.

Second, when the president would need a boost in his domestic approval rating most, it is the least likely for him to go to the summit. On the one hand, in the month of an election, he cannot be sure that the roughly 1% boost may come in the U.S. states where he or his party needs it most and campaigning in battleground states seems to be a safer strategy. On the other hand, when looking for support for a bill among legislators, he is also unlikely to sway too many legislators in Congress by a one percent and quickly vanishing increase in his domestic approval ratings. Trying to personally convince hesitant or reluctant legislators seems more practical.

Third, if this is compared with the investment in time and preparation that a summit requires just from the president himself and with the risks that it involves in

relations to interstate relations then the potential costs are much higher than the possible benefits. The chief diplomat needs to familiarize himself with the issues that may emerge at a summit as well as with the profile of the other leader(s) he is to meet. It is also often argued that presidents should not go to the summit without an agenda, which is most unlikely to be present when only the public relations component attracts the president to a summit meeting (Reynolds 2007, 428-429).

Fourth, as the positive impact of summits disappeared with the end of the Cold War, there is nothing to gain for current presidents by a summit meeting. Even if Cold War presidents could have entertained the idea of creating a diversion by summits, this option is not available for post-Cold War presidents.

In fact, presidents gained most in their popularity at home, when their sole or primary focus was on the international significance of a summit meeting as it was the case in the Camp David and Washington summits. Consequently, presidents must have been aware of the fact that by reverting to summitry because of domestic rather than international reasons, they are likely to sacrifice a tool of foreign policy-making for a tiny and ephemeral personal gain. Keeping this in mind is particularly important for current presidents who cannot hope even for a small increase in their popularity. Although presently summit meetings have no influence whatsoever on the president's domestic standing, there is no reason to avoid attending summit meetings if international circumstances so desire. Indeed, the primary function of summitry is international, not domestic and, therefore, heads of state and government should be and most likely are concerned with their international impact above all and this is what the next two chapters focus on.

CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACT OF SUMMIT MEETINGS ON INTERSTATE RELATIONS, 1948-2001

Introduction

Although the most often emphasized side of summit meetings is their ceremonial nature, it is not the most important aspect of these meetings. I have shown in the previous chapter how the president may create a favorable view by his fellow citizens as a result of summit meetings. However, the rather small positive contribution of summits to presidential approval ratings, the frequency with which summits occur, and the amount of effort that foreign policy bureaucracies and the leaders themselves invest into a summit go beyond what they might gain in terms of popularity and therefore it is fair to say that popularity boost is a highly welcomed residual rather than the primary motivation behind these events.

Summit meetings are events of international politics, and thus, it is logical to expect that they affect interstate relations. Indeed, it is often claimed that the meeting between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna on July 3-4, 1961 proved fateful in the development of such subsequent events as the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 or the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. It was during the Vienna summit that Khrushchev became convinced that his young opponent was inexperienced and did not have the backbone to stand up to such challenges (Dunn 1996; Eubank 1966). On the other hand, the general wisdom about President Reagan's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik on October 11-12, 1986 is just the opposite. Although the meeting itself did not result in the much anticipated arms

limitation agreement, it did pave the way for the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and eventually led to the end of the Cold War (Schultz 1993). Both of these examples are based on the assumption that summitry does have an impact on interstate relations. Yet, they differ in the nature of the impact that states experience as a result of the meeting of their heads.

As I have briefly pointed out in the introductory chapter this disagreement about the possible effects of summit meetings on interstate relations is also present in the literature between the professional-realist vs. the liberalist-idealist positions (Watt 1963). However, so far no systematic study has examined either the underlying assumption that summit diplomatic events affect interstate relations or the nature of such an influence. As I show in detail below many reasons have been cited how summits may positively or negatively impact interstate relations. However these lack an overarching theoretical framework that would link the personal experience of individual heads of state/government to the bilateral relationship of their states. I argue in this chapter that summit meetings positively influence interstate relations because they serve as a means to socialize heads of state and government into the group of international leaders. By internalizing the norms and rules of this community of leaders and inherently those of international politics, they can bring their states closer to each other.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I give a more nuanced overview of the professional-realist–liberalist-idealist debate. Then I turn onto describing my theoretical framework and lay out my hypotheses. After identifying my variables and methods, I put forward and discuss the results. Finally, I conclude with addressing the implication of the small positive and lasting influence that summit meetings have on interstate relations.

Summit Meetings and Interstate Relations

Liberalist-idealists view a summit meeting as a positive phenomenon of international politics based on two underlying assumptions. The first and more common one is that conflicts are the results of inadequate communications that are only fortified at the regular diplomatic level (Watt 1963). Therefore, opposing national interests are, in fact, misunderstandings of each other's preferences that can be sorted out by an honest exchange of views by leaders. The other assumption is best described by former U.S. President Richard Nixon (1985), who argues that the differences between the interests of states are real and the crucial factor is for leaders to understand that they are so. Only then will they be able to start serious negotiations that may result in the betterment of the relationship of their states. While both of these assumptions suggest that summits are best in improving relations between inimical states, it is not necessarily so. Summit meetings might help build good relationships between states that hitherto remained out of touch, and leaders of friendly or allied states might also exploit summits to reach milestones in their relationship (Plischke 1967).

Many explanations have been cited for the positive effects of summit meetings. The most common view is that leaders can develop a favorable chemistry among themselves that enables them to communicate more effectively (Plischke 1986a). Furthermore, adding the element of the personality of leaders to the usual power equation based on military and economic might helps overcome power disparity that previously made negotiations unworthy for the weaker side due to the lack of ability to influence at least some issues in its favor (Weilemann 2000). When evaluating summit meetings,

leaders of the Cold War superpowers usually stressed either the opportunity to become familiar with the mindset of their counterparts that later proved crucial in understanding the logic behind their actions or the fact that the two leaders could achieve a level of trust that was lacking in the general relationship of their states (e.g. Nixon 1974). According to this view, heads of enemy states have to overcome double barriers: first, a political one that divides their own countries and that often reflects on how they judge their counterpart. Second, on a personal level they must develop some affinity toward the other leader and overcome their suspicion about the motives of that head of state/government. Unfortunately existing accounts do not explain sufficiently why and how these happen.

Sometimes the emphasis is put on the symbolic value of summits, which explicitly treats summits as a process and points to the fact that these events can affect interstate relations in an indirect way. A summit meeting may demonstrate that two or more countries, just as their leaders, can come together and surpass existing barriers. It can also facilitate the relationship of states because it speeds up lower level negotiations by imposing a deadline and pressure for positive outcomes. Similarly, leaders can agree on some broad definition of a problem that may prove crucial in working out the details at lower levels. Moreover, the organization of summit meetings can develop a favorable relationship among the members of the diplomatic corps and other officials who prepare these summits by realizing that obstacles can be solved through cooperation. The impact is more direct when agreements are made at the summit: heads of state and government may achieve a breakthrough in negotiations that were hitherto impossible by professional diplomats who have less freedom of maneuver (Plischke 1958; 1967; 1986a).

As opposed to this, the professional-realist camp contend that summits aggravate rather than improve interstate relations and they base their argument on three underlying assumption. First, chief executives are not trained diplomats, and thus, most often unaware of the pitfalls of diplomatic negotiations. Second, they are also inexperienced in negotiating at the international level, which is markedly different from what they are used to at home: as the most powerful actors within their states, their view most often prevails on the domestic scene whereas internationally they meet their equals (Eubank 1966). Third, they are ill-prepared, and thus, unaware of the details of the issues they are expected to negotiate about. Moreover, they do not always understand the deeper implication of the agreements that they make (Giauque 2001).

Indeed, the most general argument is that there is no guarantee that the meetings of two or more heads of state or government will lead to friendship or even good working relationship between them. Summits may also make leaders detest each other, which then can negatively influence the relationship of their states either immediately or in the longer run. It does not only prohibit the improvement of relations between hostile powers, but may also chill relations between allies. Moreover, some of these can be simply the result of misunderstandings emerging due to cultural, linguistic, or stylistic differences where even well-meaning gestures may have unexpected negative consequences (Plischke 1986a; Ball 1976). Heads of state/government are more likely to be carried away by their passion and temper than professional diplomats, which might have long-term negative consequences (Rogers 1955). Neither does the stress that accompanies summits favors the establishment of good interstate relations. While these

problems are not unique to state leaders, professional diplomats are trained to deal with them.

In addition, there is a great temptation for leaders to exploit the presence of the media, and try to score points over their negotiating partner in front of the press that may generally undermine the belief of the other side that the leader is sincerely motivated to improve the state of affairs between their countries (Dunn 1996; Plischke 1967; 1986a). Besides, and rather naturally, each chief executive wishes to strike the most favorable deal for his or her state, and for that end, try to negotiate from a position of strength (Rusk 1960).

Even agreements reached at summits and often seen as positive outcomes may have the opposite effect. If a head of state or government is unable to get domestic support for an agreement reached at the summit, it does not only annul the given agreement, but it might also undermine the leader's credibility at future negotiations. Sometimes agreements are only achieved because of misunderstandings about what the leaders really agreed upon. This can subsequently cause breaches in interstate relations (Weilemann 2000; Giaouque 2001). Finally, the pressure for result may make leaders strike bad agreements that can aggravate the general relationship between their states.

While both approaches make some worthy arguments, it is unlikely that summit diplomacy could become such a frequently used foreign policy tool had it systematically worsened interstate relations. Therefore the question is how and why summit meetings may have a positive impact on the bilateral relations of states even when they do not conclude with an agreement or result in a friendship between the heads of state/government. I contend that summits have a so far unexplored function and, thus,

value to them, namely, that they help state leaders get socialized into international politics.

Socialization at the Summit

Summit meetings can facilitate the improvement of relations between states even when there is little substantive component to these meetings and when leaders only exchange their views because of the socialization that occurs during these events. Socialization is “the process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Zürn and Checkel 2005, 1046; Johnston 2001).

Understanding diplomacy as a tool of socialization is not novel in itself. Johnston (2001, 489) argues that

“non-coercive diplomatic influence attempts by most actors most of the time are aimed at ‘changing the minds’ of others, of persuading cajoling, or shaming them to accept, and [...] internalize new facts, figures, arguments, norms, and causal understanding about particular issues.”

Summit meetings can fulfill this socialization function in two ways. The first process builds on the idea of the previous chapter: the bare fact of the meeting can serve as a reward because heads of state or government can gain in prestige both domestically and internationally if they can visibly associate themselves with a powerful or popular fellow leader like the American president. States that reject international rules and norms do not have the chance for such a meeting: North Korea has been an unlikely candidate for a summit meeting with most states, but especially with the United States. In October 2000 North Korea’s Kim Jong-Il has repeatedly extended his invitation to President

Clinton, who, however, used the potential of a summit as a carrot trying to coerce North Korea to follow international norms, i.e. halt their nuclear missile program (Shin 2000; Park 2007).¹⁰ Nonetheless, while using summits as carrots certainly entails socialization, it would be very difficult to measure as the impact of summits since this is a pre-condition for rather than a consequence of a summit meeting.

Second, and most importantly for this work, socialization can occur at the context of the summit. A summit is a longer process which involves delicate preparations regarding the logistics and content of these meetings including several contacts between the two states before the actual summit takes place. It is why the liberalist-idealist side could argue that contact between the diplomatic corps of the two states during preparation of the summit may also have a positive influence on interstate relations (Plischke 1958; 1967; 1986a). Furthermore, it is also the context of socialization that makes the liberalist-idealist concept of “loneliness at the top” more understandable. It is not only states, but also their leaders who are socialized into a new society. That is, it is not only the international society that is important here, but also that invisible group of state leaders. The goal is to make every head of state/government understand that they belong to this community. For instance, at G-8 summits leaders customarily call each other by first names rather than by their official titles to strengthen the idea of belonging to the same club (Reagan 1990). Funeral summits also illustrate this well. Due to its impromptu nature, many high ranking guests, and brevity, these occasions are inadequate for serious negotiations. Nonetheless, these summits are still sufficient for inducting the

¹⁰ It is important to note, however, that the summit meeting failed to materialize not because they have been enemies. Heads of the Soviet Union and the United States did meet during the Cold War despite their adversarial positions.

new leader to the community of heads of state and government. Short meetings are usually organized between the heads giving the first opportunity for foreign leaders to meet the new leadership (Berridge 1996; Barston 2006).

However, summits are much more than courtesy visits: most of the time serious discussions and negotiations are conducted by the participating heads, which further enhances their socialization experience. Often a simple exchange of views can make them understand each other better by simply having listened to ideas and their justification other than their own.

In socializing states into the international system the role of the United States is crucial: with the end of the Second World War, the U.S. has become a preponderant power and with the end of the Cold War the only superpower of the international system. Consequently, the head of this power is interested in maintaining its power position, and thus, the current international system. This is only possible if other players accept the rules and norms of the international society. Simply through the power that the U.S. possesses it is capable of exerting a large amount of social influence over other international actors.

It is essential to understand, however, that the U.S. is not a neutral and disinterested party in this process. There are certain widely accepted rules and norms of summitry or international relations, but the value system of the United States will leave a mark on the outcome of its socialization efforts as well. For example, during the Cold War both the United States and the Soviet Union were strong powers interested in upholding the bipolar system, yet the kind of socialization state leaders were subjected to by American and Soviet leaders were very different. While each superpower was

interested in making all heads understand the importance of following norms like sovereignty, non-interference, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, they also had their own interpretation of what constituted a norm. Summit meetings in Washington D.C. were unlikely to stress the importance of Communist principles, whereas summits in Moscow did not emphasize the value of human rights. If a convergence of values between two leaders and two states occurs, the level of socialization will be higher and thus the improvement in their states' relations will be greater.

However, for socialization to occur at a summit and for it to influence bilateral relations positively, it is enough if heads of state and government understand that they belong to the community of leaders, and consequently, that their identities as well as responsibilities go beyond those linked to their country. In addition to recognizing fellow leaders as their equals as heads of state/government,¹¹ belonging to this society of leaders requires a belief in the effectiveness of summit diplomacy to positively influence interstate relations, in its use for honest exchanges, a feeling of belonging together based on the liberalist-idealist principle of "loneliness at the top," a conviction that they are capable of shaping international relations personally at smaller or larger scales, and understanding that the other leader also keeps an eye on both international and domestic politics when attending a summit. Therefore, in accordance with the liberalist-idealist view I expect that (hypothesis 4.1) *the summit meetings of the president of the United States with other heads of state and government will lead to more friendly relations between their states.*

¹¹ This is not saying or implying that they acknowledge power equality between their *states*. Rather this is based on the sovereign equality of states.

The normative version of the democratic peace thesis argues that states that operate on the basis of similar value systems are likely to have more peaceful relations. It is particularly true of democracies that believe that differences of opinion and disputes should be settled through negotiation rather than by force. They externalize these domestic rules and norms to the international scene (Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993). Hence, leaders of democratic states should especially welcome the opportunity of a summit meeting and use it to improve relations between their states by settling existing disputes and looking for a higher level of cooperation. Democratic heads of state may dislike each other personally, but their common commitment to democratic norms serves as a constraint on their personal feelings. However, non-democratic leaders are not constrained by such norms. They do not have special appreciation for negotiations as a means of resolving conflicts: in their value system victory often equals the elimination of their opponent. Therefore, at a summit meeting they are more likely to look for opportunities to score a point or to negotiate from a position of strength.

Maoz and Russett (1993) point out that when faced with a challenge emanating from the differing behavioral norms of autocracies it is easier for democracies to conform to those rules than for non-democracies to adapt to the democratic playing field based on democratic values. Extrapolating this to summits, when leaders of democratic nations find themselves treated with suspicion or are even bullied and taken advantage of by the heads of state/government of autocratic countries, they are likely to react in similar fashion and start negotiating more cautiously or even from a position of strength. In other words, professionalist-realists may be right when it comes to summit meetings with non-democratic states. Given the democratic nature of the American political system, I

hypothesize that (hypothesis 4.2) *the president's meetings with the heads of democratic states will lead to bigger improvements in the post-summit relations between their states than a similar meeting between the president and the leaders of autocratic regimes.*

As I have shown and explained in chapter 2, the number of summit meetings that American presidents attended has steadily grown over time, but erupted after the end of the Cold War which stems from the fact that there are many more state leaders to meet with and socialize into the rules and norms of summitry as well as those of international politics and the bulk of this work has fallen on the shoulders of the U.S. president above. The more meetings the president has to attend, the less likely that he can prepare for serious negotiations and more likely that summit meetings turn into short episodes with little lasting impressions. It is an issue because the longer the subject is exposed to the rules and norms of summitry and those of international politics the more likely that s/he is going to internalize those values. Hence, I posit that (hypothesis 4.3) *presidential summit meetings during the Cold War were more influential than those held in the post-Cold War period.*

Wendt (1994, 391) suggests that such symbolic meetings as the annual G-7 (G-8) summits are important because states and their leaders “are engaging in discursive practices designed to express and/or to change ideas about who ‘the self’ [...] is.” In this sense, regular institutionalized summits like the G-7, Summits of the Americas, NATO, or ASEAN annual meetings are more likely to operate as what Bearce and Bondanella (2007) call type II socialization. By belonging to these institutions an actor can acquire a new identity that leads to a change of interest over time. Institutional summit meetings, hence, are likely to reinforce the internalization of norms at the highest level. In general,

however, non-institutional, *ad hoc* summit meetings are more common in international relations. While summits have their own rules and norms, *ad hoc* summits lack the structure of institutional summits as well as the additional norms that are specific to the goals of the institution. Therefore, type I socialization describes them more accurately: here “actors simply learn playing by the rules of a new social context” which leads to a change in behavior without the actors redefining their interests or identities (Bearce and Bondanella 2007, 706). Zürn and Checkel (2005, 1056) argue that “diplomatic code as a behavioral standard gets socialized more easily than basic norms such as human rights.” Consequently, I expect that (hypothesis 4.4) *summits conducted within the framework of international organizations are more likely to lead to significant improvement in interstate relations than ad hoc meetings of heads of state and government.*

The dynamics of bilateral and multilateral summit meetings are rather different. Multilateral meetings mean the participation of several heads of state. At these meetings negotiations are more formalized and the observance of the diplomatic etiquette is more rigid. Second, often there is no chance for one-on-one meetings between leaders – and certainly not between all leaders. Therefore, adjusting to the norms and rules of summitry and international relations are generally expected among participants. Emotions play a smaller role at these meetings: angry outbursts and personal likes and dislikes have fewer opportunities to emerge. Simply looking at these one could easily assume that multilateral meetings lead to higher level of socialization than bilateral ones.

However, when we speak of socialization, each state interested in the upholding or just adhering to the rules and norms of international politics wants other states to follow these rules *and* at the same time makes an attempt to influence those states to

internalize at least some part of its value system. This is why I argued above that one should take into consideration that the United States is not a disinterested party and as much the American president wants to see other states play by the rules of the current international system, he will also attempt to make the meeting state's head understand and potentially internalize the value system of the United States. In other words, he tries to achieve a convergence in the value system of the small community of the United States and the meeting state through a meeting of minds. These two processes of influence are intertwined. As every state is engaged in these practices, this has a profound effect on the socialization experience of heads participating in multilateral and bilateral summits.

The many attendees at a multilateral summit mean that there are fewer opportunities and less time for state leaders to touch upon their own value systems. In addition, the subjects of these socialization attempts receive not only weaker signals but a cacophony of signals as well, which means that most of these attempts extinguish each other. Hence, the opportunity of the American president to socialize the meeting states into its values are most often limited to being in the same room and taking part in the same general discussion at multilateral summits with limited opportunities to contribute to the discussion as the rules of summitry gives all participating heads equal opportunity to participate in the debate.

During bilateral summits the opportunities for socializing leaders of the meeting states into the rules and norms of summitry and those of the international community are not less than at multilateral meetings. In general it is fair to expect that multilateral meetings give leaders a better sense of belonging to an international community of leaders than bilateral summits. Probably the only exception from this is bilateral summits

with the state seen as the embodiment of the existing values in the international community. In the eyes of the meeting state the U.S. is the international community. The United States has played this role together with the Soviet Union after the end of the Second World War and alone since 1991. Bilateral meetings, however, can go beyond just transmitting or reinforcing the norms and rules of the international community. These meetings also allow both participating heads to speak more and, thus, reveal more of their own value systems. This gives opportunities to reach a higher level of cooperation within this small community of two states. Consequently, socialization is more straightforward and powerful at bilateral than at multilateral meetings and therefore I expect that (hypothesis 4.5) *the president's attendance of multilateral summit meetings will have a smaller impact on the interstate relations of the United States than his participation in bilateral summits.*

Socialization occurs when there is change in the behavior of actors manifested in this case by cooperation between states. However, it is necessary to point out that this change should be lasting. A change of behavior on the part of state leaders that results in a short-term, one-month in this case, alteration of behavior is rather a tactical move than an attestation to the internalization of rules and norms. Hence, if summit meetings socialize heads of state and government into the community of international leaders and have a chance to influence interstate relations, the impact of summits should last longer than a single month. Therefore, I hypothesize that (hypothesis 4.6) *summit meetings have a positive impact on dyadic interstate relations in both the short and the long run.*

Data and Methods


The data is arrayed as time-series cross-section, where time is measured by month and non-directed dyads are the cross sections. Due to limited data availability the final dataset covers the 1948-2001 period and consists of 191 dyads and 88,446 observations.

As for the dependent variable, I use a conflict-cooperation scale to measure the dyadic relationship of states. For this I splice the Conflict and Peace Databank (COPDAB), the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) and the Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) datasets together (Azar 1980; 1993; McClelland 1999; Bond et al. 2003). Splicing is necessitated by the fact that each of these datasets covers only a part of my period of interest: COPDAB codes events for 1948-1978, WEIS for 1966-1992, and IDEA for 1990-2004. There are some differences between the datasets: COPDAB and WEIS are manually, whereas IDEA is machine coded. COPDAB uses a variety of sources, while WEIS and IDEA rely on one: the former is based on the *New York Times* while the latter on *Reuters Newswires*. Despite the fact that each uses a different coding scheme and scales, high levels of correspondence have been established between both COPDAB and WEIS, and WEIS and IDEA (Vincent 1983; Howell 1983; Goldstein 1992; Reuveny and Kang 1996; Taylor et al. 1999; King and Lowe 2003; Drury 2005).

I relied on Goldstein's (1992) and King and Lowe's (2003) conversion tables, and where necessary I did my own coding based on the relationships between datasets as established on the on IDEA's homepage ("IDEA to WEIS" 2009). Consequently, I flipped the 1-15 scale of COPDAB not only in the interest of more intuitive results, but also to match the other two databases by having the lowest value (1) as the most conflictual and the highest (15) as the most cooperative measure. Second, after the data

conversion, both the WEIS and IDEA scales ranged from -10 to 8.3, which were turned into a positive scale after a simple transformation. Hence, the spliced conflict-cooperation scale ranges from 0 to 18.3. Third, in order to make the scale continuous, gaps of missing data were filled by keeping the previous value constant. Fourth, in years where two datasets overlapped I used an average of the values. Finally, as this event data is coded daily, it had to be aggregated up to a monthly level and, thus, I use monthly averages. Figure 4.1 gives a description of the dependent variable: it closely resembles a normal curve where most events – many which is either neutral comments or just business as usual diplomacy – fall at the middle of the scale. Extreme events like military cooperation and war are rare at both tales of the curve.

Figure 4.1. Descriptive histogram for the dependent variable of conflict and cooperation scale, 1948-2001



As for the independent variable of interest, summit meetings, there is one significant change compared to the dataset used in chapter 3. Multilateral summits had to be transformed into dyadic relationships between the United States and other participating states. Second, there are several occasions where the meeting took place within the framework of an international organization. This necessitates the identification of all the states represented at the summit level. Where the Department of State website does not offer details on this issue, I have consulted several outside sources such as the homepages of institutions like the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (“ASEAN summits” 2008), or of the G8 Information Centre of the University of Toronto (2008). Unfortunately, in a few cases not all meeting states could be identified and these cases had to be dropped. As a consequence of these modifications, there are 2,704 dyadic summit meetings in the final dataset.

In order to test hypothesis 4.2 an interaction variable was added for summits and the regime type of the meeting state. Regime type is measured by the dichotomous variable described in chapter 2 (democracy=1; non-democracy=0). I expect the summit-democracy interaction term to be positive.

Hypothesis 4.3 requires creating another interaction term, this time between the summit and Cold War variables. After employing the Cold War dummy described in chapter 3 the resulting interaction is also a dummy where Cold War summits are coded as “1” and “0” otherwise. This variable should have a positive relationship with the dependent variable.

Furthermore, I employ the *ad hoc*-institutional and bilateral-multilateral summit indicators introduced in chapter 2 in order to test hypotheses 4.4 and 4.5.

A few control variables have also been added to the equation. First, based on the democratic peace thesis I expect that, in general, the United States' relationship with democratic countries will be more cooperative than with non-democratic ones (e.g. Small and Singer 1976; Morgan and Campbell 1991; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993; Bueno de Mesquita et. al 1999; Zinnes 2004).

Second, I control for alliance structure. It is likely that the prior relationship of the meeting state and the United States, here measured by alliance, influence the level of conflict and cooperation between those states. Similarly to chapter 2 I rely on the ATOP (Leeds 2005) dataset's alliance dummy where "1" denotes the existence of the alliance between the United States and the meeting state and "0" indicates the lack of such an agreement. Being allied with the United States is expected to positively influence their relationship.

Third, there is substantial evidence for trade dependence leading to less conflict between countries (e.g. Oneal et al. 1996; Oneal and Russett 1997; 1999; Gartzke, Li and Boehmer 2001; Gartzke 2007). This finding about the relationship of trade and conflict can be straightforwardly applied to the overall relationship of states. Thus, I expect that higher level of trade between two states will lead to more cooperative relationship within that dyad. I use Gleditsch's (2002) trade data that is available until 2001, and lag the natural log of the trade flow between two states with 3 time periods (months) as it usually takes some time until economic trends are clear and politicians are able to react to it.

Fourth, given the highly confrontational behavior between the Soviet Union and the United States, I have introduced a dummy variable for the superpower dyad (1=yes; 0=no). I expect this to manifest a negative relationship on the conflict-cooperation scale.

Fifth, a variable was added for contiguity since the geographical proximity of states has been established to affect their propensity to engage in conflict (e.g. Kocs 1995; Huth 1996; Hensel 2000; Reed and Chiba 2010). I use the contiguity measure of the *Correlates of War* project (2008) and recode it into a dichotomous variable (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). If states share land border or are closer than 150 miles by sea, the variable is coded as “1”, and “0” otherwise. Contiguity should have a negative effect on interstate relations.

Sixth, in order to make sure that the summit variable does not pick up on the effect of similarity in foreign policy goals, I have introduced a control variable for foreign policy affinity. I use Signorino and Ritter’s (1999) S-scores of global alliance portfolio similarity. States whose foreign policy positions are close are likely to have better relations than those whose foreign policy goals are very divergent or even adverse. Therefore, I expect this variable to have a positive relationship with the conflict-cooperation scale.

Finally, similarly to the previous chapter, I added a year variable to the model in order to control for the trending effect in summit meetings over time.

Results and Discussion

The data manifested unit specific errors (Hausman test $\chi^2=119,583.94$; $p=0$) which necessitates a fixed-effects model. It is, however, only possible to run on the first, bivariate model as some of the variables in the multivariate analyses are time-invariant or vary very little over time and two of them – the regime type of the meeting state and the Cold War – are ones that are crucial for testing my hypotheses. Therefore, I use a fixed-

effects vector decomposition (FEVD) model which, unlike a fixed-effects model, allows for the estimation of time-invariant and rarely changing variables alike. The FEVD model has the advantage that it performs better in estimating time-invariant variables than a random-effects model as well as it is more efficient and reliable than a fixed-effects specification when it comes to rarely changing variables. The latter is especially true in cases where the overall R^2 is low, which is a common characteristic of international relations analyses (Plümper and Troeger 2007; 2011). I correct for serial correlation (Wooldridge test $F(1, 155)=679.676, p>0$) as well using a Prais-Winsten specification. On the other hand, no unit root is present in the data (Fisher test $\chi^2=9321.2134; p<0$), which is essential to meet the stationarity assumption of the Prais-Winsten model.

The result of the base model is supportive of hypothesis 4.1 (Model 1, Table 4.1). The effect of summit diplomacy on interstate relations is significant ($p=.000$) and, as expected, positive. That is, when the president of the United States meets with a foreign head of state or government, the summit improves relations among the leaders' countries with .236 on a 0-18.3 scale. When controlling for potential confounding factors summit diplomacy has a .240 positive impact on interstate relations (Model 2, Table 4.1). This approximately 1.3% improvement in bilateral relations supports evidence for the liberalist-idealist view of summit meetings.

Since the socialization explanation is an extension on this approach, summit meetings may be also interpreted as instruments of socialization. According to this, foreign leaders who meet the American president are understood to internalize more of the values that the United States propagates. Thus, these leaders are seen to conform more to the rules of the international society through their association with the power

responsible for the maintenance of that system. Regardless whether it is because of personal chemistry, the feeling of belonging to the same community, or greater affinity toward the rules and norms of the current international order, it is also fair to assume that leaders who met each other are more willing to distinguish acts that are meant to be messages to domestic audiences or are honest mistakes from intentional insults. Of course, this may only work within certain boundaries. Yet, it could be the key in leaders avoiding those unnecessary quarrels that the professional-realist camp cautions against.

Most control variables behave as expected. Controlling for foreign policy portfolio affinity and alliance helps avoid that the summit variable simply picks up on the effects of alliances and similar foreign policy objectives. Both of these control variables are statistically significant and positive: the United States has a more cooperative relationship both with his allies and countries of similar foreign policy orientation. Bilateral trade flow also has a positive impact on the relations of the United States: in general, the more the U.S. trades with a country, the more positive their relationship is. Superpower relations as well as contiguity have a statistically significant but negative impact: U.S.-Soviet relations are worse than the United States' relationship with other countries, and the closer a state is located to the United States the more conflictual their relationship is. It is only the regime type of the meeting state that does not meet my expectations: while the variable reaches statistical significance, the relationship is negative implying that the United States has worse relationship with democratic than with non-democratic countries *ceteris paribus*. This clearly contradicts the logic of the democratic peace thesis. My results are closer to Gartzke's (2007) interpretation of an existing capitalist peace in that it is economic relations – and thus indirectly Gartzke's

argument about economic development and free markets – rather than domestic regime type that determines conflict and cooperation between nations. Alternatively, it could be the result of an omitted variable bias due to a potentially missing interaction term between summits and regime type.

Table 4.1. The impact of summit diplomacy on interstate relations, 1948-2001

Independent Variables	Model 1 <i>FE ARI</i>	Model 2 <i>FEVD ARI</i>
Summit meeting	.236 *** (.025)	.240 *** (.034)
Democratic meeting state		-.484 *** (.013)
Alliance		.271 *** (.029)
Superpower		-.365 *** (.073)
Contiguity		-1.186 *** (.038)
Trade flow (3 lags)		.211 *** (.006)
Foreign policy affinity		.980 *** (.058)
Year		.012 *** (.001)
Eta		.957 *** (.006)
Constant	10.265 *** (.005)	-13.839 *** (0.008)
R ²	.0024	.1565
F	91.57***	4537.88***
N	79392	68638

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Two-tailed tests
Standard errors are in parentheses
Unit of analysis: US-country dyad month
Dependent variable: *conflict-cooperation scale*

Looking at the different types of summits not only reinforces the results above, but also tells a more complex and nuanced story. Model 3 (Table 4.2) tests the impact of U.S. presidential summits with the heads of democratic and non-democratic states. Since this requires the introduction of an interaction, I use Brambor, Clark, and Golder's (2006) method again to compute the marginal effect and standard error of this interaction. As earlier, the modifying variable, the regime type of the meeting state, takes only on the values of 0 and 1, and, therefore only these two values of the y-axis can be meaningfully interpreted on the figures below.¹²

However, the hypothesis (4.2) about the increased positive impact of presidential summits with democratic states does not receive support. Table 4.2 shows that the interaction term does not reach statistical significance ($p=0.432$) and Figure 4.2 supports this: although the dotted lines representing the 95% confidence interval are above zero which indicates a statistically significant result, and the difference between summit meetings with the heads of state of autocratic and democratic regimes is undistinguishable when it comes to the impact that summits play on interstate relations. The most likely explanation is that if a state leader is deemed worthy of a summit then they are considered to belong to that relatively small and tight-knit group of state leaders independently of how they have acquired and exercised power in his home country.

[Table follows on next page]

¹² These hold for the remaining interactions and figures as well.

Table 4.2. The impact of summit diplomacy on interstate relations under different conditions, 1948-2001

Independent Variables	Model 3	Model 4
Summit meeting	.214 *** (.054)	.150 ** (.057)
Cold War summits (interaction)		.137 * (.070)
Cold War		-.453 *** (.018)
Summit with democratic state (interaction)	-.044 (.069)	
Democratic meeting state	-.486 *** (.013)	-.511 *** (.013)
Alliance	.271 *** (.029)	.283 *** (.029)
Superpower	-.364 *** (.073)	-.295 *** (.073)
Contiguity	-1.185 *** (.036)	-1.156 *** (.036)
Trade flow (3 lags)	.211 *** (.006)	.199 *** (.006)
Foreign policy affinity	.980 *** (.058)	.965 *** (.058)
Year	.012 *** (.001)	.012 *** (.001)
Eta	.957 *** (.006)	.966 *** (.006)
Constant	-13.829 *** (.008)	15.236 *** (.015)
R ²	.1565	.1569
F	4085.59 ***	3627.94 ***
N	68638	68638

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Models: FEVD with AR1


Two-tailed tests

Standard errors are in parenthesis

Unit of analysis: US-country dyad month

Dependent variable: *conflict-cooperation scale*

Figure 4.2. Marginal effect of presidential summit meeting on interstate relations as the regime type of the meeting state changes, 1948-2001



In other words, all heads of state and government who are willing to go to the summit share a strong sense of belonging with their fellow leaders and believe that together they can personally either overcome existing difficulties between their countries or further advance their relations. Those who attend summit meetings with the American president accept and conform to the norms and rules that characterize the group of state leaders independently of their domestic regimes. If they do not, they are unlikely to engage in summity as aggravating relations with the United States is not in their interest, either. In other words, it means that even these leaders realize the socialization effect of summits: they try avoiding it by staying away from it. This way they can also assure that in relations with other states, or maybe at a later point in time even with the U.S., this tool of foreign policy-making remains available for them. It is so because there is a strong


chance that leaders who use summits for provoking conflict would not be considered again for another summit by the U.S. and other actors who wish to avoid such a scenario.¹³

Hypothesis 4.3 that addresses the differences between summits during and after the Cold War gained sufficient support (Model 4, Table 4.2). Summits during the Cold War are nearly twice as influential as summit meetings in the post-Cold War era. Cold War summits gave a 1.6% boost to relations between states compared to post-Cold War summits which only led to a .9% increase in cooperation (see Figure 4.3). That is, summit meetings had a much stronger effect during the Cold War than they have today. There were fewer summits conducted in the Cold War which meant that state leaders could spend more time together and this is crucial for socialization. Consequently, the fact that almost any state which does not violate basic international norms, has diplomatic relations with the United States, and accepts the norms of summitry can have a summit nowadays decreases the impact of these meeting.

[Figure follows on next page]

¹³ One must keep in mind, however, that there is a potential selection effect in play: those autocratic leaders who gained a summit with the American president might be different from those who were not considered summit worthy. While this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation, future analysis should look into both the determinants of summit meetings and how those factors may influence the way summit meetings affect interstate relations.

Figure 4.3. Marginal effect of presidential summit meetings during and after the Cold War, 1948-2001



This result may also be interpreted as a structural phenomenon: summits under a bipolar systemic structure can enhance interstate relations better than summits under a unipolar system. In the Cold War there were fewer states with whom the U.S. president met since leaders of the Second World rarely had an opportunity for a summit meeting with the American president. Their socialization into the international system depended on the Soviet Union and its leaders. This also explains why the Cold War reinforced itself for so long: while there were certain norms and rules that both superpowers propagated like non-intervention to the domestic affairs of other states, they also aimed at reinforcing values specific to Communism or democracy. When the Cold War collapsed, the United States remained the only superpower primarily responsible for the maintenance of the international order. Paradoxically, while it is the American value system that solely

augments the written and unwritten rules and norm of the international system today, summit meetings of the U.S. president are less effective in socializing states into the international system. In other words, if there are more states to be socialized into the international system and the great bulk of this is the responsibility of one state, the impact will be smaller than when there are two or more states interested in maintaining the international order and there are only a smaller circle of leaders who need to be introduced to and then treated as part of the international community.

Examining the joint impact of democratic and Cold War summits further enriches the story (Table 4.3). The ideal specification to measure the joint effect of summit meetings with the heads of non-democratic and democratic state under different systemic structures is to run a single regression that includes two-way interactions for the Cold War, democracy, and summits as well as a three-way interaction between all three variables.¹⁴ However, given the complexity that the interpretation of such a model requires, I opt for the more straightforward modeling choice and present the results by running two separate regressions: one for the Cold War and one for the post-Cold War period. While during the Cold War both democratic and non-democratic summits were statistically significant, there is no difference with regards to their impact. In the post-Cold War period, however, summits with democratic states are not only twice as influential, but non-democratic summits also fail to reach statistical significance (Figures 4.4 and 4.5).

¹⁴ This model was run and the results are largely confirmatory of the findings presented here.

Table 4.3. The impact of summit diplomacy conditional on the regime type of the meeting state during and after the Cold War, 1948-2001

Independent Variables	Model 5a <i>Cold War</i>	Model 5b <i>Post-Cold War</i>
Cold War summits	.279 *** (.060)	
Post-Cold War summits		.053 (.118)
Cold War summit with democratic state (interaction)	.011 (.079)	
Post-Cold War summit with democratic state (interaction)		.151 (.143)
Democratic meeting state	-.423 *** (.014)	.586 *** (.035)
Alliance	.199 *** (.031)	-.570 *** (.107)
Superpower	-.334 *** (.070)	
Contiguity	-1.151 *** (.038)	-.003 (.087)
Trade flow (3 lags)	.212 *** (.007)	-.024 (.027)
Foreign policy affinity	.894 *** (.064)	.303 (.270)
Year	.011 *** (.001)	.023 *** (.006)
Eta	.961 *** (.006)	.991 *** (.005)
Constant	-13.0324 *** (.008)	-35.065 *** (.028)
R ²	.1745	.1620
F	3549.55 ***	549.54 ***
N	52870	15644

Note: *p ≤ .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Models: FEVD with AR1

Standard errors are in parentheses

Unit of analysis: US-country dyad month

Dependent variable: *conflict-cooperation scale*

Figure 4.4. Marginal effect of presidential summit meetings on interstate relations as the regime type of the meeting state changes in the Cold War, 1948-1991





Figure 4.5. Marginal effect of presidential summit meetings on interstate relations as the regime type of the meeting state changes after the Cold War, 1992-2001



These support evidence for the general assumption that regime type received more attention with the end of the Soviet-American rivalry. The lack of difference between summits with democratic and autocratic leaders in the analysis of the entire 1948-2001 period is due to the predominance of Cold War summits in the database.

Given the high correlation between institutional vs. *ad hoc* and multilateral vs. bilateral summits it is not surprising that results for hypotheses 4 and 5 are quite similar (Table 4.4). Both *ad hoc* and bilateral meetings positively influence the relations of the United States with other states. Both lead to an approximately 1.5% improvement (Models 6 and 8). In both cases, the impact of these summits was about twice as strong during the Cold War than after it (Model 7 and 9; Figures 4.6 and 4.7). This offers additional support for hypothesis 4.3.

Results are also similar with regards to multilateral and institutional summits in that both multilateral ($p=.008$) and institutional summits ($p=.008$) reach statistical significance (Models 6 and 8). Nonetheless, the substantive impacts of both multilateral and institutional summits are smaller (about 1%) than those of *ad hoc* and bilateral summits respectively. Thus, expectations regarding the increased influence of institutional as opposed to *ad hoc* summits are not met (hypothesis 4.4).

[Table follows on next page]

Table 4.4. The impact of bilateral and multilateral, *ad hoc* and institutional summits on interstate relations, 1948-2001

Independent Variables	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Bilateral summits			.290 *** (.04)	.144 (.085)
Multilateral summits			.169 ** (.052)	.154 * (.074)
Cold War bilateral summits (interaction)				.197 * (.098)
Cold War multilateral summits (interaction)				.024 (.102)
<i>Ad hoc</i> summits	.273 *** (.40)	.164 * (.073)		
Institutional summits	.161 * (.061)	.129 (.087)		
Cold War <i>ad hoc</i> summits (interaction)		.153 (.085)		
Cold War institutional summits (interaction)		.058 (.120)		
Cold War	-.447 *** (.018)	-.452 *** (.018)	-.447 *** (.018)	-.452 *** (.018)
Democratic meeting state	-.510 *** (.013)	-.510 *** (.013)	-.510 *** (.013)	-.510 *** (.013)
Alliance	.284 *** (.029)	.283 *** (.029)	.283 *** (.029)	.283 *** (.029)
Superpower	-.295 *** (.073)	-.296 *** (.073)	-.294 *** (.073)	-.295 *** (.073)
Contiguity	-1.156 *** (.036)	-1.155 *** (.036)	-1.157 *** (.036)	-1.156 *** (.036)
Trade flow (3 lags)	.199 *** (.058)	.199 *** (.006)	.199 *** (.006)	.199 *** (.006)
Foreign policy affinity	.965 *** (.058)	.965 *** (.058)	.965 *** (.058)	.965 *** (.058)
Year	.013 *** (.001)	.012 *** (.001)	.013 ** (.001)	.012 ** (.001)
Eta	.966 *** (.006)	.966 *** (.006)	.966 *** (.006)	.966 *** (.006)
Constant	-15.304 *** (.015)	-15.258 *** (.015)	-15.299 *** (.015)	-15.259 *** (.015)
R ²	.1569	.1569	.1569	.1569
F	3629.66 ***	3070.69 ***	3629.44 ***	3070.33 ***
N	68638	68638	68638	68638

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Models: FEVD with AR1

Standard errors are in parentheses

Unit of analysis: US-country dyad month

Dependent variable: *conflict-cooperation scale*

Figure 4.6. Marginal effect of *ad hoc* presidential summitry on interstate relations during and after the Cold War, 1948-2001





Figure 4.7. Marginal effect of bilateral presidential summit meetings on interstate relations during and after the Cold War, 1948-2001



What does this mean from the perspective of socialization? While the above results show that institutional summits do not have a type II socializing influence, the amount and nature of interactions between heads of state and government at an *ad hoc* summit does caution against concluding that the underlying reasoning regarding the relationship between these types of summits and socialization is the opposite of the hypothesized one. In other words, *ad hoc* summits are unlikely to lead to type II socialization as it is not realistic to expect that leaders and their states will acquire a new identity as they confer with the American president for a few hours. Rather, both *ad hoc* and institutional summit meetings fulfill the criteria of type I socialization as heads, and thus their states, learn to play by the rules and norms of summit diplomacy and international relations (Bearce and Bondanella 2007). It seems, however, that this impact is less powerful at institutional summits potentially because of the more diverge cues that heads of state and government receive at such events and because of the shorter and less intensive personal interactions. Furthermore, the finding that institutional summits do improve interstate relations contradicts the lack of consistent evidence for the socializing effects of institutional interactions demonstrated elsewhere (cf. Kelley 2004; Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005) which may originate from differences in the types of institutional interactions used to measure the socialization experience.

In addition, there seems to exist only a minor difference between the impact of institutional and multilateral summits in and after the Cold War (Models 7 and 9; Figures 4.8 and 4.9). Institutional summits are significant during both periods without manifesting discernable differences in their impact. Whereas multilateral summits show

the same lack of substantive differences over the two periods, but they do not reach statistical significance after the end of the Cold War.

These could be also explained with the fact that although international organizations and multilateral gatherings of leaders gained more attention after the end of the bipolar world order, the increase in their number has not favored a deeper socialization experience. The growing number of these kinds of summits as well as the increasing number of attendees of many of these meetings made deeper socialization difficult due to less time and a growing number of cross-cutting influences from other members. It is also possible that in case of institutional summits the simple facts of more organizations and organizations with expanding membership could be a precondition that already raised the level of socialization between members and, thus, it is difficult to improve on it at the actual summit.

[Figure follows on next page]

Figure 4.8. Marginal effect of institutional presidential summit meetings on interstate relations during and after the Cold War, 1948-2001





Figure 4.9. Marginal effect of multilateral presidential summit meetings on interstate relations during and after the Cold War, 1948-2001



The results above, however, also confirm hypothesis 4.5 about bilateral summits being more effective in improving relations among states than multilateral ones (Model 8; see also Figures 4.7 and 4.9). This is another attestation to the potential importance of the length and depth of interactions at the summit to successful socialization.

Finally, after looking at the various types of summits – Cold War vs. post-Cold War, *ad hoc* vs. institutional, multilateral vs. bilateral summits, and meetings with democratic and autocratic leaders – and establishing that in general summit meetings have a positive impact on bilateral interstate relations, it is important to see whether or not the impact of summit meetings are lasting. For summits to have a socialization function it is essential that their impact extend beyond the short term effect that has been established above. To measure this I run an error correction model that allows for the estimation of both short and long-term effects (Table 4.5).

[Figure follows on next page]

Table 4.5. The long and short term impact of summit diplomacy on interstate relations, 1948-2001

Independent Variables	Model 8
Conflict-Cooperation (lagged)	-.245 *** (.003)
Summit meeting (short term)	.345 *** (.034)
Summit meeting (long term)	.305 *** (.047)
Democratic meeting state	-.123 *** (.015)
Alliance	.052 ** (.018)
Superpower	.003 (.075)
Contiguity	-.310 *** (.037)
Trade flow (3 lags)	.041 *** (.003)
Foreign policy affinity	.355 *** (.029)
Year	.004 *** (.001)
Eta	1.000 *** (.030)
Constant	-4.792 *** (.906)
R ²	.1235
F	878.65 ***
N	68778

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Standard errors are in parenthesis

Model: FEVD error correction\

Unit of analysis: US-country dyad month

Dependent variable: *conflict-cooperation scale*

Results show that a summit meeting between the heads of the United States and another country can lead to an immediate improvement of .345 (1.9%) in their bilateral relations. More importantly, summit meetings have a significant long-term impact on the

relations of the United States and the meeting state. This means that such a meeting can cause an additional positive change of 1.25 ($=.305/.245$) on the 18.3 scale – roughly 6.8% – over time. However, this takes a few months to materialize given that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is small ($\beta=.245$) which is an indication that the effect is spread out over a long period of time. This shows that summit meetings do not only result in short-lived tactical changes in the actions of the meeting state, but they also have a lasting impact on the behavior of states, which is what one would expect in case of the materialization of socialization. In sum, it is sufficient to conclude that the summit meetings of the American president have an important role to play in international politics even when they do not result in an agreement or build a friendship between the participants. In general, they lead to more peaceful relations between the United States and other states by socializing the head of state/government of the meeting state to the community of state leaders, and consequently, by helping him/her internalize the code of behavior of the international community.

Conclusion

Summit meetings are not only frequent, but also influential events of international politics both in the short and the long run. In general summits positively influence bilateral interstate relations causing an approximately 1-2% percent move toward cooperation. This result corresponds to the position of the liberalist-idealist camp that argues that summit meetings can improve interstate relations even if their reasoning seems just as inadequate as that of the professional-realists. I argued in this chapter that summit diplomacy exerts its influence on international politics not so much by the

personal likes or dislikes of heads of state and government but by socializing state leaders into the community of international leaders that has its own rules and norms. This helps heads of state and government overcome personal factors and concentrate on politics. Even when no specific agreement is signed, the realization by leaders that they bear responsibility toward not only their home state but also the international community is in itself influential. Similarly, heads of state and government understand that they have to conform to the rules of international politics as well as to those of their countries and therefore they are, to a certain extent, able to overlook the rhetorical encroachments of their fellow leaders.

The impact that summit meetings of the U.S. president and other heads of state/government is lasting but not eternal. My findings support evidence for the important socialization function that summits can play in international politics as well as for the central role of the United States in this process. However, this is not to argue that international politics in general are going to be more peaceful and cooperative with time as liberalists would expect. If summits between non-U.S. dyads have similar impact on the socialization of state leaders and the international relations of those dyads than it necessarily means the weakening of the influence of socialization exerted by the United States. In addition, any time a leader loses office, their socialization to the international community of leaders will not spill over to their successor. Consequently, the rules and norms have to be reinforced time after time at other summit meetings with the American president.

This puts a tremendous weight on the shoulders and schedule of the president of the United States, the state primarily responsible for the maintenance of the international

order since the Second World War. During the Cold War some of these burdens were shared with the Soviet Union. Today the U.S. is solely responsible for assuring the survival of the rules of international politics. Among other things, it means more summit meetings. Ironically, the more meetings the president attends, the less influential they seem to become.

Yet, one should be cautious to conclude that fewer summits are better. First, in many cases it would not mean that there are fewer summits with the same leader of one state. Rather it would mean either that heads of state/government of certain countries would never meet the president of the United States or that not every leader of a state would have a chance for a summit. These leaders would not be subject to the socializing effect of summit meetings. Even though the actual improvement in interstate relations due to a single summit meeting is relatively small, we saw that the effect is persistent in the long run. Hence, excluding certain leaders – and in some cases certain states – from this socialization experience might do more harm than good.

Therefore, it is not so much that the number of meetings in which the American president participates should change, but rather it is the kind of meetings that he should be paying more attention to. The consistently larger impact of bilateral and *ad hoc* summits suggests that they should be further prioritized to multilateral and institutional summits. Consequently, if a reduction in summit meetings is desirable, it should be done by eliminating some of the mushrooming multilateral and institutional summits that have much smaller impact but require just as much, if not more, preparations from the president.

Based on these findings as well as on certain theoretical considerations, the next chapter focuses on the impact of bilateral summits exclusively. In doing so, it keeps investigating the international impact of presidential summitry looking at its influence on international economic relations between the United States and developing meeting states.

CHAPTER 5: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BILATERAL SUMMIT MEETINGS

Introduction

On June 6, 1995 Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn rolled up to the gates of the White House on board of an America-Ikarus bus, a product of a joint American-Hungarian venture. He and U.S. President Bill Clinton toured the bus as part of their summit meeting that day. This rather unusual entrance was used to popularize the bus, improve its sale, and hence increase trade relations between the U.S. and Hungary (Gross 1995; Horn 1999). While efforts by heads of state and government are rarely this straightforward in advancing their goal of bringing improvement to their home economies, it illustrates the point well that state leaders, especially those of developing countries, try to exploit their meeting with the American president to improve bilateral relations not only politically but also economically. This chapter analyzes these efforts by looking at the impact of the American president's bilateral summit meetings with developing state leaders on bilateral trade relations of the two states as well as U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign aid to the meeting state. In general, I argue that just as these economic processes were found to 'follow the flag' – that is, diplomatic and political factors are understood to influence economic relations – they also 'follow the leader', that is, the American president to developing countries.

This chapter proceeds as follows. I start with discussing the importance and prevalence of summitry in the foreign relations of developing nations. Although my general argument remains the same, due to the differences in the natures of these three economic phenomena, I discuss them separately. Hence, I start with trade and after a

short overview of the literature I develop my hypotheses. The data and methodological section is followed by the description and discussion of results. I proceed in similar fashion regarding FDI and foreign aid. Finally, I elaborate on the implications of the differences that were uncovered with regards to the impact of summitry on these three economic processes.

Summitry and Developing Nations

Unlike the previous two chapters, this chapter focuses on the economic consequences of *ad hoc* bilateral summit meetings only. Multilateral summits are more formal, often compulsory for the heads of participating member states to attend, and give fewer opportunities for the leaders of developing states to draw attention to their country. Most importantly, most multilateral summits are institutional summits as well. This has the potential of introducing bias into the results. First, as Büthe and Milner (2008) show, membership in institutions may signal to the business community or aid donors a stable political setting in itself. Second, attending summits of an international organization is a duty rather than the choice of the participants. State leaders might tolerate each other at these meetings for the sake of the organization, but certain statesmen would not agree to a bilateral meeting. However, the willingness of the American president to meet the head of state of a developing country is essential for summits to have an impact on economic actors. Third, during an institutional summit heads of state and government share the limelight, and thus, the potential to make a favorable impression on potential investors, trade partners, and donor states are much smaller and more difficult.

On the one hand, the United States has the largest economy in the world, which makes it a good target for other states when they are interested in improving their economic performance. On the other hand, almost every nation has an interest to attract more money be it the results of foreign aid, foreign direct investment or bilateral trade. This need is even more pronounced in developing countries that lag behind in economic growth and lack the necessary domestic capital to improve their situation. Unfortunately, these are also the states that are less favorably positioned in the international system to obtain the necessary amount of money, as their relationship with the United States (and other advanced industrialized countries) is often more distant and their contacts are less frequent with American political or economic actors than it is in the case of developed nations. Therefore, these are the countries that are most keen on exploiting every opportunity they may have to improve economic relations with the United States.

Heads of state and government of developing countries are not only the agents with the most interest in playing an active role in this process in order to assure their own political survival, but they are also the ones best positioned to do so. Even democratic developing regimes are rather centralized, with a very prevalent role for the head of state/government. Moreover, because of the organization as well as the lack of expertise and sufficient resources of their foreign ministry, they frequently face difficulties in “the handling of the international economic aspects of foreign policy” (Barston 2006, 19). Often, developing country embassies differ in personnel or function from those of developed countries: other than the usual career diplomats and diplomatic tasks, they also tend to have more military personnel and invest much of their resources into monitoring political exiles. These reinforce “the tendency for developing countries to conduct their

foreign policy from the centre through personalized diplomacy rather than through their own foreign ministry and embassy channels” (Barston 2006, 74). Therefore, summit diplomacy is an important foreign policy tool for developing nations to conduct their political but especially economic relations with other states.

Bilateral Summit Meetings and Trade Relations, 1948-2000

Summits and the Political Determinants of Trade

The impact of diplomatic relations has been largely ignored regarding bilateral trade volumes despite extensive research on non-economic influences over the amount of trade between two countries. Although several scholars have addressed the issue before Pollins (see Hirschman 1945; Polachek 1980; Brada and Mendez 1983), it was his seminal articles (1989a; 1989b) that inspired an extensive research program on the political determinants of bilateral trade flows. Pollins argued that “changes in international politics affect trade ties” as improving political relations lead to higher level of trade flows while a turn for the worse in the relationship of states will decrease their bilateral trade (Pollins 1989b, 737). Utilizing a firm-based approach, Pollins offers an argument building on the general diplomatic climate between nations rather than on one or more specific type of foreign policy events. According to this, rational profit-maximizing firms are interested in a secure political environment and in avoiding the interruption of their business with other economic actors. Therefore, they prioritize trading partners in countries with whom their host state has a friendly relationship and refrain from conducting business with firms located in enemy states. Subsequent studies

taking a similar approach have provided further evidence and refined Pollins' findings (see Reuveny and Kang 1996; 1998; Reuveny 2001).

Other scholars are interested in the impact of specific international and domestic political factors. A variety of political factors has been shown to have a positive influence on trade. For alliances exerting this kind of effect, two reasons were cited. On the one hand, firms look for a safe business environment and they see allied governments as less likely to turn to policies such as economic sanctions or higher tariffs that would have a negative impact on trade. On the other hand, realists argue that trade between countries leads to gains in power for both and, thus, firms and especially states are led by relative power considerations and prioritize contributing to the economic capabilities of their allies rather than their foes (Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Mansfield and Bronson 1997a; 1997b; Long 2003; cf. Liberman 1996; Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998).

Analogous logic is used to explain why similarities in the foreign policy goals of two states may increase the level of trade in between them (Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998; Dixon and Moon 1993). Joint membership in intergovernmental organizations (Jacobson, Reisiner, and Mathers 1986; Rose 2004; Ingram, Robinson, and Busch 2005; Mansfield and Reinhardt 2008) or the existence of a preferential trade agreement (PTA) between two countries (Mansfield and Bronson 1997a; Mansfield and Reinhardt 2008) have also been shown to have a favorable impact on bilateral trade flows as they reduce opportunistic behavior by governments.

In contrast to the above events of international politics, dyadic conflict – whether operationalized as war or MID – has been found to have dampening effects on trade (Mansfield 1992; Mansfield and Bronson 1997a; Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Keshk,

Pollins, and Reuveny 2004; Kim and Rousseau 2005; Bliss and Russett 1998; Anderton and Carter 2001a cf. Morrow Siverson, and Tabares 1998; Barbieri and Levy 1999).

Morrow (1999) contends that from diplomatic signals between states firms are able to anticipate the occurrence of a conflict and, hence, hedge against it by diverting their trade away from troubled states to countries with more stable political relations and safer business climates before a crisis materializes. However, claims about the *ex post* impact of trade is more common as firms cannot always foresee the worsening of political relations as some conflicts emerge abruptly and, therefore, they suffer its consequences (see Li and Sacko 2002).

Convincing evidence has been supported for the positive impact of one domestic political variable, namely the regime type of trading partners (for example Bliss and Russett 1998; Dixon and Moon 1993; Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998). Especially relevant to the present study is Dixon and Moon's (1993) finding that U.S. exporters favored democratic to non-democratic states. In general, they argue that the existence of democratic institutions make for a less volatile political and economic environment due to less involvement by the government in the economy and to the presence of an effective legal system where firms have a realistic chance to contest arbitrary moves by the government. Moreover, familiarity with the democratic regime type may not only make agreements on lowering trade barriers between democratic countries easier, but may also attract American traders as they are more comfortable operating in such a political system.

Despite the fact that meetings between heads of state and government are frequent events of international politics, this diplomatic method has fallen outside the interest of

scholars studying the impact of political factors of trade. It is rather surprising given that diplomatic relations have been understood as crucial to the political environment of trade and, thus, to the behavior of firms (see Morrow 1999). Most likely this ignorance results not so much from a lack of interest, but from the fact that ‘diplomatic relations’ is a rather broad term that is difficult to quantify. Focusing on summit diplomatic interactions helps overcome this barrier.

Finally, a substantial part of the literature makes general claims about the impact of one or more political factors, but tests their cases on a limited set of countries (e.g. Pollins 1989a; 1989b; Morrow, Siverson, Tabares 1998; Mansfield and Bronson 1997b). Very little is known about developing countries as studies usually focus on more advanced states or just lump developing states together with developed ones. Findings relevant to developing countries point out that states less integrated into the world economy are likely to be more vulnerable to political forces (Pollins 1989a), which suggests that developing states take a different approach and are subject to different influences in international economic relations. In addition, articles examining specifically the bilateral trade relations of the United States with other countries, especially with developing states, are also rather rare (see Dixon and Moon 1993; Summary 1993).

This section makes up for the above gaps in the literature by focusing on the impact of summit meetings on the bilateral trade relations of the United States and developing countries.

U.S. Bilateral Summits and Trade

In the post-WWII liberal economic order almost every nation has an incentive to be an active participant in international trade. Those states who are latecomers to the international economic scene are the ones most in need to improve their participation in the global economy in order to catch up with developed nations. Developing countries are primarily interested in finding markets for their products but they may also look for importing basic commodities, everyday goods, and technology. On the other hand, these nations offer new markets for industrialized Western economic actors.

Whether exporting to or importing from developing nations American businesses are driven by making a profit. Therefore, developing countries have two necessary conditions to fulfill to become attractive to American firms. First, they need to create an economic environment that can offer low prices for foreign importers and high enough demand for foreign exporters in order to make the endeavor profitable to these firms. Second, in order to avoid actual or expectational losses traders prioritize states with durable trade policies so that their profit is predictable. More importantly, the risk averseness of firms also means that they shy away from doing business in political environments that are unstable due to political turmoil.

There is, however, a sufficient condition that is often overlooked in the literature. It is not enough for a country to offer promising economic returns and political stability. This has to be communicated to business firms. In every given time there might be dozens of states that fulfill the necessary conditions. Hence, a competition emerges between these traders and markets to convince potential partners to choose their business and, thus, their states.

Notwithstanding the fact of serious market analysis before an investment decision, the choice of the actual trading partner from the list of eligible firms may be somewhat arbitrary. For example, after the fall of Communism in Central Europe, German businessmen often favored Hungary to other states in the region due to their gratitude for the Hungarian government's decision to let East German refugees through to the West rather than deport them back to East Germany – a decision that contributed to the reunification of Germany. Similarly, the preferences of some American businessmen are influenced by such personal factors as their ethnic origins (Gillespie et al. 1999).¹⁵

Given that the United States has the largest and most developed economy in the world, it offers an excellent opportunity for economic actors in developing countries who are looking for a foreign market. Likewise, numerous American firms try to find new markets beyond America's borders and for some of them emerging new markets in these developing nations offer great opportunities. The size of the American economy means that there is a large circle of economic actors that the leader of the meeting state may court to improve economic relations. These actors are not politically motivated: they make their decisions strictly on an economic basis. Consequently, the impact of summits can only be indirect as they can influence actors' opinion about the political context. I identify two mechanisms through which summit meetings can contribute to this process.

First, during their meetings the U.S. president and the head of the developing state are likely to discuss economic issues including trade relations between their states.

Leaders of developing countries might push for a favorable change in American tariff policy toward their states, for example, by lobbying for most preferred nation status for

¹⁵ Partly, of course, this is due to the fact that their country of origin tries to cultivate a good relationship with its foreign diasporas (King and Melvin 1999-2000).

their states. Often, however, obtaining a simple endorsement by the U.S. president regarding the importance of economic and political relations between the two countries at the post-summit press conference could be satisfactory for developing states.

Second, the president's willingness to receive a foreign dignitary or to travel to a certain state may send positive signals to the market. The notion that 'trade follows the flag' emphasizes that economics is inseparable from the political environment, as firms are interested in politically safe business environments in order to avoid the loss that they would suffer from the interruption of trade. Similarly to the existence of alliances, bilateral summit meetings can help signal a secure political environment for businesses. On the one hand, since a meeting with the American president equals recognition by the international community and since meeting an unreliable leader can have audience costs for the U.S. president at home, the president tries to avoid meeting foreign heads who might be subject to irregular political removal. For example, between 1961 and 1985, when heads of state in Argentina changed annually without the prospect of a stable regime, no bilateral meetings between the Argentine leader and the U.S. president occurred.¹⁶ Similarly, the president is unlikely to travel to states where the domestic political situation is unstable, and hence, he is at risk. Finally, if the president considers a foreign leader worthy of a summit meeting, the business community can understand it as a signal that aggravation of relations – economic sanctions or military action against and by the host state – is not on the horizon.

¹⁶ This hiatus in bilateral summits cannot be equated with the rejection of the military junta for several reasons. First, meetings ceased before the first military *coup d'etat* took place. Second, there were no U.S.-Argentine summit meetings during the short but unstable democratic regime beginning at the end of the 1950s. Nor was President Alfonsín – the Argentine president who was democratically elected in 1983 – invited to the White House until 16 months into his tenure.

Pollins (1989a; 1989b) openly emphasizes the importance of diplomatic relations to the level of trade flows between two countries. Unlike Pollins, however, I am not interested in the effect of the general diplomatic climate of two states, but in the impact of one specific type of diplomatic episodes: summit meetings. By this I take the argument one step further and argue that this political environment is not always a given and that it can be directly or indirectly influenced to a certain extent by political actors.

Accordingly, summits are one of those few means through which heads of state and government can influence bilateral trade relations between their two countries.

Consequently, I hypothesize that (hypothesis 5.1) *ad hoc bilateral summit meetings between the heads of state/government of the U.S. and a developing country will lead to higher levels of trade between these two states.*

Even though firms in both the U.S. and the developing meeting state are looking for new markets, their ability to penetrate the market differs. Firms in developed economies enjoy advantages over businesses of developing nations (O'Brien and Helleiner 1980). First, they have an advantage in obtaining information about the potential business climate. American firms are more likely to be able to afford a more thorough market research and better understand the demand of consumers in their potential target state. Second, some of this information is collected systematically in the United States and can be purchased by economic actors whereas these kinds of efforts are largely missing in developing countries, as neither the state nor economic actors can afford investing into similar data collection efforts (O'Brien and Helleiner 1980). Third, as a result of better information and bigger flexibility in production, American firms are more likely to be able to meet the demands of the market they are interested in

penetrating. For many firms in developing countries such opportunities are limited: they have to deal with what they have, that is, their ability to conform to the demands of the new market is limited and they try to sell their product as is. Finally, these firms and states are less integrated into the world economy and significantly more vulnerable to the consequences of economic interdependence. They also have less of an ability to resist penetration by foreign economic or political actors (Pollins 1989a). Therefore, I expect that (hypothesis 5.2) *a U.S. presidential summit will have a larger influence on U.S. export to the meeting state than on U.S. import from the same state.*

Finally, with the end of the Cold War not only the international political context changed but a new economic order has also emerged. Although it was in the making for several years, a global liberal economic order became only possible when Capitalism triumphed over Communism. Therefore, it is fair to expect that summit meetings had a different role to play in and after the Cold War. Fewer summit meetings, more media attention, and clearer lines between friends and enemy suggest that (hypothesis 5.3) *summit meetings have a greater influence on bilateral trade relations during than after the Cold War.*

Data and Methods

My data is arrayed in a time-series (years) cross-section (dyads) format. Each dyad contains the United States and a developing nation. Developing countries are those that were not members of the OECD in the given year. The dependent variables – import, export, and total bilateral trade – are based on Gleditsch's (2002) data limiting the analysis to the 1948-2000 period. The data is in millions of current year U.S. dollars. Due

to different domestic book keeping methods, information for U.S. export data to a developing nation does not match that nation's import from the United States and *vice versa*. To overcome this problem, I have decided to use averages for these variables. In each case I take the natural log of the variables.

Ad hoc bilateral summit diplomatic meeting is my main explanatory variable. This dummy variable is coded 1 if at least one summit meeting took place between the president of the United States and the head of the meeting state in the given year. Hence, this variable differs from the one used in chapter 4 in two ways. First, the data is aggregated up to yearly level. While this leads to some loss of information, it is necessary given that only yearly data is available for the dependent and several other control variables. Second, since this chapter focuses on *ad hoc* bilateral meetings, multilateral and institutional summits were dropped. Finally, this variable is lagged with one year as it is likely that if summits have an impact on investor behavior then a certain amount of time is necessary to pass between the date of the summit and the actual investment.

First, I account for the impact of economic factors on trade and I use a gravity model. Consequently, I add a variable for the size of the economy of each state in the dyad. In general, states with larger economies tend to trade more (Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny 2004). I use Gleditsch's (2002) real GDP per capita figures that are measured in constant U.S. dollars using 1996 as the base year.

Furthermore, states with larger population have larger domestic markets, and thus, it is more likely that supply and demand find each other within the borders of the country. Hence, the larger the population of a country the smaller its participation in international trade will be (Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny 2004). I include a population variable for both

states in the dyad using the total population measure of the *Correlates of War* project (2008; Singer, Bremer, Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987).

In addition, states that are located too close to each other are more likely to become trading partners as traders have to deal with lower transportation costs and thus have a chance for making a larger profit. The distance variable measures the closeness of two national capitals in miles (Bennett and Stam 2000). I take the natural log of all economic variables.

Second, several political variables have been found to influence trade flows and I control for these as well. Democratic dyads tend to trade more than other dyads. I include the dummy variable for democratic meetings states where democracies are denoted by “1” and non-democracies by “0”. The variable is lagged with one year.

In order to make sure that the summit variable does not pick up on the effect of similarity in foreign policy goals, I have included the control variable for foreign policy affinity. States whose foreign policy positions are close are likely to have higher levels of trade (Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998). Therefore, I expect this variable to have a positive relationship with the dependent variable.

Allies are also more likely to trade with each other. I use again the ATOP (Leeds 2005) dataset’s alliance dummy. Being allied with the United States is expected to positively influence their trade relationship.

Mansfield and Bronson (1997a; Mansfield and Reinhardt 2008) show that the existence of a preferential trade agreement between a pair of states increases bilateral trade levels, so I add a dummy variable for PTAs using Hafner-Burton and Montgomery’s (2008) data. The variable is lagged with one year.

The negative impact of conflict on trade has received overwhelming support in the literature (e.g. Mansfield 1992; Mansfield and Bronson 1997a; Barbieri and Levy 1999; Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny 2004; Kim and Rousseau 2005; Bliss and Russett 1998; cf. Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998), so I include the COW's dichotomous variable which is coded "1" (=conflict) if in the given year there was an ongoing MID within the dyad (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). This variable is not lagged as I expect conflict to have more abrupt effect on trade than other political factors.

Since the period of analysis covers both the Cold War and the post-1991 era and since trade relations were greatly liberalized in the latter as well as more countries joined the ranks of market economies after the fall of the Eastern bloc trade patterns are likely to be different under the bipolar and unipolar systemic structures, I include the dummy variable for the Cold War that I have employed previously. I expect trade levels to be higher in the post-Cold War era.

I employed a Prais-Winsten feasible generalized least squares estimation (Wooldridge test $F(1, 139)=25.353, p>0$). In addition, I also corrected for heteroskedasticity (Breusch-Pagan test $\chi^2=2859.692; p\text{-value}=0.000$).¹⁷ No unit root is present in the data (Fisher test $\chi^2=672.723; p<0$), which is essential to meet the stationarity assumption of the Prais-Winsten model. Although the presence of unit specific errors is confirmed by the Hausman test ($\chi^2=26291.25; p=0$), I have decided against using a fixed effects model so that the effect of slow-moving variables such as the democracy indicator of the meeting state can also be meaningfully estimated. Since the

¹⁷ In Stata 10.1, I used `xtgls` with the `ar(1)` and `panels(heteroskedastic)` options.

main independent variable of interest remained robust to various specifications, the modeling decision does not influence my finding about the effect of summit diplomacy on interstate relations.¹⁸

Results and Discussions

The result of the aggregate trade model is confirmatory of hypothesis 5.1 (Table 5.1). The impact of summit meetings are statistically significant ($p=0.020$) and to the expected positive direction. Consequently, a bilateral summit meeting between the U.S. president and the head of a developing nation does have a positive impact on the total trade flow between their countries. However, the substantive impact is relatively modest: a summit meeting with the U.S. president means an approximately 2.2% increase in average trade levels between the United States and the meeting state.

Nonetheless, disaggregating the trade variable into U.S. exports and imports results in a more complex understanding of how summit meetings may impact trade relations. Only American exports but not imports increase as a result of presidential summitry, which confirms hypothesis 5.2. Export by American firms to a developing nation receive a statistically significant ($p=0.003$), 3.3% boost in the year following a bilateral summit meeting between the president and the leader of that nation.

¹⁸ Diagnostic information in the main text is presented for equations including *total trade* as the dependent variable. As the other dependent variables, *U.S. export* and *U.S. import*, are subsets of the total trade flow within the dyad, diagnostics yield much the same conclusions: there is no unit root (Fisher test, U.S. export: $\chi^2=838.071$, $p<0$; U.S. import: $\chi^2=428.32$, $p<0$), there is serial correlation (Wooldridge test, U.S. export: $F(1, 139)=77.191$, $p>0$; U.S. import $F(1, 139)=36.086$, $p>0$), and unit specific errors (Hausman test, U.S. export: $\chi^2=26576.56$; $p=0$; U.S. import: $\chi^2=24719.92$; $p=0$). The only difference is that the dependent variable for U.S. export manifest heteroskedasticity (Brausch-pagan test: $\chi^2=2551.413$, $p\text{-value}=0.000$) while U.S. import does not (U.S. import: $\chi^2=749.789$; $p\text{-value}=8.e-152$). Therefore, I drop the heteroskedasticity option in Stata when analyzing the impact of bilateral summits on U.S. import.

Table 5.1. The impact of bilateral U.S. presidential summit meetings on U.S. trade with the developing meeting state, 1948-2000

Independent Variables	Model 1 <i>DV: Total trade</i>	Model 2 <i>DV: US export</i>	Model 3 <i>DV: US import</i>
Bilateral summits	.021* (.009)	.032** (.011)	.007 (.024)
Democratic meeting state	.080** (.029)	.111*** (.032)	.156* (.079)
Alliance	.010 (.048)	.064 (.055)	.147 (.098)
Preferential trade agreement	.291*** (.069)	.352*** (.076)	.403* (.180)
Militarized interstate disputes	-.247*** (.071)	-.177* (.077)	-.410*** (.101)
Foreign policy affinity	.990*** (.083)	.955*** (.096)	-1.165*** (.179)
U.S. population	.264 (.352)	1.339** (.403)	-1.845* (.924)
Meeting state population	.893*** (.016)	.880*** (.017)	.915*** (.044)
Size of US economy	.999*** (.165)	.420* (.191)	2.271*** (.419)
Size of meeting state economy	1.215*** (.026)	1.262** (.026)	1.380*** (.067)
Distance	-.720*** (.049)	-.730*** (.048)	-.466** (.144)
Cold War	-.212*** (.034)	-.228*** (.038)	-.141 (.078)
Constant	-19.333*** (2.891)	-27.670*** (3.258)	-11.080 (7.760)
Wald χ^2	7617.35***	7776.77***	1223.01***
N	4996	4922	4850

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Models: FGLS with AR1

Two-tailed tests

Standard errors are in parentheses

Unit of analysis: US-country dyad year

A summit can call the attention of the American business community to an otherwise lesser known state and attract American investors and exporters to those markets by also assuring them about a safe political and economic environment.

However, the size of this boost is quite small. The reason behind this could be manifold: first, not all summits result in equal media attention and, thus, some meeting states will have much less to gain from them. Second, there are many factors influencing trade relations and summitry is only one of them. Third, markets in these developing states vary in size, but quite often are rather limited. Thus, only certain types of products can be sold in these markets and only in limited quantities.

The same, however, cannot be said about foreign firms' ability to penetrate the U.S. market. While the impact of summits on American import from developing nations is to the expected positive direction, it is not only substantively smaller ($\beta_{\text{EXPORT}}=0.032$; $\beta_{\text{IMPORT}}=0.007$) than in the case of U.S. export levels, but also statistically insignificant. Hence, while summit meetings do have a small impact on bilateral trade relations, they seem to reinforce rather than overcome the existing asymmetrical interdependence between developed industrialized nations – represented here by the United States – and developing nations. American firms see these states as an opportunity, however small, to expand their market. The advantage that American firms possess in information, size, wealth, flexibility, and thus in their ability to adapt to local demand over the firms in developing countries give them an edge in penetrating the market.

In the aggregate trade model all of the political control variables are to the expected direction: alliances, PTAs, similarity in foreign policy goals and the presence of a democratic regime in the meeting state all boost bilateral trade, while the presence of a conflict dampens it. Note, however, that the impact of dyadic alliance is not statistically

significant, yet, the high correlation (.656) between dyadic alliance and foreign policy similarity can account for this.¹⁹

As for the economic variables, they also confirm expectations with one noteworthy exception: the size of meeting state's population has a positive rather than a negative effect, so the larger the population of a country, the more likely it is for the state to engage in foreign trade. This finding contradicts Keshk, Pollins, and Revueny's (2004) argument. It is possible that these developing countries have relatively small population where even the larger markets fail to reach the tipping point that is necessary for a higher balance between supply and demand. Finally, the distance and Cold War variables perform as expected and they are statistically significant as well: bilateral trade flows are higher after the Cold War which is not surprising given the rapid expansion of the liberal economic order in that period, and American firms trade more with countries that are located geographically closer to the United States.

A look at political control variables further emphasizes that the factors that determine U.S. exports differ from the determinants of U.S. imports from developing nations. In general, political factors seem to be more important for U.S. exporters: all political control variables are to the expected direction and statistically significant including the existence of dyadic alliance. When it comes to U.S. import, however, neither alliance nor the existence of a military dispute seem to have an impact. This suggests that earlier disagreements in the literature about the exact impact of alliances and conflict could originate from differences in export, import, and aggregate level findings (e.g. Barbieri and Levy 1999; 2001; Anderton and Carter 2001a; 2001b).

¹⁹ Another possible explanation is that, as Long (2003) argues, not all alliances matter equally and only defense pacts should have an impact on bilateral trade.

Furthermore, as for the economic control variables, results regarding U.S. exports match aggregate trade results, whereas all of these variables are influential regarding U.S. imports. It seems that U.S. import levels from these countries are less affected by political variables and more by economic factors. The difference in the volume of exports and imports could account for this, and so could the possibility that existing payment methods and more developed banking practices help American firms be more successful in working against the negative impacts of political instability in case of imports. Finally, the Cold War and the parallel transition to a more open world market had no impact on the U.S. import levels which further supports the conclusion above with regards to the impacts of summits.

Exploring the differences under two different systemic conditions helps in reconsidering the impacts of economic liberalization (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). In general, the impact of summit diplomacy is positive across both periods and all three dependent variables. However, statistical significance shows that most of the above findings regarding the impact of summits on trade are the result of U.S. export during the Cold War. After the Cold War summit meetings are no longer a good guide for traders in their search for stable markets. Therefore, results partially support hypothesis 5.3, as summit meetings during the Cold War have indeed been found more influential regarding trader behavior but only in case of U.S. export. The impact of summits on U.S. imports is equally inconsequential in both eras.

[Table follows on next page]

Table 5.2. The impact of bilateral U.S. presidential summit meetings on U.S. trade with the developing meeting state during the Cold War, 1948-1991

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	<i>DV: Total trade</i>	<i>DV: US export</i>	<i>DV: US import</i>
Bilateral summits	.020 (.011)	.030* (.012)	.008 (.028)
Democratic meeting state	.067 (.036)	.091* (.039)	.190 (.100)
Alliance	.170** (.055)	.243*** (.063)	.298** (.113)
Preferential trade agreement	.333** (.102)	.368** (.113)	.375 (.246)
Militarized interstate disputes	-.250** (.087)	-.130 (.090)	-.447*** (.120)
Foreign policy affinity	.693*** (.086)	.561*** (.099)	1.097*** (.190)
U.S. population	.980*** (.364)	1.629*** (.413)	1.075 (.929)
Meeting state population	.854*** (.019)	.861 (.018)	.889*** (.047)
Size of US economy	.970*** (.177)	.627** (.202)	2.016*** (.439)
Size of meeting state economy	1.162*** (.030)	1.209*** (.0294)	1.381*** (.439)
Distance	-.713*** (.053)	-.694*** (.051)	-.465** (.151)
Constant	-27.238*** (2.995)	-33.100*** (3.328)	-17.924* (7.824)
Wald χ^2	5301.10***	5564.37***	931.86***
N	3846	3772	3729

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Models: FGLS with AR1

Two-tailed tests

Standard errors are in parentheses

Unit of analysis: US-country dyad year

Table 5.3. The impact of bilateral U.S. presidential summit meetings on U.S. trade with the developing meeting state after the Cold War, 1992-2000

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	<i>DV: Total trade</i>	<i>DV: US export</i>	<i>DV: US import</i>
Bilateral summits	.016 (0.17)	.038 (.021)	.001 (.057)
Democratic meeting state	.261*** (.050)	.204*** (.052)	.220 (.132)
Alliance	-.105 (.069)	.067 (.071)	-.216 (.182)
Preferential trade agreement	1.457*** (.077)	1.539*** (.076)	1.296*** (.261)
Militarized interstate disputes	-.197 (.162)	-.235 (.171)	-.319 (.235)
Foreign policy affinity	.810*** (.129)	.861*** (.139)	1.305*** (.363)
U.S. population	-1.321 (1.786)	-.709 (2.231)	-4.482 (5.245)
Meeting state population	.856*** (.015)	.820*** (.018)	.942*** (.059)
Size of US economy	1.341 (.693)	.169 (.863)	3.925 (2.033)
Size of meeting state economy	1.290*** (.034)	1.284*** (.034)	1.430*** (.091)
Distance	-.912*** (.077)	-1.139*** (.067)	-.550* (.220)
Constant	-1.943 (15.662)	3.993 (19.479)	4.870 (46.165)
Wald χ^2	8183.15***	7474.59***	727.44***
N	1147	1147	1118

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Models: FGLS with AR1

Two-tailed tests

Standard errors are in parentheses

Unit of analysis: US-country dyad year

Indeed, it seems that after 1991 other factors gain higher importance in traders' eyes when selecting their trading partners. Similarly to summits, alliance and MIDs between the United States and a developing country are no longer significant determinants of the volume of trade with developing countries while the meeting state's

democratic status and the existence of preferential trade agreements weigh much more heavily in the materialization of trade. Another interesting occurrence is that in the Cold War those indicators that describe the United States' economy were crucial to trade, while this evaporated after the collapse of the Soviet Union. A possible explanation for these developments is that American foreign policy interests dominated even private trade decisions more heavily during the Cold War than in the following era: in other words it was the United States' needs and position in the international system that determined the materialization of trade during their competition with the Soviet Union while later the characteristics of the meeting state are more heavily considered. Partially, these processes also account for the differences in the impact of the summit meetings: during the Cold War a summit meeting was a sure sign of good relations between two countries and, thus, of American foreign policy interests. With the collapse of the bipolar world order summit meetings became too frequent and too widespread with developing states for it to have an impact on the decision of traders.

Bilateral Summit Meetings and Foreign Direct Investment, 1966-2000

Political Stability, Summits, and FDI

President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia had the opportunity to meet President George H. W. Bush in both 1990 and 1991. Each time their negotiations focused on the economic transition of post-Communist Czechoslovakia, the importance of lifting U.S. trade barriers and that of the growing American investments to the Central European state. Instead of requesting more U.S. government aid, Havel "has asked for support in getting more U.S. investment" at his summit meetings with President Bush and the treaty

that they signed “aimed at providing what Bush called ‘an attractive investment climate’ for U.S. investors” (“Havel Visit” 1990; Devroy 1991). This is a great example of how foreign heads of state and government try to use the occasion of a summit meeting not only to obtain more favorable trade conditions, but also to facilitate U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) to their countries.

Foreign direct investment refers to “private capital flows that provide a parent firm with control over an enterprise outside the home country” (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007). FDI is an illiquid capital: once the investment is made, FDI – unlike portfolio investments – cannot be easily withdrawn if circumstances change and the profitability of the enterprise is no longer ensured. In addition, the return of the costs of the investment requires long time horizons (Jensen 2003; Ahlquist 2006). Therefore, political conditions are especially important for foreign investors. Initially, investors feared expropriation/nationalization of their assets, however, this is not a widespread concern anymore. Rather, foreign direct investors are interested in the general political climate – its stability and predictability. It is especially so as there is no one general international – multilateral – regime for foreign direct investment mainly because developing countries reject the idea (Büthe and Milner 2008).

Research so far has looked at various political factors when seeking to explain the patterns of FDI inflows to developing countries. They include both domestic and international conditions. Regime type has received most of the attention. In general, democracies attract more FDI than autocracies (Jensen 2003; 2006; Tuman and Emmert 2004). Yet, Oneal (1994) argues that investment in autocratic developing countries yield higher returns than in democratic nations of the periphery. Consequently, autocracies

have something to offer to investors. In fact, investors are not so much interested in regime type but rather in the stability of any regimes. It is well-demonstrated by Resnick's (2001) finding that emerging new democracies, where the outcomes of the transition process are still in doubt, are unattractive for investors. The potential for riots and other societal conflicts has also been found to impact the willingness of foreign capital to flow to certain countries negatively (Alesina and Perotti 1996; Jodice 1980; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2006).

Nonetheless, the attractiveness of democracies is generally explained by the existence of multiple veto players, which puts restrictions on a democratic government to change its policy. They also have to face an audience cost if they fail to live up to their policy commitments. Given that losing FDI can lead to worsening economic and social conditions for their constituents, leaders try to avoid this outcome because they can be held accountable for it by the electorate and removed from office (Jensen 2003). Hence, countries with the probability of irregular political changes push long-term investors away while regular government changes that characterize democracies have no negative effect on FDI (Feng 2001). Government stability eliminates a large proportion of uncertainty about the future and makes the calculations of costs and benefits easier and more predictable for investors. Furthermore, democracies often pursue liberal economic policies that are especially attractive to foreign investors.

Finally, the probability of diplomatic or military conflicts between the sender and host nations of the investment scares investors away. Following this logic some argue (Jones and Kane 2005; Little and Leblang 2004; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007) that U.S. foreign direct investment "follows the flag." That is, American investment favors states

where U.S. troops are stationed. Investors consider troop stationing as a security assurance: in the presence of American troops host countries are less likely to act against American FDI. It does not only make the investment environment safer, but states that accept the stationing of U.S. troops on their soil usually have or eventually will develop a good political relationship with the United States. Therefore, American investors do not have to fear the negative consequences of interstate politics. Following this logic, I contend that summit meetings may play a similar role.

While every nation is interested in attracting FDI for the prosperity of their economy, foreign direct investment is vital for the operation and growth of developing country economies (Jensen 2003). These investments are crucial for developing countries to “increase their capital stock, encourage technology transfer, generate employment and increase tax revenues” (Jensen 2004, 201; see also Resnick 2001). Since these states lack sufficient amount of capital at home, they have to find investors abroad.

Given that political stability often depends on economic stability and prosperity in these countries, leaders of developing nations have a vested interest in working toward attracting foreign investors to their country. Regardless of whether economic troubles make them likely to suffer a regular removal from office as it happens in democratic regimes or whether the entire regime will be overthrown as it is more characteristic of autocratic regimes, those in power positions try to avoid this outcome. Incumbents who can attract enough resources to satisfy their (s)electorate will succeed. The need for a generally high level of economic performance is more straightforward in democracies where keeping one’s leadership position is based on providing public rather than private goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002). Hence, if the entire economy is doing better

creating high level of employment, higher wages, job security, and better social conditions, the democratic leader is more likely to stay in office. Since in developing countries domestic private and public capitals are scarce resources, investment from foreign firms can generally contribute to the above goal.

This need is not unique to democratic leaders. Autocratic leaders may also preserve their power by satisfying their selectorate. What is more, this is easier for them to do as the circle of people to satisfy is smaller in autocratic than in democratic states. Nonetheless, they are also constrained by limited domestic resources. Therefore, attracting foreign capital can help strengthening their power, too. Although the distribution mechanisms differ across the two regime types, the need for more resources is mutual. Consequently, heads of state and government of developing democratic and autocratic nations are equally interested in attracting foreign capitals. Although evidence shows that democracies are somewhat more successful, under the right conditions autocratic regimes can be appealing to foreign investors (Oneal 1994).

Developing countries have two necessary conditions to fulfill to become attractive investment sites. First, either through domestic policy moves such as breaks or through interstate agreements like bilateral investment treaties, they need to create an economic environment that can turn capital investment into a profitable venture. Second, due to the illiquid nature of foreign direct investment, they have to ascertain that foreign investors can trust that these policies are not going to change and that political and social conditions remain such that they do not have to fear losing their money. In this, a stable political context is crucial. It requires an environment where political turmoil is unlikely

and the government has the necessary political capacity to enforce its policies (Feng and Chen 1997).

Similarly to trade relations, there is a sufficient condition that is often overlooked in the literature. As in any given time there might be dozens of states that fulfill the necessary conditions of political stability and economic profitability, a competition emerges between these capital craving developing countries to convince potential investors to choose their states rather than another. States that can communicate the existence of favorable economic and political conditions are the ones most likely to succeed in attracting investors.

The United States is the largest foreign direct investor in the world, and as such it is a primary target for developing countries who seek foreign capital. The size of the American economy means that there is a large circle of economic actors that the leader of the meeting state may court to improve economic relations. On the other hand, although they consider political or even military conditions when assessing the level of risk associated with the market, these actors make their decisions primarily on an economic basis. They are not motivated by political goals and therefore politicians – including heads of state and government – can only influence their decision indirectly. As in the case of bilateral tradeflows, I put forward two mechanisms through which summit meetings may contribute to this process.

First, during the meeting of the U.S. president and the head of the developing state the economic issues they discuss can be that of the need for foreign capital in the meeting state. The leader of the developing country might lobby for a favorable change in American policy toward their state, for example, through American tax laws that give

preferences to the mother company of multinational companies (MNC) that invest in developing nations. A public endorsement by the U.S. president stressing the importance of economic and political relations between the two countries may also provide assurance to investors.

Second, the president's willingness to receive a foreign dignitary or to travel to a certain state can serve as a signal of stability in the meeting state. The American president will avoid meeting foreign leaders who have dubious reputation at home and abroad and who will put the president in unfavorable international and domestic positions. He is also avoid travelling to states where he is in potential physical danger because as the domestic political situation of the meeting state is unstable and/or unpredictable. The very fact that the foreign leader was deemed worthy of a summit with the American president may signal to businessmen that relations between the United States and the meeting state are stable or improving and that state actions endangering the success and profitability of business ventures – sanctions, armed conflict, and expropriation – are not likely to happen. In fact, in a similar argument about the effect of the presence of U.S. troops on FDI inflow to the host state Little and Leblang (2004; see also Jones and Kane 2005; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007) point out that they use troop deployment as a proxy for diplomatic relations. Using *ad hoc* bilateral summit meetings in uncovering the determinants of FDI means employing an actual diplomatic indicator to measure the impact of diplomatic relations. Consequently, I hypothesize that (hypothesis 5.4) *ad hoc bilateral summit meetings between the heads of state/government of the U.S. and a developing country will lead to higher levels of U.S. foreign direct investment in the meeting state.*

In light of my earlier findings on political and trade relations and systemic differences, foreign direct investors are also expected to behave differently during and after the Cold War with regards to FDI. In general, although their investment opportunities were more limited, international conditions seemed also more stable and calculable in the bipolar world order. In general, U.S. foreign policy could be a good lead to follow for investors. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc not only political but economic relations have become more complicated. As the United States emerged as the world's leading military and economic power most developing nations were interested in a good relationship with the U.S. Hence, political interstate contacts became less useful as signals to the business community and investors are likely to have paid more attention to actual circumstances in the recipient states. Therefore, I expect that (hypothesis 5.5) *summit meetings were more influential on U.S. investor behavior in developing nations in the Cold War than after 1991.*

Data and Methods

I run a time-series (years) cross-section (dyads) analysis again. In measuring my dependent variable, foreign direct investment, I rely on Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) who include data for 126 developing countries. This dataset covers the 1966 and 2000 period and is based on the U.S. FDI data available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (2008). Since most of today's developing nations gained their independence after 1960, this temporal limitation due to data availability seems empirically justified. U.S. investments are measured in million dollars using 1995 as the base year, and I take the natural log of this variable

Ad hoc bilateral summit diplomatic meeting remains my main explanatory variable and, as earlier, this is a lagged dummy variable that is coded 1 if at least one summit meeting took place between the president of the United States and the head of the meeting state in the previous year.

I have decided to follow Biglaiser and DeRouen's (2007) lead and add various economic and political control variables. As for international political variables, I account for the fact that states with similar foreign policy affinity are likely to have better relations including closer economic ties and lag the variable with one year. I keep Biglaiser and DeRouen's (2007) U.S. foreign troops variable – logged and lagged – among my controls. This variable is expected to have positive impact on capital investment. To measure conflict I use Marshall's (2002, 2009) dataset on Major Episodes on Political Violence since this includes both internal and external conflict events (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007). This way I can control for the negative effects of both domestic and international conflicts. I control for the Cold War too. Finally, the domestic political variable that I employ is the regime type of the host/meeting state.

Although this section focuses on the political determinants of foreign direct investment, economic factors that figure in the final investment decision should not be left unaddressed. Hence, I control for such domestic factors as the level of economic development (log of real GDP per capita) and economic growth (annual percent of GDP increase). Capital controls is from Jensen (2003) and measures the level of the liberalization of capital inflow. Bilateral trade is the logged measure of total import and export divided by GDP. All economic control variables are lagged with one year.

The data manifested serial correlation (Woodridge test, $F=24.211$, $p<.000$) and non-constant variance (Braush-Pagan test $\chi^2=2734.196$, $p=0$) but no unit-roots were detected (Fisher test, $\chi^2=468.185$, $p=0$). Consequently, I first difference the equation in order to correct for serial correlation using and lagged dependent variable (LDV) model clustering on dyads.²⁰ Besides methodological considerations, the fact that the level of foreign direct investment in the previous year was often found the most significant in current FDI levels also requires a model that can accommodate a lagged dependent variable.

Results and Discussion

The lack of any evidence to support hypothesis 5.4 about the impact of bilateral summit meetings on American FDI inflows to developing countries is most striking (Table 5.4). Although the summity variable is to the expected positive direction, it fails to reach statistical significance ($p=.787$) in the LDV model (Model 1). On the other hand, troop deployment has a highly significant and positive impact on American foreign direct investments where 1% change in the number of troops present in a developing country will lead to 9% higher U.S. FDI inflow to that country.

Nonetheless, past investment has the largest influence on the amount of this year's investment. In addition, the more economically developed a state, the more likely that investors take their capital to that country. This is in line with the expectations that capital

²⁰ I believe that this is a better modeling choice than Biglaiser and DeRouen's (2007) choice of a two-stage Heckman model. I contend that a decision about foreign direct investment does not involve a two-step process: multinational corporations usually know what they need and how much money they can afford and want to invest before they decide about the exact location of the investment. In other words, they do not select the location first, and decide about the amount of investment later as Biglaiser and DeRouen assumes.

prefers countries with more developed markets and, most importantly, with more skilled and educated labor force. Finally, in the post-Cold War period American businesses are more likely to invest in developing countries than they were during the Cold War. This finding can be easily explained by globalization and liberalization of the world's markets in the post-Cold War era and the fact that investment opportunities during the Cold War were limited to non-Communist nations. It is interesting that neither conflict nor the regime type of the meeting state influences investment decisions and that there is no correspondence between the amount of bilateral trade and the American investments in these countries.

However, I have assumed that if Little and Leblang (2004) are right and troop deployment is indeed a proxy for diplomatic relations then the variables for the presence of U.S. troops and bilateral summits should at least partially cover the same phenomenon, a slice of diplomatic relations. Therefore, I dropped the troops variable from the equation (Model 2 in Table 5.4). However even without the troop variable the summit meetings did not reach statistical significance ($p=0.243$). Neither did dropping the summit variable impact the level of significance or the beta coefficient of troops (Model 3 in Table 5.4). The correlation between the troops and summit variables supports these results: it is rather low ($p=0.218$). It suggests that either diplomatic relations are not considered by foreign investors or that summit diplomacy may not be the best measure for diplomatic relations.

[Table follows on next page]

Table 5.4. The impact of bilateral U.S. presidential summit meetings on U.S. foreign direct investment in developing meeting states, 1966-2000

Independent Variables	Model 1 <i>LDV</i>	Model 2 <i>LDV</i>	Model 3 <i>LDV</i>	Model 4 <i>LDV</i>	Model 5 <i>Prais-Winsten</i>
US foreign direct investment (lagged DV)	.827*** (.031)	.844*** (.030)	.827*** (.031)	.842*** (.030)	
Bilateral summits	.023 (.084)	.103 (.088)		.073 (.087)	.051 (.027)
Meeting state development	.299** (.094)	.367*** (.091)	.299** (.094)	.331*** (.092)	1.865*** (.115)
Meeting state growth	-.004 (.006)	-.004 (.006)	-.004 (.006)	-.004 (.006)	-.002 (.002)
Capital controls	-.034 (.022)	-.031 (.021)	-.034 (.022)	-.031 (.022)	-.008 (.014)
Troops (Biglaiser & DeRouen 2007)	.094*** (.019)		.093*** (.020)		.158*** (.019)
Troops (Lai 2003)				.298** (.086)	
Domestic and international conflict	.019 (.022)	.026 (.023)	.019 (.022)	.025 (.025)	.028 (.018)
Democratic meeting state	.126 (.090)	.070 (.092)	.128 (.090)	.098 (.093)	.179* (.071)
Cold War	-.222* (.090)	-.225* (.088)	-.221* (.087)	-.214* (.087)	-.292*** (.061)
Foreign policy affinity	.259 (.228)	.284 (.233)	.255 (.230)	.312 (.238)	.606 (.169)***
Bilateral trade	.076 (.048)	.091 (.051)	.076 (.048)	.077 (.051)	.304*** (.039)
Constant	.988 (.979)	1.221 (1.026)	.987 (.979)	1.050 (1.019)	3.654** (.813)
R ²	0.781	0.779	0.781	0.779	
Wald χ^2	6279.68***	6100.88***	6273.90***	6045.20***	683.30***
N	1765	1774	1765	1765	1878

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Dependent variable: *logged US FDI in 1995 million USD*

Two-tailed tests

Robust standard errors are in parentheses

Unit of analysis: US-country dyad year

Based on the above findings I also question that the presence of troops would be a sufficient measure for diplomatic relations. Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) use *any* number of troops when operationalizing their variable. The problem is that if during the Cold War there was a military attaché present at a U.S. embassy in a Communist country, it is also counted as troops presence. Unfortunately, this does not represent either diplomatic relations to signify good relations nor a strong military presence that would threaten local governments from appropriating American assets. What it represents is unclear and so is its impact on American foreign direct investment. Therefore, I decided to reconceptualize my troops variable following Brian Lai (2003) and turn Biglaiser and DeRouen's (2007) continuous variable into a dummy: if at least 100 troops were present in a country, the variable is coded as "1" and otherwise "0". This measure is more likely to cover the impact that troops by their presence may have on U.S. FDI inflow. Model 4 (table 5.4) shows that the re-specification of the variable did not significantly alter the main results: no variable flips signs and the troops variable remains highly significant ($p=.001$) while summit diplomacy continues to fail to reach statistical significance ($p=0.406$). All in all, it remains uncertain what the presence of less than 100 military personnel in a country means and it would be worth rethinking the theoretical and empirical arguments behind the influence that the presence of troops has in a country especially whether or not it is an appropriate proxy for diplomatic relations.

The above findings have led me to reconsider the choice of my model as first differencing might have proved a too drastic – although effective – solution to deal with serial correlation. Therefore, I ran a partially differenced Prais-Winsten model controlling

for heteroskedasticity (Model 5 in Table 5.4). This, however, did not affect the main finding that bilateral summit meetings do not influence American investment behavior ($p=.057$) and the impact that the presence of troops have on U.S. FDI to developing countries remained positive and highly significant. It did, however, result in some changes regarding the control variables: while no sign was flipped, the regime type of the meeting state, foreign policy preferences, and bilateral trade have reached statistical significance and they all have a positive influence on the flow of American capital to developing countries: democratic states receive more aid than non-democratic nations, the closer the foreign policy of the United States and a developing country corresponds to each other the more U.S. investments are directed to that state, and higher bilateral trade flows between two countries also mean higher capital inflow.

Taking into account the different systemic conditions, results remain unchanged with regards to the independent variable of interest: summit meeting could not exert an influence over U.S. investor behavior in either the Cold War or the post-1991 eras.²¹ This fails to provide evidence for hypothesis 5.5 as well. There are, however, a few interesting changes in between the two periods that seem to justify the logic behind this hypothesis. During the Cold War FDI was mostly determined by the stationing of U.S. troops in the target country and by past investment practices. Today past foreign direct investment remains important. Additionally, investors also take into account the level of the development of the meeting state: more developed states attract more investment. A more unexpected finding is that developing states with domestic and international conflict are also prioritized by foreign direct investors. This seems counterintuitive, although it is

²¹ I ran these analyses using Model 4 of Table 5.4 as I believe this is theoretically the most accurate specification.

possible that often these are states that are already at a reconstruction phase and investors are attracted by future opportunity rather than being thwarted by past (and partially present) danger.

Table 5.5. The impact of bilateral U.S. presidential summit meetings on U.S. foreign direct investment in developing meeting states during and after the Cold War, 1966-2000

Independent Variables	Cold War (1966-1991)	Post-Cold War (1992-2000)
US foreign direct investment (lagged DV)	.715*** (.050)	.854*** (.043)
Bilateral summits	.053 (.094)	.021 (.167)
Meeting state development	.374 (.198)	.543*** (.135)
Meeting state growth	-.010 (.009)	-.008 (.008)
Capital controls	-.060 (.045)	-.002 (.020)
Troops (Lai 2003)	.379* (.177)	.073 (.128)
Domestic and international conflict	-.018 (.034)	.073** (.027)
Democratic meeting state	-.050 (.204)	.192 (.134)
Foreign policy affinity	.901 (.465)	-.113 (.293)
Bilateral trade	.104 (.087)	.112 (.068)
Constant	1.612 (1.805)	.911 (1.284)
R ²	0.747	0.818
Wald χ^2	947.49***	1759.96**
N	1074	624

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Dependent variable: *logged US FDI in 1995 million USD*

Model: LDV

Two-tailed tests

Robust standard errors are in parentheses

Unit of analysis: US-country dyad year

The only question remaining is why summit diplomacy has no influence on U.S. foreign direct investment. There are several possible explanations. First, while summit diplomacy is a valid measure of diplomatic relations, it is a very specific type of diplomatic event and, thus, accounts for only the tip of the iceberg. In other words, while it is a diplomatic measure, it is not a sufficient measure to cover for the entirety of diplomatic relations between two countries.

Second, it is also possible that the summit meetings of the U.S. president with the heads of state of less prominent developing countries do not receive enough media attention in order to change investor behavior. The media buzz that accompanied President Havel on his first two trips to the United States may be the exception rather than the rule: few heads of state and government are symbols of the resistance against a government denounced by the United States and have a distinguished literary career.

Third, the relationship between private investor behavior and the state visits of heads may be too indirect. The U.S. president personally can do little to influence American businessmen and all of those policy instruments that he can control are potentially too circumstantial to have a visible impact. This, coupled with the fact that capital is far less mobile than goods that countries can trade, may prompt investors against reading too much into the meetings of heads of state/government. In other words, capital investors are more cautious in their behavior when it comes to making business than traders and, therefore, they need more concrete and potentially more lasting signs than a 1-3 day meeting between the leaders of the United States and a developing country. Nonetheless, this should not be an issue when it comes to U.S. foreign aid allocation.

Bilateral Summits and U.S. Foreign Aid, 1972-2000

On April 18, 1990 Prime Minister József Antall, the head of the first democratically elected post-Communist government in Hungary, met President George H. W. Bush in the White House. During their meeting Antall asked for assistance from Bush to help Hungary's economic transition from Communism to Capitalism and was offered \$47.5 million in agricultural credits and loans ("Antall Sees Bush..." 1990). In about three years later, Russian President Boris Yeltsin used his summits with a variety of Western foreign heads of state and government to obtain foreign aid in order to salvage and continue economic and political reforms in Russia (Schmemmann 1993). Among these was U.S. President Clinton who announced a \$1.62 billion foreign aid package at their summit meeting in Washington in April 1993 (Nichols 1993). Similarly, in 1994, President Clinton used the occasion of President Nazarbayev's official visit to Washington to announce the tripling of U.S. aid to Kazakhstan – a Caucasian state that has become a strategic ally of the United States in the region – to help its political and economic reforms (Ifill 1994). From these examples it is clear that the summit meetings of the president of the United States with the heads of state and government of developing countries offer opportunities for foreign leaders to ask for and receive foreign aid. I argue that bilateral summit meetings between the president of the United States and leaders of developing states have a positive impact on U.S. foreign aid allocation to these states.

The Determinants of U.S. Foreign Aid Allocation

In general there are two approaches to the study of American foreign aid allocation. The first, and less popular, approach is based on an Idealist view that considers the need, often understood as poverty, of the target state as crucial to aid decisions (see Lai 2003; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998; McKinlay and Little 1977). While humanitarian circumstances are not ignored by policy makers, they are never the most important considerations in providing foreign aid (Lai 2003 cf. Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Lebovic 1988; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998). Consequently, the majority of the field uses a Realist logic and considers foreign aid allocation as a strategic process through which the donor country wants to further its own foreign policy interests (Lai 2003; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998). Substantial evidence has been found that various strategic political and economic factors may inform decision-makers (e.g. Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998).

Interestingly, the most studied of all the strategic policy considerations, the human rights behavior of the recipient state leads to the biggest disagreement among scholars. Results are mixed despite the growing methodological sophistication of these studies that have moved away from bivariate (McKinlay and Little 1977) to multivariate regression (e.g. Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Lai 2003), from single year studies (e.g. Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; McCormick and Mitchell 1988; Carleton and Stohl 1987) to the analysis of longer time periods. (Lai 2003; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007), and from one-stage (Lebovic 1988; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998) to two-stage modeling (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Poe and Meernik 1995; Blanton 2000; Lai 2003) of

foreign aid allocation. Some find that human rights play no role at all (Carleton and Stohl 1987; Regan 1995), others establish a negative relationship claiming that human rights abusers get more aid (e.g. Neumayer 2003), while a group of scholars find a positive relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and the human rights behavior of the target state (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Lai 2003). Even those who find evidence that human rights considerations do influence American policy makers are divided over whether it happens in the gate-keeping stage, that is when the countries that will receive aid is decided (Blanton 2000; Lai 2003), or in the allocation stage, that is when the decision is made about the amount of aid (Poe 1992) or both (Poe and Meernik 1995). Some of these differences are due to their focus on different types of aid: total aid, military aid, and economic aid. For example, Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) as well as Apodaca and Stohl (1999) who looked at both military and economic aid allocation to Latin American countries found that human rights influences the gatekeeping stage regarding military aid and the allocation stage in case of economic aid. There are also different subsets of countries included in the various analyses.

Despite the wide variety of strategic factors considered all of these studies miss an important factor, namely the interaction of these states with the United States. Foreign policy is not made in a vacuum without the influence of other actors on the international scene. In fact, potential recipient states have a vested interest in convincing the donor nations, in this case the United States, that offering foreign aid to their country is beneficial to the donor state and the developing country alike. Indeed, the limitation on the overall amount of U.S. foreign aid leads to a fierce competition between the states that are vying for American assistance (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998, 295). I offer

an approach that takes these factors into account by focusing on diplomatic relations in the form of the meetings of state leaders in the analysis of U.S. foreign aid allocation.

Furthermore, while existing studies consider both systemic and state level factors, decision-makers have been largely left out of these investigations. Even though systemic conditions and state attributes are important, statesmen are not helpless in modifying the impact of these dynamics. Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985, 543) argue that studies that evaluate changes in the human rights approach of individual American administrations inherently presume that “presidential preferences are more important than those of Congress in foreign aid decisions” and, thus, that these arguments are very strongly linked to individuals. But it is only Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) who give primary consideration to the interest of the leaders of both the recipient and the donor states by applying their selectorate theory to foreign aid allocation. However, while their theory is excellent in helping to understand the domestic factors behind each leader’s moves, they do not deal with the actual interaction of these leaders. Drawing bilateral summit meetings into the analysis assures the direct inclusion of decision-makers – in this case heads of state and government – in the decision-making process. I argue that potential target states do want to influence the American decision-making process and foreign heads of state and government exploit the opportunity of a summit meeting for that end.

Bilateral Summits and Foreign Aid Allocation

For many developing countries foreign aid can serve as an important source of income, and, therefore, their leaders would make every effort for keeping the current

level of aid or securing more of it. Meeting the president of the United States, the largest aid giving country, offers an unparalleled opportunity for these heads of state/government for lobbying at the heart of the American government. As the executive branch generally has a more favorable attitude to foreign aid than Congress, it makes the seeking of aid from the president more worthwhile for foreign states (Lai 2003). Even though foreign aid allocations require congressional action, the president remains responsible for setting the general policy line for aid allocation and it is the executive branch's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that prepares the budget, which includes foreign aid items as well. Thus, the executive branch has an agenda setting role in the foreign aid allocation process. The president also has power to persuade members of Congress to secure their support for his policy (Neustadt 1990). In addition, the potential media attention surrounding a summit meeting may allow the foreign leader to make his case publically if necessary (Kegley and Hook 1991 make a similar argument regarding Reagan's linkage politics) in order to appeal for aid in front of a wider audience.

For heads of state and government of developing nations it is more rational to lobby the president of the United States for foreign aid than try to pursue the same goal at other levels of the U.S. government or with the legislative branch. On the one hand, they are the most visible representatives of their countries and a meeting with the president of the United States either at home or abroad offers them an excellent opportunity to pursue their economic agenda including securing foreign aid.

More importantly, for the leaders of these developing nations it is a lot easier to have an impact on the executive than on the legislative branch. It is not only that lobbying Congress through diplomatic means would give fewer opportunities to foreign

heads to sell the obtaining of aid as his personal victory. It would also require more resources to get access to more policy-makers and a continuous effort by the entire diplomatic corps and traditionally this is where developing states are disadvantaged. Neither can foreign heads meet all or at least a significant majority of the members of both chambers of Congress. In contrast, if they manage to obtain a summit meeting with the U.S. president, aid could be discussed as part of the summit process.

On the other hand, leaders in developing nations but especially those of non-democratic regimes have high personal incentives in obtaining these aids. As Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) point out not only the giving but also the securing of aid is a strategic process. Recipient heads of state and government want to assure their survival by obtaining the foreign aid that is not only often crucial to the economy of their states but that may also serve as a means to secure the support of their winning coalition. In this it is also important that the leader can present those aid donations as his personal success: it increases his personal standing and, thus, his role in allocating the money. Even if the foreign assistance and its domestic allocation are conditioned by the donor, it is the head of the recipient country that may have the most impact over those details as well.

I refer to the summit process rather than just the meeting as there is more than one reason for going to the summit where a plea for aid can be made. First, summit meetings can be used as a means to speed up lower level negotiations by imposing a deadline and some pressure for positive outcomes (Plischke 1958; 1967; 1986a). If the aid request was made prior to the summit process, the agreement to meet can signal willingness on the part of the government of the United States to seriously consider providing some assistance. In other words, if the developing country is not deemed worthy of U.S.

foreign aid – be it for strategic considerations or because of the domestic politics of the developing state – these obstacles would also disqualify the state and its leader from a summit. In addition, the president is unlikely to set up himself for a public relations fiasco by committing to a summit where he will have to announce to his foreign counterpart *and* the media that the United States cannot afford the provision of aid.

The topic of aid might emerge during the organization of the summit when the sides are putting together the agenda of the meeting. If this is so, preliminary negotiations are possible on the issue as part of the summit preparation process. This may often lead to an agreement that can be finalized and/or announced at the summit. Both of the above two processes can explain why an announcement about foreign assistance is made as part of the summit meeting of the two heads of state/government just as we have seen in the opening paragraph of this section.

Finally, the developing head of state has the opportunity to use their private negotiations with the American president to raise the issue of aid. It is also a good opportunity for developing state leaders who were criticized by the American government for their policies – e.g. human rights abuses, foreign policy orientation or rhetoric, or the domestic operation of their regime – to explain themselves. Even if not always in practice, but in rhetoric the U.S. does try to motivate or threaten aid recipients that go against American foreign policy interests (Kegley and Hook 1991; Wang 1999; Owusu 2007). These leaders may point out that actions have already been taken to remedy the situation or that a short term solution is not possible, but the loss or reduction of (potential) American aid might worsen the situation. In fact, according to the logic of the selectorate theory of aid allocation, the loss of aid could have serious personal

consequences to the leader (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007). If the leader loses support of his winning coalition, he might lose power leading to a power struggle and corresponding political instability. Nonetheless, in this case announcements about aid are less likely as, unless the president had intentions to raise the issue himself, aid decisions are unlikely to be made on the spot in an *impromptu* manner. In the longer run, however, these personal meetings may positively convince the American president to take into consideration giving aid or providing more aid to such states and this can have an impact on aid allocation.

All in all, I argue that through bilateral summits, leaders of developing states can help their country's chances to receive American foreign aid. This is so both in the gate keeping and distribution stages: it is possible for the developing heads of state/government to influence the decision on including their states among the aid recipient countries as well as to affect the amount that is allocated to their countries. Hence I expect to find that (hypothesis 5.6) *a developing state whose head of state or government attends an ad hoc bilateral summit meeting with the U.S. president will be more likely to receive U.S. foreign aid.* Similarly, I hypothesize that (hypothesis 5.7) *an ad hoc bilateral summit meeting between the heads of state/government of the U.S. and a developing country will lead to higher levels of U.S. foreign assistance to that country.*

Finally, I have shown earlier how the systemic change that the end of the Cold War brought about have influenced the impact of summitry both in domestic and foreign political relations as well as with regards to trade. It is also clear that foreign aid allocation practices were altered after the Cold War in the United States. In general, there are more potential aid recipient states whereas political forces – especially the general

public and Congress – wish to see less money being spent abroad and more invested into domestic programs. While presidents are more committed to helping foreign nations, these circumstances will likely limit their ability to give or promise aid during the summit process (Lai 2003). Therefore, I hypothesize that (hypothesis 5.8) *a summit meeting between the head of the United States and a developing nation is less influential on U.S. foreign aid policies after the Cold War.*

Data and Methods

I work with a time-series (years) cross-sectional (dyads) data again. However, due to data limitations, this analysis covers the 1972-2000 period only. I employ Heckman selection models that are comprised of two stages.²² The first stage of the model is the selection equation that includes the decision by U.S. decision-makers whether or not to give aid to a developing country. The advantage of the Heckman model over running two equations – one each for the binary and continuous dependent variables – is that it links the two stages together by incorporating the relevant error terms from the first to the second state. It is necessary as it is unlikely that decision-makers make the decision about how much aid to allocate without keeping in mind the reasons why they selected the actual state as an aid recipient.

As the data manifested serial correlation I use cubic polynomials regarding the first stage of the equation in order to correct for the potential bias that the non-independence of observations would introduce to the estimates in this probit analysis of

²² The data manifested heteroskedasity but no unit root. Unit specific errors are present, but the analysis are run with random rather than fixed effect models not only because it allows for the estimation of variables that are slow moving or lack within-group variance but also because the implementation of the Heckman model does not allow for a fixed effect model in Stata.

binary time-series cross-section (BTSCS) data (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Carter and Signorino 2010). Cubic polynomials add three variables to the model: the first is the time elapsed since the last event, and the second and third are the squared and cubed values of the first. While there are other methods to control for the non-independence of BTSCS data, cubic polynomials are superior to both temporal dummies – as those may result in bias in case of complete and quasi-complete separateness, lead to loss of significant degrees of freedom in longer time-series, and are very labor intensive to implement – and cubic splines (cf. Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998) – which perform similarly to polynomials, however, they are not only more complicated to implement but decisions on which type of splines to select may result in bias and their interpretation is unclear (Carter and Signorino 2010). I also cluster on dyads.

The second stage of the model is the outcome equation which represents the decision on the amount of money that selected recipient states get. Therefore, this section includes only those states that received aid and utilizes ordinary least square regression.

Because I run separate analyses for economic, military, and total aid I use several dependent variables. In each model there is an aid dummy variable (1=yes, 0=no) and size of aid variable. The natural log of the latter dependent variable was taken in order to compensate for the outliers in the data. U.S. foreign aid data is from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Data (2003), the Greenbook, as coded by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007). It is measured in thousands of constant 1996 U.S. dollar.

Ad hoc bilateral summit meeting remains my main explanatory variable, which is lagged with one year.

I again use a series of control variables most of which appear in both stages of the analysis and all of them are lagged with one year. There are several strategic factors that American decision-makers consider when they are allocating foreign aid. In this, their primary interest is to assure that U.S. foreign policy goals can be facilitated through the provision, increase, reduction, or withdrawal of aid. First, on a rhetorical level politicians of various U.S. administrations explicitly tried to link the human rights behavior of the recipient state to the aid giving process, and it needs to be seen how this variable holds up under a more refined specification. I create my human rights abuser dummy based on the Freedom House (2011) civil liberties score.²³ Any country that scores 6 or higher is coded as not an abuser (=0) and any state with a score between 1 and 5 is considered as an abuser of human rights (=1). I expect that there is a negative relationship between aid and human rights abuses, that is, those who do not respect human rights will not get or will get less aid.

Second, it is also more likely that the United States will provide aid for allied developing states. On the one hand, it is the potential of receiving aid that makes the alliance attractive for some states. Furthermore, during the Cold War there was a race between the superpowers to win the support of developing states and, hence, limit the other superpower's influence over them through the provision of aid. Therefore, I include the alliance dummy again and expect that being allied with the United States will have positive influence on the allocation as well as the size of aid.

²³ There is a tradition in the literature to use a composite index of various human rights measures (see Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998), however it is also argued that as there is a high overlap between the State Department, Freedom House, and Amnesty International human rights variables and therefore only one of these is sufficient for a reliable estimation (Lai 2003; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985).

Third, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) argue that some similarity between foreign policy objectives is necessary for both the recipient and the donor to find the aid process attractive. They caution though that perfect harmony of foreign policy goals are just as impractical as having nothing common when bargaining for aid. Since perfect match between foreign policy goals are unlikely, it is fair to assume that the closer the foreign policy affinity of two states are, the more likely that they get aid and the more aid they will get.

Fourth, aid may also be used in order to protect U.S. interests in the target state. Earlier studies established that the United States is more likely to aid those states with whom American firms engage into high levels of trade (e.g. Poe and Meernik 1995; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; cf. Lundsgaarde, Breunig, and Prakash 2007). Some (Lebovic 1988; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Apodaca and Stohl 1999) claim that U.S. import from the target state is a better measure while others (e.g. Lai 2003) argue that the U.S. sees these developing states as markets for American products and, therefore, tries to protect their interest by ascertaining political stability and a predictable economic environment. I use Gleditsch's (2002) total bilateral trade measure as described earlier.

Fifth, Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) show that U.S. troops, which they consider as a proxy for diplomatic relations, are crucial in protecting American interest regarding foreign direct investment. Although I have argued above that troops are unlikely to represent diplomatic relations, their presence may still be a significant predictor of who gets and how much aid from the United States. If the United States stations its troops in a country, it is safe to assume that it is a developing country with substantial U.S. interests.

Hence, politicians made a commitment to this country which they will support with other policy instruments including foreign aid. Therefore, I expect to find that the presence of troops will have a positive impact on aid allocation in both stages. For the reasons explained above, I follow Lai's (2003) coding and use a dummy.

In addition, there are certain target state characteristics that may influence aid decisions. First, there is a very strong preference for supporting democratic states in U.S. foreign policy and specifically in aid policy. Donor states – including the United States – were found to prioritize democratic recipient states (Berthélemy and Tichit 2004). Stable democratic states are more likely to use American assistance in the intended way, that is, in the interest of the population rather than in support of their leaders' political ambitions. Therefore, I expect that democratic developing countries are more likely to receive aid than non-democratic ones.

Second, developing states with lower levels of economic growth are the countries that require aid the most. Hence, I control for the level of economic development of the meeting state by taking the natural log of real GDP per capita measured in constant 1996 million dollars (Gleditsch 2002).

There are variables that are not included in both stages of the model. Partly, this is due to the fact that the model itself requires that there is at least one variable difference between the two stages. Partly, it has theoretical reasons. Although security considerations may prompt the United States to prioritize those states that are closer to American soil when deciding about giving aid, I do not expect that it will influence the amount of aid. Therefore, I employ the distance variable that I already used in relations to trade in the selection stage only.

The outcome equation includes a variable for the population of the recipient state. Following a liberalist humanitarian logic, one expects that when deciding about the exact amount of aid, American politicians consider that the same amount of aid might have very different impacts in countries with small and sizeable populations. However, it is unlikely that the size of the population influences whether a state will or will not receive aid. I also add a year variable to control for the trending in the amount of aid in the second state of the model.

Results and Discussion

In general, results are supportive of hypotheses 5.6 and 5.7. As for the aggregate analysis, that is, the allocation of total aid by the American government during the entire 1972-2000 period, a summit meeting in the previous year positively influences both the decision about who will get aid and how much aid the selected developing nations will receive (Table 5.6). In case of the decision to give aid, a summit between the heads of state/government of the U.S. and a developing country raises the probability with 0.04 that the meeting state will get aid, holding other variables at their mean (see also Figure 5.1). Although this is statistically significant, the impact is small. Nonetheless, it shows that leaders of developing states do have a chance to influence whether or not their state will receive American aid. However, the impact that summit diplomacy has on the amount of aid is much more impressive. In general, a state receives about 88% percent more aid if its head met the American president the previous year.

Table 5.6. The impact of bilateral U.S. presidential summit meetings on American foreign aid allocation to developing countries, 1972-2000

Stage 1 (Selection Equation) of the Heckman Model: Determining the Pool of Aid Recipients

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Total Aid</i> (Dummy 1=yes; 0=no)	<i>Economic Aid</i> (Dummy 1=yes; 0=no)	<i>Military Aid</i> (Dummy 1=yes; 0=no)
Bilateral summits	.249* (.106)	.212* (.095)	.275** (.084)
Alliance	.198 (.114)	.138 (.128)	.004 (.111)
Bilateral trade	-.087** (.027)	-.077** (.026)	.015 (.022)
Human rights abuser	-1.090*** (.129)	-.934*** (.121)	-.627*** (.085)
Foreign policy affinity	.135 (.234)	-.024 (.246)	1.263*** (.226)
Troops	.414** (.144)	.420** (.143)	.253 (.129)
Economic development of meeting state	-.356*** (.085)	-.460*** (.088)	-.182** (.059)
Democratic meeting state	-.286* (.125)	-.232* (.116)	-.151 (.101)
Distance	-.185 (.144)	-.268 (.149)	.125 (.125)
T	-.592*** (.045)	-.582*** (.044)	-.499*** (.022)
t ²	.025*** (.003)	.024*** (.003)	.024*** (.002)
t ³	-.000*** (.000)	-.000*** (.000)	-.000*** (.000)
Constant	6.885*** (1.530)	8.178*** (1.537)	.601 (1.193)

Stage 2 (Outcome Equation) of the Heckman Model: Determinants of the Amount of Foreign Aid Allocated

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Total Aid</i> (Amount of Aid)	<i>Economic Aid</i> (Amount of Aid)	<i>Military Aid</i> (Amount of Aid)
Bilateral summits	.631** (.185)	.511** (.149)	.687** (.254)
Alliance	.888*** (.229)	.742*** (.212)	.513 (.319)
Bilateral trade	.127 (.076)	.171* (.069)	.155 (.090)
Human rights abuser	-.351* (.152)	-.213 (.138)	-.013 (.223)
Foreign policy affinity	-.413 (.505)	-.538 (.526)	-1.606* (.751)
Troops	.962** (.320)	.770* (.316)	1.725** (.524)
Economic development of meeting state	-.878*** (.143)	-.775*** (.152)	.191 (.191)
Democratic meeting state	-.105 (.210)	-.057 (.198)	-.413 (.325)
Population	.265** (.102)	.200* (.098)	.012 (.136)
Year	-.033*** (.008)	-.018* (.007)	-.117*** (.013)
Constant	79.767*** (15.227)	48.018** (14.445)	236.50*** (26.296)
Heckman model			
N	3706	3706	3706
Rho	-.357	-.433	-.377
Rho χ^2	11.10**	9.53**	42.72***
χ^2	192.72***	162.77***	256.62***


Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Two-tailed tests

Robust standard errors are in parentheses

Unit of analysis: US-country dyad year

Figure 5.1. Predicted probabilities for the impact of summit meetings on U.S. foreign aid allocation to developing states, 1972-2000 (selection equation)



Note: statistical significance is marked with frame around the graph

After disintegrating the dependent variable into economic and military aid, a very similar story can be established. Countries whose heads of state have met the American president previously are more likely to receive aid than those who did not have a summit with the U.S. president. These states also receive a larger amount of both types of aid. Specifically, developing state leaders have a higher probability to influence getting military than economic aid: a summit meeting raises the probability that the meeting state will get military aid with 0.1 and economic aid with 0.06 *ceteris paribus*. Similarly, meeting states do not only receive more military and economic aid if their head attends a summit with the American president, but they have a more sizeable influence over the increase in the amount of military (99%) than economic (67%) aid.

Regarding the control variables, in the selection stage countries that were engaged in questionable human rights practices were 0.24 less likely to be selected as aid recipients. On the other hand, the presence of at least 100 American troops makes it 0.07 more likely that a developing state will receive aid. The closeness of foreign policy positions influence only military aid recipient selection (although in that case the impact is rather strong). However, the presence of an alliance between the U.S. and another country is not significant at all.

Higher levels of bilateral trade with a developing country will make it less likely that that state will be selected to receive aid, especially economic aid. This result corresponds to Lundsgaarde, Breunig, and Prakash's (2007) findings regarding 19 OECD donor countries in between 1980 and 2000. They explain this with the fact that decision-makers in these industrialized democracies are also taking into account their domestic

constituencies that wish to see less money being given away to foreign states and more spent on resolving domestic problems. Thus they allocate money to the more needy which can be more easily justified in the eyes of the public. It is also possible that it is the richest of the developing nations that have higher level trade flows with the United States, and therefore, there seem to be fewer reasons to give aid to these countries. This argument is also supported by the fact that recipient countries with higher level of economic growth are also less likely to get any kind of aid. Moreover, non-democracies are 0.07 less likely to receive aid than democracies which is reasonable if one considers that democratic countries are likely to be the more prosperous ones in the developing world.

All in all, it is fair to say that, in addition to political considerations, there is a strong need based aspect to selecting who will get aid. It is also clear that summit meetings are the least influential of those factors that affect which developing states will receive aid, economic or military.

As for the decision about the amount of aid to these nations, allies of the United States may expect two and a half times the amount of the aid than what non-allies get, however, this overall result is driven by economic aid practices as the existence of an alliance does not have a statistically significant impact on military aid allocation. Consequently, more economic aid is given to those regimes that already support the United States. That is economic aid serves as reward. As opposed to this, military assistance is best understood as a carrot, that is, as a means to buy support from certain developing nations. This understanding seems to be further supported by the fact that the

farther a state's foreign policy is from that of the United States, the more military aid it receives.

On the other hand, human rights abusers get less aid than those that follow human rights conventions. This corresponds to Poe and Meernik's (1995) findings that abusing human rights negatively affects the receipt of aid although this impact is much stronger in the selection stage of the decision making process. However, Blanton's (2000) and partially Apodaca and Stohl's (1999) findings regarding military aid also received confirmation as human rights practices of the meeting state only influence the decision on giving aid but not on its amount.

Not surprisingly a state's economic development and population are also crucial factors in the provision of economic but not military aid. Thus, humanitarian motivations seem to be more important in determining the amount of economic aid: countries with larger population and poorer economies are likely to receive more foreign economic assistance. However, economic aid is not only allocated on the basis of altruistic goals: developing nations that trade more with the United States get more aid suggesting that aid is also considered as a means to increase demand in the meeting states, potentially facilitating the growth of U.S. export to those countries.

On the other hand, strategic factors are more important to military aid allocation than economic ones: if there were at least 100 U.S. troops stationed in a developing state, then the United States allocates higher amounts of military aid to this state. The fact that the smaller the correspondence between the foreign policy goals of the donor and the recipient states the more likely that military aid will be allocated supports Bueno de Mesquita and Smith's (2007) argument that while some correspondence between foreign

policy goals is necessary, too much harmony gives little incentive to provide aid. In other words, states whose foreign policy the United States would like to change will get more aid than those who already share American foreign policy goals. Nonetheless, it is clear that even in the outcome stage U.S. politicians give more attention to the needs of the meeting state's population in case of economic aid. Military aid allocation is more strongly motivated by political considerations. Furthermore, despite the quite sizeable influence that summits exert over aid allocation in general, it is among the least influential factors when compared with other determinants of aid distribution.

Examining the determinants of foreign aid allocation separately during and after the Cold War allows us to see other nuances (see tables 5.7 and 5.8). Foreign aid practices seem temporally dependent: bilateral summit meetings were more prominent during than after the Cold War. This is confirmatory of hypothesis 5.8. Results show that during the Cold War summit meetings were useful in convincing the American president to give and give more aid to developing nations. Countries whose leaders met the president were 0.07 more likely to receive aid. Note, however, that the pre-1992 impact is due to decisions on military aid allocation. Furthermore, of those states selected to get aid the ones whose heads attended a bilateral summit with their U.S. counterpart received 71% percent more aid in general. This impact is nearly twice as big in case of military (114%) than economic aid (61%).

[Table follows on next page]

Table 5.7. The impact of bilateral U.S. presidential summit meetings on American foreign aid allocation to developing countries in the Cold War, 1972-1991

Stage 1 (Selection Equation) of the Heckman Model: Determining the Pool of Aid Recipients

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Total Aid</i> (Dummy 1=yes; 0=no)	<i>Economic Aid</i> (Dummy 1=yes; 0=no)	<i>Military Aid</i> (Dummy 1=yes; 0=no)
Bilateral summits	.397** (.129)	.215 (.114)	.255* (.110)
Alliance	.286 (.199)	.275 (.237)	-.388 (.198)
Bilateral trade	-.039 (.046)	-.087 (.050)	.099** (.029)
Human rights abuser	-.447** (.159)	-.408* (.158)	-.232* (.102)
Foreign policy affinity	.357 (.342)	.133 (.381)	2.181*** (.386)
Troops	.469* (.189)	.057 (.263)	.355* (.175)
Economic development of meeting state	-.489*** (.106)	-.682*** (.130)	-.338*** (.074)
Democratic meeting state	-.076 (.189)	.022 (.202)	-.171 (.133)
Distance	-.111 (.208)	-.340 (.225)	.214 (.146)
t	-.671*** (.065)	-.642*** (.073)	-.556*** (.034)
t ²	.030*** (.004)	.029*** (.004)	.029*** (.003)
t ³	-.000*** (.000)	-.000*** (.000)	-.000*** (.000)
Constant	6.698** (2.058)	10.316*** (2.321)	1.183 (1.413)

Stage 2 (Outcome Equation) of the Heckman Model: Determinants of the Amount of Foreign Aid Allocated

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Total Aid</i> (Amount of Aid)	<i>Economic Aid</i> (Amount of Aid)	<i>Military Aid</i> (Amount of Aid)
Bilateral summits	.541** (.198)	.474** (.174)	.762** (.281)
Alliance	.855** (.311)	.782** (.299)	.472 (.539)
Bilateral trade	.203* (.087)	.248** (0.81)	.132 (.146)
Human rights abuser	-.170 (.171)	-.104 (.153)	-.276 (.254)
Foreign policy affinity	-.668 (.556)	-.741 (.559)	-1.757 (1.196)
Troops	1.138*** (.270)	.902** (.300)	1.817** (.608)
Economic development of meeting state	-.848*** (.196)	-.883*** (.203)	.316 (.314)
Democratic meeting state	.068 (.285)	.211 (.263)	-.643 (.464)
Population	.188 (.113)	.134 (.111)	-.034 (.184)
Year	-.013 (.012)	.003 (.011)	.100*** (.019)
Constant	38.556 (24.038)	9.005 (22.336)	204.02*** (38.458)
Heckman model			
N	2528	2528	2528
Rho	-.407	-.412	-.433
Rho χ^2	6.18*	6.90**	31.71***
χ^2	147.05***	115.01****	104.64***

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Two-tailed tests

Robust standard errors are in parentheses

Unit of analysis: US-country dyad year

Table 5.8. The impact of bilateral U.S. presidential summit meetings on American foreign aid allocation to developing countries after the Cold War, 1992-2000

Stage 1 (Selection Equation) of the Heckman Model: Determining the Pool of Aid Recipients

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Total Aid</i> (Dummy 1=yes; 0=no)	<i>Economic Aid</i> (Dummy 1=yes; 0=no)	<i>Military Aid</i> (Dummy 1=yes; 0=no)
Bilateral summits	.057 (.154)	.256 (.136)	.181 (.111)
Alliance	.136 (.187)	.368 (.204)	-.296 (.291)
Bilateral trade	-.074* (.036)	-.038 (.050)	.023 (.044)
Human rights abuser	-1.871*** (.216)	-1.806*** (.215)	-1.291*** (.170)
Foreign policy affinity	-.613 (.404)	-1.101* (.446)	.453 (.518)
Troops	.171 (.311)	.103 (.314)	-.020 (.329)
Economic development of meeting state	-.306* (.146)	-.823*** (.151)	.119 (.138)
Democratic meeting state	-.106 (.170)	.138 (.203)	.139 (.192)
Distance	-.207 (.180)	-.236 (.236)	-.017 (.243)
t	-.945* (.307)	-1.357 (1.082)	-1.424*** (.375)
t ²	.020 (.091)	.756 (1.012)	.185 (.099)
t ³	.006 (.007)	-.175 (.222)	-.005 (.007)
Constant	6.818** (2.067)	10.456*** (2.273)	-.093 (2.315)

Stage 2 (Outcome Equation) of the Heckman Model: Determinants of the Amount of Foreign Aid Allocated

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Total Aid</i> (Amount of Aid)	<i>Economic Aid</i> (Amount of Aid)	<i>Military Aid</i> (Amount of Aid)
Bilateral summits	.680** (.201)	.497** (.167)	.524 (.294)
Alliance	1.035*** (.275)	.793** (.250)	.822** (.263)
Bilateral trade	-.046 (.104)	.013 (.098)	.077 (.092)
Human rights abuser	-.524 (.292)	-.419 (.281)	.250 (.488)
Foreign policy affinity	-.247 (.787)	-.337 (.796)	-1.988** (.740)
Troops	.784 (.622)	.843 (.524)	1.584 (.889)
Economic development of meeting state	-.847*** (.180)	-.574** (.173)	.095 (.160)
Democratic meeting state	-.280 (.223)	-.422* (.205)	.090 (.196)
Population	.449*** (.119)	.345** (.106)	.139 (.160)
Year	-.047* (.022)	-.048* (.021)	.033 (.025)
Constant	105.827* (43.247)	106.420* (41.755)	-61.602 (50.615)
Heckman model			
N	1178	1178	1178
Rho	-.282	-.231	-.053
Rho χ^2	6.45*	4.18*	0.13
χ^2	103.65***	81.47***	66.09***

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Two-tailed tests

Robust standard errors are in parentheses

Unit of analysis: US-country dyad year

There is further evidence for the argument that with the significant growth in the number of summit meetings the American president attends after the end of the Cold War, the influence of summits has decreased. Even though summits retain their positive influence under all time-periods and aid types (Figure 5.1), summit meetings are no longer statistically significant when it comes to the decision of whether or not to allocate aid to a country in the post-Cold War era. As more and more developing nations compete for American foreign aid, it is less likely that the president can take into account requests conveyed to him as part of the summit process and, thus, he has to prioritize other factors in deciding on the states that will receive U.S. assistance. Nonetheless, those heads of state and government whose state were selected to receive aid – especially economic aid – could still use summit meetings to get a favorable American response for an increase in the amount of aid. More interestingly this impact was higher in the post-Cold War era (97% cf. Cold War 72%). However, summits are no longer influential when it comes to the size of military aid. In general, it may reflect a trend of moving away from a strong military doctrine toward a more economy based approach in American foreign policy.

Summit diplomacy is not the only factor whose role has changed with the transformation of the international system. Prior to 1990, human rights played a much smaller role in the process of selecting aid recipients. In the post-Cold War era the adherence to human rights values is a driving force in selecting developing nations as aid recipients and results in about a 4 times as big impact on foreign aid allocation to human rights respecting states. To the contrary, the presence of American troops became irrelevant for the entire decision-making process after 1991, whereas it had a significant

impact under the bipolar world order in both stages of the equation (with the exception of the decision to give or not to give economic aid).

Conclusion

In this chapter I find further evidence for summit meetings having a positive impact on international relations. However, not always and not all the time are summits influential. These meetings do influence American foreign aid allocation practices to and U.S. trade relations with developing countries, while they are inconsequential regarding foreign direct investment to these states. The implications of these findings are twofold: first, the more indirect the impact of the president's action on an economic measure, the less influence summits may have over economic processes. In fact, while the president is an active participant in foreign aid decisions, he does not make investment or trading decisions. Thus, he may only influence business actors through either his public appearance at the summit or by an economic agreement with the foreign head.

Second, the nature of the business venture also influences how seriously businessmen consider or look for the signals sent at summit meetings. On the one hand, while an indirect signal about the good political relations between the two countries and/or the safety of the meeting state is sufficient for American traders, investors are likely to look for more exact signs than actual relations between state leaders. They probably prefer a signal with more lasting impact. Foreign direct investment requires a long-term commitment and it is an extremely risky enterprise: if the investment climate is misinterpreted it can quickly lead to big losses. While traders normally prefer long-term

partnerships, they can prevent losses much more easily by using the right payment methods or stopping further activity in an environment that has become unstable.

On the other hand, not all types of aid or all types of trade are influenced to the same extent or in the same way by summit meetings. Even though summit meetings have an impact of U.S. exporter behavior its impact on U.S. import is inconsequential. It seems that trade does follow the American president, but not the leaders of developing countries. Therefore, developing state leaders that look for markets for their domestic products cannot use summits to this effect. However, they can attract more American businesses to sell their products in their state. Although there might be many reasons for this – for example, loss prevention is more effective in exports or U.S. importers may less actively seek business partners and, thus, less attentive to signals sent at the summit –, it clearly reinforces the existing asymmetrical relations between the United States and the developing world. Thus, developing state heads cannot further the goal of catching up with industrialized nations by attending a summit meeting with the American president

However, heads of state and government of developing nations should not worry that by going to the summit meeting they make their state more vulnerable in the international system. First, the impact of the meeting is small. Second, not all foreign products have a negative impact on their economy: if the imported goods are basic commodities that the country could not manufacture at home, then it might even have a positive outcome.

Third, the impact of bilateral summits on trade disappears after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, from the point of view of developing nations reducing the amount of summits with the United States offers little solution to their economic

underdevelopment. Not going to the summit would certainly sacrifice the potential improvement in political relations and in obtaining more aid. Moving from the bipolar to a multipolar world did change U.S. foreign aid practices including the factors that decision-makers take into account. However, the impact of summits have changed rather than completely evaporated. While participating in a summit meeting is no longer sufficient to achieve that a country is selected as an aid recipient, summit meetings still have positive and sizeable impact on the amount of aid that is allocated to a state in the post-Cold War era. In fact, the positive news for state leaders who seek to gain assistance for improving economic conditions in their home state is that the effect of summit meetings on economic aid is actually bigger today than it was prior to 1992.

All in all, bilateral summit meetings between the American president and the heads of developing states do not aggravate relations as the professional-realist camp argues. Summits are not always and not under all conditions consequential when it comes to international economic relations, but when they do have an influence, their impact is always positive on interstate relations. To sum it up, this chapter uncovered additional evidence in support of the support of the liberalist-idealists positive view of summit meetings.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Contribution

Summit meetings were ignored for long in the study of international relations. Despite (or maybe because of) the fact that politicians find these events useful tools, most presidential summit meetings seemed to have the reputation of routine diplomatic meetings behind closed doors where events were largely dependent on the personality of the individuals involved. In other words, these events were not studied because, they were not deemed worthy of studying. Attempts at taking these events more seriously mainly resulted in a dispute between the perspectives of decision-makers and diplomats that helped little in changing this predisposition in the academia. Hence, the few existing studies remained aloof from developments in the study of politics and kept focusing on the descriptive analysis of individual or groups of summits. There was also a bias toward those meetings that were understood to be of higher importance, namely, superpower summits. I have argued in this dissertation that summit meetings are foreign policy tools in the hands of politicians and understanding their nature necessitates a comprehensive study of this phenomenon.

The above chapters have demonstrated that it is worthwhile to take Small's (1979) recommendation seriously and apply quantitative methods to diplomatic studies, systemically analyzing U.S. presidential summits. What has been uncovered here provide important information for both scholars and decision-makers about the consequences of summit meetings. While results strongly favor the liberalist-idealists' positive view of summitry, it would be a mistake to throw out the professional-realist approach entirely or

to treat summit meetings from now on as the holy grail of foreign policy management. Since this project is only a preliminary study of the issue, it is too early to arrive at any such conclusions, which would risk blowing the importance of summit meetings out of proportion. All the more so because results also point to the conclusion that summit meetings are not influential in all matters and under every circumstance. Nonetheless, the uncovering of the 1-2% influence that summit meetings have in general adds to our understanding of these meetings in particular, and of the management of foreign policy in general. It also demonstrates that summit meetings – and summit diplomacy more generally – are worth to be investigated further.

In this project, based on a dataset of 2,340 U.S. presidential summit meetings between 1945 and 2007, I have examined the consequences of summit meetings focusing on three major areas: presidential popularity at home, general political relations with other states, and economic relations including trade, foreign direct investment, and foreign aid.

Presidential Popularity

In chapter 3, I show that presidential summit meetings have a small – about 1.5% –, but statistically significant impact on presidential popularity. This, however disappears after a month. Summits have the advantage compared to war that, with much less investment and risk, they still bring about one fourth of the public support that a war started by the United States rallies behind the president. The downside is that the length of this boost in public approval rating is also the fourth of those resulting from American war initiation.

Although I focus on the rallying impact of summits and did not analyze summits as a force of diversion – it is fair to say in light of the above results that summits are not good candidates for diversion. As there is little evidence that American presidents intentionally use force to divert attention away from their domestic problems (DeRouen 1995), the fact that pre-summit popularity has no bearing on the influence of summits also means that there is little chance that presidents consider summits for diversion. Nor do they have any reason to. Not only are the size and length of the boost presidential approval ratings receive due to summits too small, but it is also counterproductive to either stay away from the country or reduce the president's domestic efforts by devoting more time to summits. While in general the opportunity for a summit should be more available than an opportunity for war at any given time, cooperative foreign policy tools such as diplomatic actions are likely to be more dependent on the willingness of the head of the meeting state. At the time when the president is in a domestic trouble or in a neck-to-neck race for reelection, no rational foreign leader is expected to commit himself or herself hastily to a summit with a president whose political problems might cast a shadow over them as well or who might or might not even be in office in a few months after the summit.

Presidents, therefore, are expected to acknowledge the unexpected perks that their diplomatic engagement can bring on the domestic front but should neither strategize about its use for domestic popularity purposes, nor make too much of it. It is nonetheless valuable for them – as well as for scholars interested in presidential popularity – to understand that similarly to other foreign policy actions, summit meetings do influence presidential standing at home. In other words, while American presidents are not

expected to go to summits with a domestic agenda in mind, they should not worry about these meetings damaging their domestic political capital.

Interstate Relations

In chapter 4, I find evidence to support the liberalist-idealist position with regards to the impact of summit meetings on interstate relations: U.S. presidential summits also have a 1.3% positive effect on the United States' relations with the meeting state. It seems that presidents are capable of avoiding those pitfalls that professional-realists are most afraid of. I argue that the existing explanations for the positive influence of summits may contribute to a more comprehensive account of interstate relations. The notion of loneliness at the top and the impact that summits might have on foreign policy bureaucrats who organize these meetings have led me to argue that summits may be interpreted as acts of socialization where participants learn that they belong to the unique community of state leaders. These meetings introduce them to the rules and norms of this group as well as those of the current international system.

On the one hand, summit meetings of the American president are particularly apt to be studied within the framework of socialization, as he does have an interest in using his foreign policy tools toward the maintenance of the existing order. The findings that the impact of summits lasts for a few months and meetings where the president has the opportunity for longer discussions with his counterparts justify the application of the socialization perspective to summits. On the other hand, most of the evidence in support of socialization would also support alternative hypotheses.

Nonetheless, it is important to point out that bilateral and *ad hoc* meetings are more influential than either multilateral or institutional ones. While at some of the institutional summit meetings the attendance of the president of the United States is more or less expected, non-institutional multilateral meetings do not seem to be worth the effort and time of the president. Knowing that some multilateral summits have also attracted large demonstrations against the policies of the leading countries of the world, these types of summits contribute little to maintaining the world order. Since 1991, multilateral summits do not have a statistically significant impact on interstate relations, and those that attract opposition from non-state actors against the policies conducted under the present international order even undermine that order. In other words, these summits may even be considered counterproductive to the interests of the United States.

Foreign Economic Relations

In chapter 5, I show how bilateral summit meetings may or may not have an indirect influence over economic relations. The argument that presidential summit meetings can signal U.S. foreign policy interest and through this potential market stability to investors/traders is only supported by evidence in case of U.S. bilateral trade relations with, but not in case of foreign direct investment to developing countries. Slightly higher than 2% growth in trade can be discerned after a summit, however, this increase is led by U.S. export to developing nations rather than U.S. import from these countries. This finding is especially important as it shows that developing states that seek to alter existing trade relations and try to reach a more advantageous balance of payment vis-à-vis the United States are unlikely to succeed. The irony is that U.S. firms are better equipped to

penetrate markets than businesses in developing states due to both larger availability of information about these markets and a wider variety of products to sell. These results echo the findings of chapter 4 in that summits are better in keeping the existing order of economic relations rather than altering them especially when power inequality is so great between the U.S. and the meeting state.

Summits, however, do not cause further vulnerability in the economies of developing states; at worst these meetings expose the already existing market disadvantages by putting the country in the limelight. Despite the increasing negative balance of payment, these developing countries still gain the chance to import goods, services, or resources that are vital for the everyday life of their people and/or to make their production more competitive through, for example, modernizing their means of production. Yet, it is undeniable that meeting state heads of state/government are better off with putting their efforts into obtaining foreign aid, rather than advertising the market opportunities in their states.

Trade is also relatively flexible and, therefore, traders are more willing to venture into business that might not have long-term viability: if they are capable of selling goods only for a few years in a country it was already worth it. Moreover, due to the financial guarantee that modern banking practices can give them, they may successfully insulate themselves against loss in case of war or trade embargo against the country of their trading partner. However, once they have made their decisions, foreign direct investors need a long time until their investment returns their costs and starts bringing in profit. They remove their capital quickly from these markets, either, as factories and machines cannot be moved or sold in a few hours. Therefore, summit meetings are not sufficient

cues for them to find a market for their investment: they want a more substantial commitment and potentially protection from the United States against domestic and international political turmoil

Lastly, foreign aid is the economic process over which the American president has the greatest personal influence through the executive branch's active involvement in budgetary planning. Therefore, it is natural that summit meetings have the strongest impact on U.S. foreign aid allocation including both the decisions to give aid and how much aid to give. Some differences between practices of military and economic aid provision have been uncovered: developing nations are more likely to get and receive a larger amount of military than economic aid after their summit meetings with the American president. This suggests that when it comes to summit meetings the willingness to accept America's leading (military) role in the world and, thus, the existing international order is more fruitful than challenging the dominant (economic) position of the United States and quite possibly to interstate relations in general.

Implications for Heads of State and Government

While U.S. presidential summits have not proved the most significant factor in determining presidential popularity at home, bilateral political relations, bilateral trade volumes with, or U.S. foreign aid to the meeting state, they have proved consistently significant in their impact over these issues. Beyond this, the most consistent finding across all chapters is the change – a decrease – in the influence of presidential summit meetings after the end of the Cold War.

It seems that with regards to summit meetings the only reaction American presidents have had to the changed international circumstances is attending more summits. From a socialization point of view it makes sense: the growing number of states and the growing number of eligible states means that U.S. presidents need to reach out to more state leaders to propagate the rules and norms of the world order. In addition, the main finding that summits have a positive impact on domestic, international political and economic relations of the United States can be tempting for presidents to go to summits more often. However, more summits might not be the solution, as this seems to limit the usefulness of this foreign policy tool: with the increase of the number of meetings the impact of summits declines. Furthermore, institutional and especially multilateral summits have always been less influential than bilateral ones, but their utility has decreased further with the end of the Cold War. Therefore, it would be worth reconsidering the role, the agenda, and the use of summit meetings to keep it as a beneficial foreign policy tool. It is so because it is in the interest of every decision-maker to keep their foreign policy toolkit as wide-ranging as possible in order to maintaining flexibility in carrying out their foreign policy.

As for heads of state and government of meetings states, they can also positively benefit from meeting with the American president (and the potential domestic impact of these summits have not yet been studied in their case!): improvement in bilateral relations is beneficial for them as well. However, leaders of developing states should be aware that the resulting increased U.S. export to their state can have a negative impact on their economies – and that they might need to introduce other measures to promote the economic competitiveness of their local business. They should also refrain from

expecting to influence American capital to be invested in their economies via a summit meeting with the U.S. president. Rather, it seems a good idea to lobby most where the summit process can be economically more fruitful and include a request for foreign aid in their negotiations.

Future Research

As this has been the first systematic attempt at understanding the nature of presidential summit meetings there are many avenues available for future research. I would like to point to three directions here.

First, the impact of these summit meetings should be further studied. On the one hand, it means expanding on this research. With regards to the domestic impact, research should build on the facts that people learn about summits because the media reports these events and that Brody (1991) shows how the media can modify the impact of events on presidential popularity. Therefore, the role that the media plays regarding summit diplomacy and presidential approval ratings is worth investigating in the future.

As for the international impact, one of the biggest limitations of this research comes from the fact that the post-Cold War period stretches over no more than 10 years. These years are also the most volatile period of transformation from one international political and economic order to another. Therefore, as data on the control variables becomes available, the analysis should be extended in time and see if, for example, 9/11 brought any changes to the role that summit meetings play in international politics.

Second, related but new terrains of analyses should also be pursued. This project disregards what actually happened at each individual summit. While it is a rather research

intensive task, collection of data on the topics discussed at summit meetings, the salience of these issues, the opinions expressed, and (dis)agreements that emerged could enrich the understanding of these meetings. On the one hand, it would allow for a more subtle understanding of the economic impact of only those summit meetings where either of the parties hoped to achieve economic objectives and/or economic issues were discussed. On the other hand, investigating the effectiveness of summits would shed light on new aspects with regards to the summit process. For example, comparing the results to the agenda of the meeting and with the objectives of participating leaders could help in understanding more about the success and failure of summits.

On the other hand, this dissertation has ventured into examining the consequences of summit meetings. However, researchers also need to focus on the determinants of these meetings. There are many ideas in the literature that would make summits more or less likely: the large number of summits with allies, priority toward democratic states especially in the post-Cold War period, electoral cycles in both the United States and the meeting state, and so on. Studying this aspect of summit meetings can also help improve on examining their impact: the selection of a head of state/government for a summit meeting ultimately can influence what can or cannot be achieved at that meeting, and thus, what impact those meetings might or might not have.

Lastly, summit diplomatic events other than summit meetings also deserve attention. Presidential phone conversations, written correspondence, hotline messages, or email exchanges do not yield easily to large-N quantitative research, but this should not discourage researchers. Qualitative approaches can undoubtedly enrich the understanding

of summit diplomacy and they should be employed in order to advance our knowledge of these forms of summitry as well.

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